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ABSTRACT 
 Research examining the long-term impacts of federal interventions under the Civil 
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act on correctional institutions has been scant.  The 
result has been a failure to understand the sustainability of reforms aimed at protecting 
the civil rights of confined persons.  This dissertation examined the long-term reforms at 
the Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections following a consent decree with the U.S. 
Department of Justice from 2004 to 2007.  Interviews were conducted with current and 
former ADJC employees, juvenile justice advocates across Arizona, and county court 
representatives to determine how each of these groups perceived the status of the reforms 
at the ADJC.   
 The findings of the current dissertation suggest that long-term reforms following 
consent decrees imposed on correctional institutions are possible.  At the ADJC, the 
methods for securing the reform required that the agency reform its culture, implement a 
Quality Assurance process, revamp the Investigations and Inspections unit at the agency, 
and consider the perspectives of external agencies.  One of the primary reasons why the 
department has been committed to making these reforms is because of the perceived loss 
of legitimacy and resources that would occur if they failed to reform.  Such a failure for 
the agency could have potentially resulted in a closure of the agency.  However, the 
increase in punitive and preventive policies used to enforce the reforms may have 
negative repercussions on the organizational culture in the long term.  Policy implications 
for future CRIPA consent decrees are outlined, limitations are addressed, and suggestions 
for future research are made. 
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Chapter 1 
Statement of the Problem 
America’s prisons and jails have long been viewed as having poor conditions.  
Formed in large part as a response to increasing social disorder (e.g. crime, minority 
group threat), institutions of confinement allowed for the spread of formal social controls 
aimed at both punishment and reform (Rothman, 1971).  Many early institutions were 
founded under the guise that they would provide “benevolent reform,” where criminals 
and delinquents would adopt ethics and values, but in reality they provided “benevolent 
repression” (Pisciotta, 1994).  Instead of humane treatment, criminals were subject to 
“ineffective and brutal prisons which did not provide kindly reform” (p. 5).  
Rehabilitative programs (e.g. religious, job skills, educational) aimed at reform were 
viewed by managers merely as “tokens,” as they were more focused on confinement.  In 
the end, the reform movement failed at creating institutions that provided rehabilitation, 
but it did allow for the expansion of social control by way of incapacitation. 
It quickly became clear that confinement had adverse consequences that 
conflicted with the goals of humanizing the treatment of criminals.  While prisons were 
portrayed publicly as places of reform with minimal physical punishments, the reality 
was that mistreatment ran rampant in institutions.  Reports indicate that the earliest 
institutions of confinement were wrought with harsh conditions, such as physical abuse 
by correctional administrators, inmate riots, crowding, poor sanitary conditions, limited 
amounts of food, and poor medical care (Jacobs, 1978; Pisciotta, 1994).  Despite these 
problems, institutionalization increased because “confinement was simply too convenient 
a solution to social problems” (Rothman, 1971, p. xxxv).  Although they typically started 
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out orderly, clean, and resembled early visions of ideal prisons, rarely did these 
conditions persist (Lewis, 1922).  Beginning in the mid-19
th
 century, institutions 
experienced severe declines in conditions, growing increasingly disordered, crowded, and 
corrupt.  Subsequent efforts at correctional reform focused on rehabilitation proved 
ineffective, in large part because poor conditions and a focus on incapacitation 
undermined these efforts (Walker, 1998).   
Harsh correctional conditions, resulting in the deprivation of civil rights, have 
continued well into the 21
st
 century.  In many respects, modern correctional facilities 
resemble their early counterparts with respect to the physical structure of buildings, 
activities provided to inmates, and inmate violence (Pisciotta, 1994; Singer, 1971).  Just a 
few examples of the violations that have been brought to light recently include: holding 
inmates for days after their acquittals in Washington, D.C. (Wilber, 2011); use of 
excessive force towards inmates in Los Angeles County jails (Faturechi and Leonard, 
2012); failure to provide air conditioning in Texas state prisons, leading to indoor 
temperatures over 120 degrees in one facility (Fernandez, 2012); rat and bug infestations 
in one Illinois prison (Rushton, 2012); and the sexual abuse of females in California 
prisons (Gottesdiener, 2011).  When correctional institutions are plagued with poor 
conditions like these and deprive inmates of their civil rights, one remedy has been for 
the federal government to force compliance through consent decrees (i.e. negotiated 
settlements) and lawsuits.  In order to lift a consent decree or satisfy a lawsuit, the agency 
must first make the necessary changes.  The focus of the current dissertation is what 
happens after agencies come into compliance and are no longer under the watch of 
federal monitors.  In other words, do consent decrees and lawsuits result in long-term, 
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sustainable changes?  The following section will discuss the impact that poor correctional 
conditions can have on individuals, re-entry outcomes, and state responses; and will then 
transition into how the federal government has responded to the mistreatment of confined 
persons. 
 
Impacts of Poor Correctional Conditions 
One conditional issue that has consistently been problematic in institutions is 
overcrowding.  Among the 50 largest jails in the country, nearly 20% experienced 
overcrowding in 2010, down from 38% in 2008 (Minton, 2011).  Overcrowding has been 
particularly concerning because it has been linked to institutional misconduct, 
psychological harm to inmates, and negative outcomes upon release (Huey and McNulty, 
2005; Jan, 1980; Megargee, 1977; Paulus, Cox, McCain, and Chandler 1975).  For 
example, one study of 1,400 inmates nationwide found that higher levels of prison 
crowding was related to increased suicides and deaths in prison (McCain, Cox, and 
Paulus, 1980).  Other research suggests that overcrowding in prisons leads to other forms 
of misconduct such as riots and escapes (Jan, 1980; Wooldredge, Griffin, and Pratt, 
2001).  Similar findings have been found in juvenile institutions, where overcrowding 
contributes to suicidal behavior among juveniles, staff assaults, and escapes (Burrell, 
1998; Parent et al., 1994).   
Research now suggests that poor conditions during incarceration can influence 
reentry, although findings have been mixed.  It has been argued that:  
a setting less prone to encourage rehabilitation than a building which is 
disintegrating before the very eyes of its inmates is hard to imagine.  Moreover, 
these old buildings were constructed with a view of imprisonment that is no 
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longer accepted or acceptable; they are composed of elements which increase the 
suffering of the individual and accomplish nothing toward his eventual 
resocialization. (Singer, 1971, 373) 
 
A small body of research suggests that inmates housed in poor conditions are more likely 
to recidivate upon reentry (Chen and Shapiro, 2007; Jonson, 2010; Puritz and Scali, 
1998a).  Other factors such as too much control over inmates (Chen and Shapiro, 2007) 
and overcrowding (Farrington and Nuttall, 1980; Feldman, Wodarski, Flax, and 
Goodman, 1973) can further harm reentry.  The influence of correctional conditions on 
reentry is especially concerning considering the increases in correctional populations over 
the past forty years (Petersilia, 2003; Pratt, 2009).  In addition to the direct impacts on 
inmates, conditions of confinement can also have macro-level influences on state crime 
control. 
 In response to poor conditions of confinement, some states have made sweeping 
reforms.  For example, in response to persistent overcrowding in California prisons, 
Governor Jerry Brown was forced to realign the state’s prison structure.  Multiple 
lawsuits in 2006 alleged that the state failed to provide satisfactory health care for 
inmates (Golaszewski, 2011).  Following a judicial requirement to reduce overcrowding 
by 2011, the state was still overcrowded by over 34,000 inmates.  To ease the burdens of 
overcrowding and comply with the lawsuits, the adult prison system was realigned 
(Turner, 2011).  In other words, the burden of confining and supervising prisoners was 
shifted onto counties because low-level offenders were relocated back to counties.  
Similar correctional reforms have also been considered in Illinois (Okon, 2012) and New 
York (New York State Executive Budget, 2012).  These severe correctional reforms 
highlight the seriousness of housing inmates in inhumane conditions. 
  
5 
 
 
 Despite the negative conditions and deprivation of civil liberties reported in many 
correctional institutions, the nation has grown increasingly reliant on confinement to 
control adult and juvenile crime.  Growing correctional populations over the past thirty 
years demonstrate the reach of social control in the United States.  Since the 1980s, there 
has been nearly a 300% increase in the number of adults in/on prison, jail, probation, or 
parole (Glaze, 2011).  Despite a .3% decrease in the prison population in 2010, the first 
decrease in prisoners since the 1970s (Guerino, Harrison, and Sabol, 2011), it is evident 
that correctional controls are unlikely to significantly decline in the near future.  With 
over 7 million persons under some form of correctional supervision and an incarceration 
rate of 743 per 100,000 persons, no other country has a higher incarceration rate than the 
U.S. (Walmsley, 2011).  Similarly high rates of incapacitation are also exhibited in the 
juvenile justice system.  Although the number of confined juveniles has decreased since 
the 1990s, there are currently over 70,000 juveniles committed to some form of 
supervised care (Sickmund, Sladky, Kang, and Puzzanchera, 2011).  In sum, the 
expansion of formal social control has increasingly brought adults and juveniles into a 
correctional system that has resulted in centuries of depriving individuals of their civil 
rights, housing them in poor conditions, and negatively impacting successful reentry.   
 
Responding to Deprivations of Civil Rights 
Concerns over mistreatment, abuse, poor housing conditions, and overall 
deprivations of civil rights have led the federal government to step in to force reforms 
upon adult and juvenile correctional institutions (Jacobs, 1974).  In 1980, the enactment 
of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA) allowed the U.S. 
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Department of Justice (DOJ) to independently initiate lawsuits against state and local 
facilities for confinement institutions that violated the civil rights of confined persons 
(Holt, 1998).  CRIPA allows the Attorney General to initiate an investigation when it is 
suspected that there are “egregious or flagrant conditions which deprive such persons of 
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of 
the United States causing such persons to suffer grievous harm, and that such deprivation 
is pursuant to a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of such rights, 
privileges, or immunities” (42 U.S.C. § 1997).  The DOJ can then sue those overseeing 
institutions that deprive individuals of civil liberties to force compliance.   
In a CRIPA investigation, typically an institution is brought to the attention of the 
DOJ through either newspaper reports or complaints by employees, family members, or 
community advocates (Barczyk and Davis, 2009).  If there is sufficient cause for concern 
that there is a pattern of persons being deprived of their rights, experts are hired to 
investigate conditions at the facilities (42 U.S.C. § 1997).  The DOJ then has the option to 
either file a lawsuit to force the changes or to allow the agency to voluntarily comply and 
make the necessary changes (i.e. enter into a consent decree).   
The responses of the Justice Department to institutions that deprive individuals of 
civil rights have not been without criticism (Cornwell, 1988; Dinerstein, 1984; National 
Council on Disability, 2005).  Many of the criticisms were raised during the initial years 
of CRIPA and pertained primarily to the failure of the Justice Department to initiate 
litigation to restore the rights of inmates.  Other concerns have persisted including the 
length of time it takes to complete investigations, the length of time to achieve 
compliance, sporadic monitoring during consent decrees, and the failure to provide 
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oversight after an agency is in compliance with the conditions of confinement.  This latter 
point is particularly relevant, as some community advocates have expressed concerns that 
after a consent decree is lifted or litigation is resolved, the Justice Department no longer 
has the authority to oversee conditions.  This means that institutional conditions may 
potentially decline after a federal intervention, yet go unnoticed because of a false sense 
of security post-reform.  Because of this, it is important to examine how and why 
organizations maintain reforms. 
 Sherman (1978) posits that three questions need to be addressed when explaining 
how organizations become deviant and respond to reforms.  These include: 1.) What 
conditions led to the deviance, 2.) What were the conditions surrounding the 
implementation of the social control against the organization, and 3.) What were the 
consequences of external social controls being placed on the agency?  Although the first 
two questions are addressed to an extent in the current dissertation, the primary focus is 
the latter question of the outcomes of external influences on organizations.  This question 
is examined through the lens of institutional theory.  Meyer and Rowan (1977) suggest 
that organizations strive to appear legitimate to their external environments because they 
are dependent on their environment to provide needed resources for survival.  These 
dependencies then force organizations to adopt structures and practices because of their 
need to appear legitimate to their environment.   
In the case of CRIPAs, the initiation of a consent decree or lawsuit against a 
correctional institution may result, for example, in a loss of legitimacy by agencies 
external to the institution.  Harms that may potentially result because an institution has 
deprived the civil rights of inmates include: loss of agency funding by state governments, 
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loss of grants by external agencies, being required to pay for monitors to investigate the 
agency, having to pay litigation fees if the CRIPA lawsuit is contested, and a decline in 
the number of inmates because counties are unwilling to send inmates to inhumane 
facilities.  In correctional agencies where resources are all too often spread thin, these can 
serve as serious penalties that will likely be avoided in order to ensure “organizational 
survival.”  In other words, the organization responds to coercive isomorphism, where 
external pressures force the institution to adopt other policies of institutions that are 
viewed as legitimate (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  One way to ensure “organizational 
survival” would then be to agree to a negotiated settlement with the DOJ, make the 
changes required by the DOJ, and maintain those changes to prevent future litigation 
against the agency.  The institution would then demonstrate to their environment that 
reforms are occurring to comply with federal standards of correctional care, signaling that 
the agency seeks legitimacy.  Agencies that resist reforms may then be sued to force the 
changes to occur and perceptions of legitimacy may decline.   
A second explanation as to why correctional institutions successfully reform 
because of external pressures is the impact that the resulting internal controls may have 
on the agency. Sherman (1978) suggested that deterrence theory could explain how in 
response to external forces, organizations will implement internal controls.  Similar to the 
specific and general deterrent effects that punishments can have on individuals (Gendreau 
and Ross, 1981), organizations may also be deterred from deviance (Rottig, Koufteros, 
and Umphress, 2011; Talaulicar, 2011; Trevino, 1992).  Sherman found that police 
departments that experienced scandals in the early 1970s respond in two ways to deter 
future organizational corruption—preventive (i.e. removing opportunities for corruption) 
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and punitive (i.e. punishing officers) controls.  Specifically, he studied the effects of two 
preventive control strategies on deterring misconduct: changing organizational practices 
(i.e. internal accountability, tight supervision, abolition of corrupting procedures) and 
changing the environment (i.e. task and political environments).  Punitive controls took 
the shape of detection (i.e. intelligence was gathered from citizens, police, and internal 
policing units), investigations, and sanctions.  Police departments that implemented 
punitive and preventive controls were more effective than those without such controls.  
However, it remains unclear if a correctional institution responding to similar 
circumstances would have similar outcomes.   
 Chanin (2012) recently examined the sustainability of reforms following consent 
decrees with the Justice Department.  He argued that sustainability is the most critical 
aspect of these interventions.  His examination of four police departments reforming use 
of force practices shed light on factors that led to the institutionalization of change (e.g. 
leadership and commitment) and those that hindered effective reform (e.g. lack of 
external accountability, limited external support).  Chanin posited that four factors are 
critical for understanding sustainability of reforms including: “the process and substance 
of the reform effort, as well as organizational and environmental contexts” (p. 281).  In 
other words, the requirements outlined in the consent decree, the process of reform, 
organizational context, and the environment of the organization all shape the 
institutionalization of change in police departments.   
 Similarly, reforms made through CRIPA related interventions do not occur in a 
vacuum.  Correctional agencies that are investigated and forced to reform typically have 
deprived inmates of civil liberties for years.  Whether these problems are the result of a 
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poor staff culture, factors external to the agency (e.g. political climate in state, economy), 
the failure of administrators to effectively manage the agency, and/or other factors that 
result in conditions so severe that they warrant a federal investigation, it is critical to 
account for the background of organizations for understanding responses to consent 
decrees.  The result is that an agency marred by failures is required to make changes 
quickly under the eye of federal monitors.   
After a few short years, most agencies are no longer under federal monitor and are 
not under any external oversight.  What happens behind closed doors after the cessation 
of monitoring could then be the full adherence to the consent decree, a complete 
abandonment of these reforms, or somewhere in between.  In other words, it is unclear 
whether organizations that face CRIPA investigations will be reformed over the long 
term.  It would only be until problems are again brought to the attention of the federal 
government that the cycle would begin again of forcing compliance with a consent 
decree, improving conditions, and then leaving an agency without oversight.   
A closer examination of reforms made through CRIPA is important for multiple 
reasons.  First, the failure to extensively examine the sustainability of reforms is 
concerning because institutionalizing change is arguably the most important aspect of 
consent decrees (Chanin, 2012).  Second, in addition to the financial costs that are 
expended to employ litigators, conduct investigations, and proceed with litigation, there 
are also severe social costs for housing individuals in conditions where they are deprived 
of their civil liberties.  Third, the protection of the civil rights of confined persons is of 
less concern to the public because they are perceived as more deserving of punishment 
(Garland, 2001; Rychlak, 1990).  As a result, institutionalized persons are vulnerable to 
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abuse and physical coercion and are dependent on their custodians for all aspects of care 
(Marquart, 1986; Stojkovic, 2007; Sykes, 1958).  Finally, the conditions of institutions 
can also impact reentry outcomes (Jonson, 2010), further justifying the importance of 
maintaining reforms that improve facilities.  The fact that the conditions of countless 
correctional institutions have been subpar at the same time that the incarceration rate is 
increasing suggests that the maintenance of housing conditions and civil rights have been 
neglected in favor of expanding social control.  
Prior research has examined the historical foundations of institutions, abuse 
directed at inmates, the deprivation of civil rights of confined persons, and the lasting 
harms confinement has upon reentry have been examined in depth, yet rarely are the 
mechanisms for changing institutional conditions addressed.  Scant research exists as to 
how consent decrees reform criminal justice agencies (Chanin, 2012).  Studies examining 
CRIPA have been largely historical in nature (Plotkin, Davison, and Kaufman, 1989; 
Puritz and Scali, 1998a), been limited to the initial formation of CRIPA in the 1980s 
(Holt, 1998), focused on the confinement of those with disabilities (Dinerstein, 1989; 
National Council on Disability, 2005), or reported on the process of implementation 
(Barczyk and Davis, 2009).  Furthermore, none has examined the institutionalization of a 
consent decree resulting from CRIPA for any significant amount of time after a consent 
decree has been lifted.  This has left a gap in the understanding of if and how changes are 
sustained.  Filling this knowledge gap is important to those tasked with initiating lawsuits 
(e.g. DOJ), those responsible for monitoring the progress of an agency during a consent 
decree, and correctional administrators charged with overseeing the protection of civil 
rights to ensure that reforms are institutionalized. 
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The current dissertation will extend our understanding of CRIPA in two ways.  In 
line with Chanin (2012) and Sherman’s (1978) frameworks for evaluating the 
institutionalization of reforms in police departments this dissertation first describes the 
implementation of one CRIPA intervention from multiple perspectives, including 
correctional administrators, line level staff, community advocates, and detention 
administrators.  The requirements outlined in the consent decree and the process of 
implementation will be examined from the perspective of each of these groups.  Second, 
the current dissertation addresses those factors that encourage either sustainability of the 
conditions of the CRIPA or impede its institutionalization.  More specifically, this 
dissertation addresses both external (e.g. pressures to appear legitimate, dependence upon 
external agencies for resources) and internal (e.g. staff culture, punitive controls, 
preventive controls) forces that influence sustainability of change in a correctional 
agency.   
Few states have been subject to more than four CRIPA investigations.  Arizona is 
one such state, with investigations having occurred in prisons, jails, and juvenile justice 
facilities, which makes it an attractive location to examine the sustainability of consent 
decrees.  One agency, the Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections (ADJC), was 
formed following a consent decree with the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) to 
remedy abuses of confined juveniles.  To avoid a formal lawsuit, responsibility for 
confining and treating juveniles was shifted from ADC to ADJC.  ADJC then endured 
years of monitoring to improve conditions and insure that the rights of juveniles were not 
violated.  Shortly after the cessation of the consent decree and monitoring by external 
agents, new problems began to surface.  Three youth committed suicide in ADJC 
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institutions and local news agencies reported that staff were sexually abusing juveniles, 
juveniles were held in solitary confinement for months at a time, educational services 
were lacking, and youth were being deprived basic rights such as using the bathroom.  
Taken together, the poor conditions immediately following the first consent decree 
suggest that the ADJC might not have fully institutionalized the changes of the consent 
decree.  Sustaining change at the Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections (ADJC) 
after federal monitoring and a consent decree are the focus of the current study.    
As will be discussed in greater depth, the troubled history of the ADJC eventually 
led to federal involvement, the implementation of a consent decree, and an agency that 
was forced to change how it cared for juveniles.  The question now is, was the ADJC able 
to effectively reform as a direct result of the CRIPA?  If so, what led to successful agency 
reform?  If not, what prevented the agency from successful reform?  A case study 
research design was employed, consisting of a review of newspaper articles, government 
documents, and semi-structured interviews with 47 respondents.  These included current 
and former ADJC employees, community advocates, and detention administrators.  
Participants were interviewed regarding the conditions leading to intervention, changes 
during the CRIPA investigation, their perceptions of conditions five years after the 
consent decree was lifted, and factors that influenced the implementation of changes. 
The current study expands on prior research on organizational reform by directly 
examining the sustainability of changes made in correctional facilities as a result of 
lawsuits under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA).  The 
overarching questions guiding the dissertation is: Does federal involvement requiring 
correctional reforms produce long-term, sustainable change?  If changes are made, how 
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are they accomplished and how deeply embedded are they within the agency?  The study 
is couched in a framework that considers both how organizational needs to maintain 
legitimacy in the environment are necessary for survival and the deterrent effects of 
internal controls that are imposed on line level staff by management to ensure successful 
reforms.  In regard to the latter, a specific focus is paid to the punitive and preventive 
methods of control that are imposed subsequent to federal lawsuits.  Recommendations 
will be made for both the implementation of future consent decrees and future research 
examining sustainability of reforms.   
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
This chapter begins by examining the evolution of formal social control in the 
United States since the 19
th
 century.  The purpose of this section is to outline the 
historical roots of control and punishment to provide context for a later discussion of 
more modern forms of social control over individuals and organizations.  It begins by 
addressing how incapacitation became the response to crime, eventually leading to 
societal dissatisfaction with conditions of confinement, followed by a formal 
governmental response to abuses in institutions to encourage reforms.   
 The chapter then shifts to the institutionalization of reforms by organizations.  
When changes are made either proactively or reactively in organizations, multiple factors 
will influence the long-term outcomes of such reforms.  The impact that external and 
internal influences, along with the implementation of policies, have on institutionalizing 
reforms are addressed.   
 The chapter concludes by examining a specific policy aimed at reforming 
institutions of confinement, The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980 
(CRIPA).  The events leading up to the passing of the act and initial problems with 
implementation are addressed.  Next critiques made by legal and community advocates of 
CRIPA are examined along with some of the proposed solutions.  The chapter then 
addresses the limitations of previous research on CRIPA and sustaining organizational 
reforms.  
  
16 
 
 
Social Control: Expansion and Consequences 
 Social control is the societal response to individuals who are deemed as 
delinquent or criminal and constrains behaviors through punishments, deterrents, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation (Cohen, 1985).  Forms of social control have evolved in 
multiple ways since the 19
th
 century.  Most notably was the decline of informal controls 
placed on individuals by families, religion, and communities in the early 1800s as the 
population grew and time was increasingly spent away from home (Walker, 1998).  This 
shift meant that these once powerful institutions that restrained behavior were growing 
less influential over individual behaviors.  In response to fear of the weakened influence 
of informal social controls would lead to crime, regulation of behaviors by the 
government became commonplace.  
Prior to the formation of prisons, one method of formally controlling individual 
behaviors was physical punishment (e.g. whippings, beatings, torture, and hangings).  
Over time, physical punishments waned as efforts to ‘humanize’ the system took hold 
(Foucault, 1979).  The shift towards more humane treatment of criminals was then 
coupled with the growing sentiment that the social institutions that controlled individuals 
were breaking down (Rothman, 1971).  It was feared that as communities grew larger, 
social bonds would be weakened and lead to crime.  These two national sentiments 
largely contributed to the desire to seek out new solutions for criminals and delinquents. 
 Prisons, jails, and asylums eventually became the solution to dealing with difficult 
populations in society (Rothman, 1971; Walker, 1998).  While this has not always been 
the case, incapacitation has become an accepted form of crime control.  One explanation 
for the growth of incarceration is the decline of informal social control, although it is 
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unclear exactly why incapacitation was thought to be the best solution to this issue.  
Perceptions existed that the weakened controls of families, communities, and schools in a 
changing society would result in social disorganization (Garland, 1990).  To combat 
growing concerns over crime and disorder, asylums and prisons were the solution despite 
the crowding and inhumane conditions that typically characterized most institutions.   
 For the most part, a consensus has been demonstrated over time regarding the 
character of confinement institutions, whether they are for the mentally ill or criminals 
(Rothman, 1971).  Rothman aptly described seven consistent similarities in institutions 
(i.e. prisons, mental hospitals, reformatories, and almshouses), including: 1.) they are 
used for punishment and/or treatment, 2.) they are similarly designed/organized, 3.) they 
serve to separate inmates and mentally ill from the outside, 4.) time is strictly managed, 
5.) the two primary mechanisms used to transform behaviors were work and isolation, 6.) 
institutions typically started out ordered but over time all spiraled downward and became 
disorganized and crowded, and 7.) they were used to house the lower class.  Among the 
earliest prisons developed in the United States were the Auburn and Pennsylvania Prison 
systems.  The Auburn and Pennsylvania systems differed significantly in their forms of 
incapacitation.  Whereas the former allowed for inmate interactions, the latter required 
inmates to remain in solitary confinement.  Foucault (1979) argues that the initial goals of 
incapacitation surrounded the concept of docility.  It was believed that humans could be 
easily transformed through discipline, thereby making them obedient and docile.  Further 
changes to inmates’ physical appearance, thoughts, and actions would also serve to 
reform criminals.  In other words, the evolution of punishment from physical 
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punishments to incapacitation only served to “change the form but not the aims of social 
control” (Pisciotta, 1994, p. 22).    
A similar expansion of social control also occurred in response to increased 
juvenile delinquency (Fox, 1970; Pisciotta, 1994; Platt, 1969; Schultz, 1973).  A growing 
trend towards incapacitating juveniles was a direct result of shifts from the informal 
controls of families and communities to those of formal control by the government and 
states in the late 1890s.  Platt deemed this period the “child-saving movement,” where a 
group of middle-class women were instrumental in reforming how states responded to 
juvenile delinquents.  The involvement of females in juvenile justice was supported 
because females were viewed as the “natural caretakers” of youths and they could serve 
as social workers.  They perceived juvenile delinquents as less responsible for their 
behavior because they were not as mentally developed as adults.  Furthermore, it was 
believed that reformatories could fix behaviors that were the result of poverty and poor 
environments.  The resulting juvenile justice system was originally formed to be separate 
from the adult system in order to limit the exposure of more hardened criminals to 
youths, prevent labeling of young offenders, and provide youths with a parental figure 
(Feld, 1999).   However, this has changed over the past forty years in response to shifting 
perceptions of juveniles as hardened criminals, so-called “superpredators,” and violent 
offenders.  As a result, responses in the juvenile justice system have also grown 
increasingly punitive.  This has resulted in more youths housed at juvenile correctional 
facilities and transferred from the juvenile to adult systems.   
The resulting formal social controls have since shaped the appearance of crime 
control today.  Pisciotta (1994) states that “the rise of the adult reformatory movement 
  
19 
 
 
resulted in a wider, deeper, stronger, more sophisticated American network of social 
control” (p. 27), which has directly impacted the appearance of modern day corrections.  
This expanded network of social control has been clearly exhibited in the growth of 
incarceration and supervision since the 1970s.  A related issue is the control that is 
present over criminal justice organizations, especially by the federal government.   
 
Criticisms of Expanded Social Control  
Cohen (1985) outlines the push and pull between well intentioned reforms and the 
negative outcomes resulting from such reforms.  He argues that social control reforms 
take three shapes: 1.) reform is the response to the advancing of knowledge, where 
increasing insight into criminal control leads to improved responses to crime, 2.) reform 
is the direct result of changing social conditions, and 3.) reform occurs because of the 
actions made by a select portion of society striving to repress the lower classes under the 
guise that reforms are fairly distributed in society.  One issue complicating many reforms 
is the struggle faced by organizations when attempting to internally implement necessary 
changes while confronted with the external constraints placed upon them.  Over the 
course of time, positive reforms begin to show their flaws and weaknesses, leading to 
new programs and policies based on more recent advances in knowledge and 
understanding of deviance.  Cohen states that “it is not the system’s professed aims which 
are at fault, but their imperfect realization” (p. 18).  The imperfect realization of more 
“humane” treatment for criminals in the 19th century laid the foundation for modern 
practices of confinement.   
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 Questions have lingered as to why incapacitation became the primary mode of 
social control both in the United States and worldwide.  As Rothman (1971) has argued, 
“confinement was simply too convenient a solution for social problems” (p. xxxv).  This 
convenient solution allowed for the perpetuation of an institutional model wrought with 
problems because it served the needs of a society searching for a solution with what to do 
with the insane and criminal.  Additionally, it served an economic function for states, as 
profits were made off of inmate labor and fines (Rusche and Kirchheimer, 1939).  There 
was little evidence that incapacitation was rehabilitative, especially with the mechanisms 
for treatment that were used at the time (Foucault, 1975).  Garland (2001) further 
acknowledges the role that societal shifts in the 1960s had on increasing crime rates and, 
ultimately, the use of incarceration.  His examination of societal transformations in the 
United States and the United Kingdom argued that “late modernity,” or the “distinctive 
pattern of social, economic, and cultural relations that emerged in America…[which] 
brings with it a cluster of risks, insecurities, and control problems that have played a 
crucial role in shaping our changing response to crime” (viii), served to increase crime 
because of increased opportunities, weakened controls, and more “at risk” individuals.  
As a result, individuals and communities were more vulnerable to crime, and stronger 
crime control policies emerged that were rooted in conservative ideologies. 
The tension between liberals who believed that indeterminate sentencing unfairly 
harmed minorities and conservatives who argued that criminals were not being treated 
punitively enough then came to a head following Martinson’s (1974) finding that 
“nothing works” in rehabilitation.  Subsequent sentencing reforms to make sentences 
more punitive and fair led to the rise in incarceration during the 1970s and 1980s.  
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Additionally, concerns over the conditions of confinement (e.g. overcrowding), resulted 
in more prisons being constructed to alleviate problems (Schoenfeld, 2010).  This led to 
an increase in the “state’s capacity and willingness to incarcerate” (p. 733), and 
ultimately contributed to mass incarceration.  The convenient prison solution to merely 
construct more prisons allowed for formal controls of the state to expand.   
 The expansion of social control began to be strongly criticized by social scientists 
and the public in the 1960s (Austin and Krisberg, 1981; Scull, 1977).  Correctional 
reforms had done little to change the goals and practices of incapacitation, as modern day 
prisons still closely resembled their predecessors in many ways (Pisciotta, 1994).  Many 
questioned whether more recent practices in confinement were an improvement over 
early forms of corporal punishment that had once been perceived as cruel and unusual 
(Foucault, 1977; Rothman, 1971).  No longer able to hide under the rhetoric that had been 
concealing what was really happening in prisons, the growing reality that prisons were 
depriving individuals of their civil rights was a large factor in the deinstitutionalization 
movement (Scull, 1981).  Beginning in the 1950s, this movement was a direct result of 
the perception that treatment of the mentally ill in the community was more humane, 
rehabilitative, and, most importantly, cheaper.  The movement also impacted the criminal 
justice system, as it was claimed that prisoners were being mistreated and deprived of 
their civil rights.  Scull argues that “some of the pressure for decarceration has to be 
attributed to the growing willingness of courts, particularly Federal courts, to intervene in 
running of prisons” (p. 37). In contrast to the initial goals of deinstitutionalization efforts 
(e.g. community corrections, diversion programs) to reduce incarceration, this practice 
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actually became another clear example of the growth in formal controls in the 1960s and 
1970s (Scull, 1977).   
As a growing number of individuals were being brought into a failing system, 
there was a newfound interest in developing alternative solutions to incarceration that 
would lessen that nation’s reliance on incapacitation.  The search for alternatives to 
incarceration resulted in the phenomenon of net-widening nationwide (Blomberg, 1977; 
Decker, 1985; Mainprize, 1992).  Net-widening occurs when alternatives to detention or 
incarceration actually result in an increased number of offenders being brought under the 
control of the criminal justice system by allowing more options for punishment.  For 
example, Blomberg’s (1997) evaluation of a juvenile diversion program in the early 
1970s revealed that of those juveniles who would have previously been ineligible for 
punishment, a large number were placed in the diversion program.  In other words, rather 
than reducing the scope of those brought into the juvenile system, the diversion program 
allowed for increased control over delinquents.  Austin and Krisberg (1981) argue that 
searching out alternatives to confinement was an ironic endeavor because the funding for 
such programs was reliant on the government for support.  Ultimately efforts to reform 
the system through community corrections and diversion programs served as alternatives 
at the same time that they served as additional options for the placement of offenders 
(Cohen, 1979). 
A growing reliance on incarceration continued the conditional problems that had 
been exhibited since the earliest prisons.  The following section will address such issues 
and explore reasons why they have continued despite their harms to inmates.  This will 
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then lead into a review of how organizations, specifically correctional institutions, 
respond to formal social controls to improve conditions and restore civil rights.  
 
The Reality of Confinement Conditions 
 One of the primary contributors to the expansion and acceptance of formal 
controls nationwide has been the gap between rhetoric and reality (Feld, 1990; Giardino, 
1996; Greene and Mastrofski, 1988; Morris and Hawkins, 1970; Phelps, 2011; Pisciotta, 
1985).  When correctional practices based on false rhetoric are legitimated or justified, 
future “generation[s] could resort to [them] without especial difficulty” (Rothman, 1971, 
p. 255).  This trend has resulted in a “legitimation despite failure” of poor policies and 
practices in jails, prisons, and juvenile facilities that have severe ramifications for the 
criminal justice system.  It is especially problematic when “fully and clearly defined 
purposes become the foundation for decisions and coherent policies” (Christy, 1994, p. 
110).  In other words, the creation and/or continuation of policies based upon incorrect 
“facts” contribute to the continuation of a system that may in fact be broken.   
 As the reach of formal social controls in the 1800s spread throughout the country, 
so too did reports of poor treatment.  Pisciotta (1985, 1994) outlines some of the most 
notable cases of inmate abuse and inhumane conditions reported in juvenile facilities and 
prisons in the 19
th
 century.  The first was the Elmira Correctional Facility in Elmira, New 
York, which was investigated by the Board of Charities in 1893 over claims that the 
warden had allowed for poor conditions of confinement and had mismanaged the staff.  
These reports brought to light exactly how inmates were physically punished, tortured, 
and isolated, which was a surprise to the public who had been led astray by the warden.  
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It was recommended that the prison make severe changes to improve the conditions of 
the facility.  However, the warden was opposed to this reform and was able again use 
rhetoric to convince the public that the prior methods were necessary (New York State 
Board of Social Welfare, 1894).  Pisciotta’s examination of the New York House of 
Refuge for juveniles from the 1850s to 1930s revealed similar findings regarding the gap 
between rhetoric and reality.  His review of practices demonstrated that the juveniles 
were being used for “cheap labor,” not treated from a parental perspective, deprived of 
basic necessities, and improperly classified, all of which were in contrast to the policies 
the facility reportedly espoused.  The “brutal” conditions that were characteristic of 
confinement in the facility led Pisciotta to characterize it as a prison rather than a house 
of refuge for rehabilitating juveniles.  In addition to correctional facilities, insane asylums 
at the time were unable to live up to the rhetoric of treatment and rehabilitation 
(Rothman, 1971).   
 Many of these inhumane conditions exist to this day.  Pisciotta (1994) has argued 
that: 
Contemporary correctional institutions continue to experience many of the same 
problems which undermined late nineteenth- and early twentieth- century social 
control efforts.  Many institutions are still overcrowded, underfunded, and in poor 
structural condition (witness the continued use of the Auburn and Sing Sing 
Prisons).  Correctional facilities are still plagued by the defects of total 
institutions, the limitations of the medical model (‘tinkering science’), and the 
problem of prisoner resistance (violence, gangs, riots, drugs, theft, smuggling, 
arson, predatory sex, and suicide). (p. 153) 
 
More recent reports confirm that factors like overcrowding, a lack of resources, and 
resistance of staff (Green, 2010; Massachusetts Department of Correction, 2012; 
Muradyan, 2008) still contribute to inmate harms like sexual abuse (Beck and Harrison, 
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2010; Zweig and Blackmore, 2008) and an increased suicide risk (Dye, 2010; Hayes, 
2009).  Facilities where inmates have experienced past violence and/or have a poor staff 
culture reportedly also have a greater number of inmates who fear for their safety while 
incarcerated (Wolff and Shi, 2009).  Excessive overcrowding, which contributed to an 
increased risk for violence, the inability to control inmates, and deteriorating physical 
conditions of facilities, recently led one state to declare an emergency proclamation to 
improve conditions (Schwarzenegger, 2006).  Although poor conditions do not 
characterize all correctional facilities, the culmination of reports since the 19
th
 century are 
indicative of a pattern of misconduct and disorder in institutions for confinement. 
 The poor conditions exhibited in the Massachusetts Department of Youths 
Services (DYS) system famously led to the closure of the Massachusetts State Training 
Schools in the early 1970s in what was later termed the “Massachusetts Experiment” 
(Miller, 1998).  Jerome Miller, the Commissioner of the DYS, was concerned over the 
high rates of staff abuse against youths, escapes of juveniles, improper confinement, and 
the failure of staff in the training schools to provide rehabilitative programs.  Despite 
concerted efforts by Miller to reform the agency, he quickly realized he would be unable 
to overcome the poor culture exhibited by staff.  In response, Miller closed the large 
training schools in favor of small, decentralized group homes across the state.  While 
many of the group homes were unsuccessful and were eventually shut down, Miller’s 
“experiment” signified a growing concern over how juveniles in confinement were being 
treated. 
It is clear that both past and present efforts aimed at controlling crime have caused 
new harms to confined persons, as a growing number of individuals are incarcerated and 
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deprived of their civil liberties while incarcerated.  As a result of harsh conditions that 
harm confined persons, controls must then be placed on correctional facilities to maintain 
proper standards of care.  In other words, agents of social control may have formal 
external controls imposed upon them to achieve compliance with national standards of 
care.  The responses of organizations to forced reform will then shape their ability to 
maintain long-term changes.  The following section presents an overview of social 
control in organizations, with a specific focus on the factors influencing restraint from 
deviance and that encourage the institutionalization of reforms. 
 
Control in Organizations 
  The previous sections have outlined the evolution of formal social controls in the 
criminal justice system and how the expansion of control over individuals has led to the 
acceptance and practice of incarceration as the response to criminal behavior.  However, 
it has been argued that “we have been concerned with hidden deviance of individuals and 
not with the visible deviance of organizations” (Reiss, 1966, p. 18).  The overreliance on 
confinement and subsequent mistreatment of inmates eventually led to federal and state 
responses to control organizational deviance.  Reports of the deprivation of civil liberties 
of confined persons now demonstrate that harms to society are committed not only by 
individuals, but also by organizations empowered with control over criminals (Vaughan, 
1983).  Public dissatisfaction with criminal justice agencies then contributed to the 
“impotence” of the system (Austin and Krisberg, 1981).  As violations of civil liberties 
and abuses in prisons became public knowledge, support waned for the correctional 
system and grew for inmates and criminals.  In a direct response to the poor conditions of 
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confinement characterizing many institutions across the country, the federal government 
intervened to force the upholding of civil liberties of confined persons. 
Social controls in organizations are mechanisms that regulate behaviors to 
encourage conformity of individuals within organizations and organizations as a whole 
(Ermann and Lundman, 1978).  They may be exerted both externally and internally on 
organizations similar to the social controls that are placed on individuals (Hirschi, 1969; 
Sherman, 1978).  Whereas individuals are controlled internally by their consciences and 
social environments, so too are organizations by individuals within an organization who 
encourage conformity.  Likewise, individuals who are no longer controlled internally and 
who violate social norms will be punished externally by formal agencies, just as 
organizations may be punished for violations by outside agencies.  One way that 
organizations can become deviant is when individuals within the organization become 
corrupt (e.g. corruption of officers in a police department).  In response, “the organization 
undergoes some organizational transformation as a consequence and some of its members 
are removed from their office or position, even indicted and perhaps sentenced” (Reiss, 
1966, p. 14).   
 All organizations are subject to external controls (e.g. legal, political, economic, 
or cultural) placed upon them that regulate behaviors and operations (Hall, 1972; Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978).  Most of these external organizational controls are the direct result 
of dependencies that organizations have upon their environments (Jacobs, 1974).  
Whether organizations willingly choose or are forced to have external controls placed 
upon them, this is accomplished by other organizations which “have as their primary 
function and purpose the control and alteration of the activities of other organizations” 
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(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, p. 39).  In other words, there is an interdependence at play 
between two organizations that are reliant on one another for successful outcomes.  The 
extent of control is shaped by the dependence of one organization on another for needs 
such as money or social legitimacy.  However, public organizations are controlled by 
more external factors, especially legal and political controls, whereas private 
organizations are constrained more by financial controls (Schiflett and Zey, 1990).   
 Examined in more depth in the later discussion of consent decree implementation, 
a growing body of research now suggests that the external controls placed upon criminal 
justice agencies through court reforms can effectively improve conditions (Chanin, 2012; 
Feely and Rubin, 1998; Nathan, 2004).  Recognizing the harms that continue to occur in 
correctional institutions, the American Bar Association (2008) recommended that, in 
addition to internal controls, outside oversight of correctional facilities should be 
provided to inform the public of institutional conditions.  It is argued that by bringing 
issues to light, changes can be made to improve the quality of care.  They state that such 
external oversight could come from “monitoring by citizens’ groups, accreditation, 
legislative oversight, media access, and special mechanisms for the prosecution of crimes 
committed by correctional staff” (p. 3).   
The internal controls (e.g. organizational policies, managers, norms) of 
organizations are related to and impacted by the external controls (e.g. compliance with 
laws) that are placed upon them to function appropriately.  This relationship can be 
directly influenced by either internal or external organizational changes.  Sherman (1978) 
argues that “one possible consequence of external social control of deviant organizations 
is an increase in internal organizational control of deviant behavior among the 
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organizations members” (p. 28).  Such findings suggest that the success or failure of 
sustaining changes within failing organizations will be dependent on the internal 
responses to external control.  In other words, a high degree of external control may have 
little influence on an organization where the employees are unwilling or unable to reform.  
Internal controls are those that are enforced by supervisors over both staff and 
inmates.  Foucault’s (1975) vision of the Panopticon described this concept when he 
stated that: 
In this central tower, the director may spy on all the employees that he has under 
his orders: nurses, doctors, foremen, teachers, warders; he will be able to judge 
them continuously, alter their behavior, impose upon them the methods he thinks 
best; and it will even be possible to observe the director himself.  An inspector 
arriving unexpectedly at the centre of the Panopticon will be able to judge at a 
glance, without anything being concealed from him, how the entire establishment 
is functioning. (p. 204) 
 
Some scholars report that the key to maintaining order in prisons comes from the top of 
the bureaucratic chain, starting with the warden and other correctional administrators.  
For example, DiIulio (1987) found that “a paramilitary prison bureaucracy, led by able 
institutional managers and steered by a talented executive, may be the best administrative 
response to the problem of establishing and maintaining higher-custody prisons” (p. 256).  
He argues that it is not the prison culture, institutional structure, or staffing practices that 
control prisons, but rather the social controls imposed by administrators.  This control is 
gained through a variety of tactics including “training, policies and procedures, 
supervisory structures, and formal sanctions that can be imposed to ensure conformity” 
(Stojkovic, 2003, p. 219).   
Not all research suggests that extensive internal control leads to conformity, 
instead finding it can have negative consequences (Durkheim, 1897; Reisig, 1998).  For 
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example, Durkheim has argued that because of the integration of individuals in their 
social environments, their environments will serve to regulate behaviors.  Applying a 
framework of integration/regulation to the occurrence of suicide, he argues that the 
overregulation of individuals can cause them to commit suicide because they feel 
oppressed and cannot conform to such regulation.  Correctional institutions may also 
experience similar negative effects when they are excessively controlled.  For example, in 
contrast to DiIulio’s findings, Reisig’s (1998) examination of 11 prisons using control, 
consensus, or responsibility models found that prisons adopting a control model had 
increased disorder when compared with the latter two models.  These findings suggest 
that extensive regulation of officer behaviors by managers is potentially harmful to the 
successful management of prisons. 
The institutional responses to disparate leadership styles based on control are 
outlined in depth in Jacobs’ (1978) review of the Stateville Correctional Center in Illinois 
from the 1920s to the 1970s.  Opened in the early 1920s in response to the overcrowding 
and poor conditions in another Illinois prison, Stateville was characterized early on as 
employing correctional officers with little experience, providing no organizational goals 
for staff, having weak internal controls over staff, and having flexible rules for inmates.  
In response, the institution during this time “experienced one of the most violent and 
unstable periods in its history” (p. 201).  The later appointment of Warden Joe Ragen 
from 1936 to 1961 resulted in more rigidity through his authoritative and totalitarian 
leadership style, where both staff and inmates were required to give him “absolute 
loyalty.”  He sought full control over correctional officers, by hiring from distant cities 
and forcing officers to live in barracks, in essence segregating them from their 
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surrounding areas.  Because Ragen only provided the basic necessities to inmates, all 
other extras were allotted to them based on a reward system.  The inmate society during 
Ragen’s administration was characterized as being highly competitive for jobs and 
luxuries.  At the time, these rewards served as incentives for inmates, as they provided 
mobility and more freedoms within the institution.   
Following Ragen’s tenure as warden, Jacobs (1978) outlines the shifting political 
and social climate in the 1960s, which served to challenge how prisons were being 
managed.  Although the physical isolation of inmates prevented their direct involvement 
in these reforms, they were impacted by the growing perception that inmates’ rights 
needed to be upheld.  Jacobs notes that prior to this time, it was believed that convicted 
inmates were severed of their rights and they had little legal recourse to bring about 
change.  The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 eventually led to “federal and state 
courts…scrutiniz[ing] every aspect of the prison regime and…issu[ed] injunctions and 
declaratory judgments affecting discipline, good time, living conditions, health care, 
censorship, restrictions on religion and speech, and access to the courts” (p. 9).  As a 
result, later management styles were characterized as being professional and formalistic.  
These changes were demonstrated with the hiring of experts and professionals for 
treatment, the implementation of grievance systems for inmates, and the formal 
relationships between officers and inmates.     
The very nature of institutions for confinement means that power is wielded over 
inmates.  The dynamics of such a relationship can oftentimes result in opportunities for 
misconduct and corruption by the more dominant group.  Vaughan’s (1983) review of 
large corporations where employees engaged in misconduct outlines the harm that arises 
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when opportunities for misbehavior exist.  She argues that organizations can “provid[e] 
normative support for illegality, provid[e] mechanisms for carrying out illegal acts, and 
minimize the risk of detection and sanctioning” (p. 67), even though initial intentions for 
such opportunities were for legitimate reasons.  Other factors that may directly lead to 
corruption include the size and age of the organization.  For example, large organizations 
may allow for physical isolation, making it more difficult to detect illegal behavior.  
Organizations that are confronted with employee misconduct, corruption, and 
opportunities for deviance may respond by creating internal controls.  The following 
section will discuss two forms of internal controls, punitive and preventive, which can be 
placed on organizations to prevent future misconduct. 
 
Deterrence through Punitive and Preventive Controls 
 Internal controls in institutions are shaped by both preventive and punitive control 
policies (Igbinovia, 1985; Mohamed and Man, 2010; Sherman, 1978).  Whereas the 
former focuses on the removal of opportunities that may corrupt line level staff, the latter 
deals with detecting and punishing officers.  Sherman’s review of police departments 
experiencing post-scandal reforms is one of the first and most extensive studies to 
directly examine how the institutionalization of changes in criminal justice organizations 
are shaped by preventive and punitive controls.  His case study of four police 
departments rocked by scandal in the 1970s and their attempts at reform will be examined 
in more depth as it sheds light on organizations that were able to effectively reform, 
factors that influenced sustainability, and those that were unsuccessful at 
institutionalizing changes.  While both punitive and preventive control methods are 
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implemented with the goal of deterring misconduct, Sherman (1978) contends that 
punitive controls are more in line with deterrence theory, as they punish deviance.  The 
following section will briefly review deterrence theory as it relates to organizational 
misconduct and will then provide a more in depth review of how both forms of control 
serve as deterrents. 
 Some of the earliest perspectives on crime and punishment argued that offenders 
rationally weighed the costs and benefits of crime, subsequently deciding whether or not 
to offend (Beccaria, 1775).  In essence, if the costs were not worth the benefits of 
offending, criminals would be deterred from crime.  Deterrence may then occur when an 
increase in punishments results in decreased offending.  Because of this perception, 
deterrence, in addition to retribution, rehabilitation, and incapacitation, became one of the 
primary justifications for punishment.  Punishments may deter individuals in two ways, 
generally and specifically (Gibbs, 1975).  Whereas general deterrence occurs when the 
general population is deterred from crime after observing the punishments of others, 
specific deterrence occurs when individuals are deterred from crime after they are 
punished.  In theory, the most effective way to deter crime is by creating punishments 
that are severe, certain, and swift, however, research on their deterrent effects is mixed.  
For example, some research suggests that sanctions and punishments do lead to reduced 
recidivism (Mendes and McDonald, 2001; Sherman and Berk, 1984; Tittle, 1980), 
especially when punishments are given out swiftly and with high certainty (Bailey, 1976; 
Darlauf and Nagin, 2011; Loughran, Pogarsky, Piquero, and Paternoster, 2011; Nagin 
and Pogarsky, 2001; Tittle and Rowe, 1974).  In contrast, others find that incarceration 
can actually cause offenders to commit future crimes (i.e. deviance amplification) 
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(Farrington, 1977; Matsueda, 1992), does not serve as a deterrent (Cullen, Jonson, and 
Nagin, 2011; Morris and Piquero, 2011; Payne, 1973), and the severity of punishment 
may have no influence at all (Brennan and Mednick, 1994).  The impact of punishments 
on deterring crime may also extend to organizations that are faced with similar controls. 
While deterrence theory has traditionally been considered from an individual 
perspective, it has also been applied to individuals within organizations to determine the 
compliance of individuals to departmental policies and regulations (Hu, Xu, Dinev, and 
Ling, 2010; Trevino, 1992).  In fact, criminologists have argued that deterrence theory 
“would apply to work settings where actors contemplating noncompliance with 
organizational rules could be expected to take into account their perceptions of threats of 
organizationally-imposed, socially imposed, and self-imposed punishments” (Grasmick 
and Kobayashi, 2002, p. 23).  For example, one study of employee theft found that 
certainty and severity did impact employee deviance, but that younger employees were 
less deterred by sanctions than older employees (Hollinger and Clark, 1983). 
The application of deterrence theory may be extended past the criminality of 
individuals and those within organizations to consider how organizations as a whole may 
be impacted by specific and general deterrents (Braithwaite and Makkai, 1991; Sherman, 
1978).  More specifically, many organizations are required to be compliant with laws and 
regulations placed upon them by external agencies, therefore policies may be in place to 
deter non-compliance of organizations.  For example, Braithwaite and Makkai’s review 
of nursing homes that violated the civil rights of individuals (e.g. residents were 
undernourished, had bed sores) showed that the certainty of detection led to greater 
organizational compliance, while other deterrence oriented variables were not influential.  
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This issue was recently questioned in Chanin’s (2012) examination of law enforcement 
agencies that were sanctioned following misconduct when he suggested that future 
research should examine the effectiveness of agency-wide versus individual efforts to 
deter misconduct.  One study that has been particularly noteworthy concerning criminal 
justice reforms and how organizations deter future deviance has been Sherman’s (1978) 
examination of police agencies experiencing scandals. 
 Criminal justice organizations plagued by corruption employ a variety of policies 
to establish and instill preventive internal controls that serve to deter deviance (Sherman, 
1978).  These include: “internal accountability, tight supervision, and abolition of 
procedures encouraging corruptions” (p. 120).  First, departments that change internal 
accountability policies allow for a greater number of employees, including both line level 
and top level administrators, to become responsible for themselves and others.  
Administrators employing internal accountability tactics do so under the notion that it 
will encourage staff to report misconduct.  Sherman argues that “a prerequisite of internal 
accountability is a clear communication of standards in which the employees will be held 
accountable” (p. 121).   
Second, departments attempting to rein in corruption will likely tighten 
supervision by monitoring work time and/or “product.”  For example, Sherman’s review 
of the Oakland police department’s reform indicated that efforts to tighten supervision 
included increased documentation by supervisors of cases, progress reports of detectives’ 
activities, and changing procedures for property seizures.  In contrast, the New York 
Police Department took a different technique by becoming more decentralized and 
moving the mechanisms for controlling corruption further down the bureaucratic chain.   
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The final method of improving internal controls is that of removing practices that 
encourage corruption.  Corrupting “procedures either imply levels of productivity that are 
all but impossible to achieve by legitimate means, or the procedures may create pressure 
for a de facto financial contribution from officers which they often try to ‘earn back’ in 
corrupt ways” (Sherman, 1978, p. 122).  In other words, when officers are encouraged to 
perform duties that require them to go above and beyond their duties (e.g. paying for gas 
out of pocket), they may attempt to recoup these losses illegally.  Sherman found that 
only two of the police departments attempted to remove corrupting procedures.     
In response to scandals, organizations will also frequently implement punitive 
controls to deter future misconduct.  Those that are unable to effectively control staff 
misbehaviors will be doomed to fail (Sherman, 1978).  In the case of the agencies 
investigated by Sherman, punitive control policies “were attempts to increase the 
detection and punishment of corrupt acts in order to deter all officers in each department 
from engaging in corrupt acts” (p. 146).  Detection of inappropriate behaviors may be 
done proactively or reactively, being brought to light through reports from outsiders, 
officers, or administrators.  Although he notes that it is uncommon for police departments 
to have internal policing units, all four of the departments he examined had adopted some 
form of internal policing.  For the most part, these policing units dealt with incidents and 
complaints in a reactive fashion.  While Sherman concluded that internal controls were 
more effective at reforming agencies than were external controls, he found that both 
punitive and preventive controls were critical to change.  Such findings suggest that the 
removal of opportunities for corruption coupled with establishing deterrents for deviance 
will encourage long-term reforms. 
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The preceding section has discussed how attempts to impose formal social 
controls on the population have ultimately resulted in the necessity for organizational 
controls to be placed upon the very agencies tasked with controlling individuals.  The 
following section will examine factors shaping the sustainability of organizational 
reforms.  A specific focus is paid to how pressures to maintain legitimacy in the 
institutional environment will result in change.   
 
Sustaining Change in Organizations 
The ability for organizations to make successful and effective reforms is shaped in 
large part by forces external to the agency, such as shifts in administration, policies, 
politics, and budgetary constraints (Austin and Krisberg, 1981; Berkhout, Hertin, and 
Gann, 2006; Dunphy, 1996; Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Weick and Quinn, 1999).  For 
example, Cohen’s (1985) model of organizational convenience suggests that, despite the 
best intentions of agencies to produce the most beneficial changes, they frequently result 
in organizations considering their own needs.  Cohen argues that “on the one hand there 
are goals, objectives, strategies, ideals and intentions.  On the other, there is a series of 
powerful organizational constraints and constraints on organizations—technology, 
budgets, inter-agency competition, public opinion, system interdependence, political 
interference, etc” (p. 94).  These factors all occur in conjunction with one another to 
impact the implementation of programs and policies.  Cohen’s model suggests that a 
multitude of both internal and external forces may serve to impede implementation and 
lead to frustrations among employees.   
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Despite agency concerns for effective operation, the reliance of organizations on 
external environments for resources and legitimacy results in the conformity to the rules 
and norms adhered to by institutional environments (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  Meyer 
and Rowan’s Institutional Theory argues that although they are a hindrance to efficiency, 
“institutionalized products, services, techniques, policies, and programs function as 
powerful myths, and many organizations adopt them ceremonially” (p. 340).  In other 
words, the overreliance that organizations have on their environments causes them to 
adopt practices that may actually be harmful for them.  Organizations that are then able to 
conform to the values of their environments are much more likely to survive.  Meyer and 
Rowan suggest in response to these contrasting necessities, organizations will remain “in 
a loosely coupled state” (p. 359) where there is a gap between policies and practices in 
the organization.  This is beneficial to the organization because it can then be assumed 
that the policies are working, when in fact practices may not reflect a strict adherence to 
policy.   
This ceremonial adoption of similar practices and procedures results in 
isomorphism, or the practice where organizations change to resemble other successful 
organizations in order to obtain legitimacy, power, and resources (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983).  Pressures from the institutional environment subsequently result in three types of 
isomorphic changes: coercive, mimetic, and normative.  Coercive isomorphism occurs 
when change is the result of pressures from external organizations to adopt policies and 
practices that are perceived as legitimate.  DiMaggio and Powell suggest that in 
organizations where dependence is high on external agencies, it is likely that 
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organizations will strive to appear similar in “structure, climate, and behavioral focus” (p. 
154).   
In contrast, mimetic isomorphism occurs when there is organizational uncertainty.  
The organization will then look to similar organizations to imitate practices that have 
been successful.  Being able to mimic other successful organizations can in turn reduce 
the expense associated with implementing impractical solutions.   
Finally, Dimaggio and Powell outline how normative isomorphism is the result of 
change occurring to achieve professionalism in the institutional environment.  For 
example, as the acceptance of formal education (e.g. college degree, certificate) in a field 
grows, the organization may only hire those who have obtained a degree or training.  As 
certain practices become legitimized in the environment, the organization will then seek 
to adopt those practices that make them appear professional.    
The dependence of organizations on external agencies has been demonstrated in 
numerous studies of police (Crank, 2003; Dover and Lawrence, 2010; Katz, 2001; Willis, 
Mastrofski, and Weisburd, 2007), but relatively few studies in corrections research (Ogle, 
1999; McGarrell, 1993).  However, Ogle suggests that corrections can be considered 
from an institutional perspective because they closely resemble one another in regards to 
goals and technology.  She finds that they have established legitimacy and are believed to 
be necessary for social order.  One factor that has been found to particularly impact 
correctional institutions is the relationship that exists between the agency and external 
agencies like police departments and courts (Christy, 1994).  The constant ebb and flow 
of persons sentenced to correctional facilities is out of the hands of correctional 
administrators, yet they are forced to make accommodations when these populations are 
  
40 
 
 
high and may struggle when populations are low.  These issues are coupled with the fact 
that oftentimes criminal justice agencies are competing with one another for resources 
(Austin and Krisberg, 1981), suggesting that those that appear to have low levels of 
legitimacy will get fewer resources.   
The current section has examined change from an institutional theory perspective.  
Two important mechanisms of change that have been employed in criminal justice 
agencies are lawsuits and consent decrees, which can require law enforcement agencies 
and correctional facilities to abide by a national set of norms.  Lawsuits may also be 
viewed from the perspective that they are a form of program being applied to an 
institution.  To explore this possibility further, the following section examines the 
implementation science literature and applies it to correctional reforms.  The section will 
then shift into a more in depth review of specific consent decrees that have shaped the 
criminal justice system. 
 
Consent Decrees: Implementation and CRIPA 
 The focus of social scientists on the implementation of programs is a newly 
emerging field that has been limited primarily to case studies (Glasgow et al., 2006; 
Proctor et al., 2009).  One of the primary goals of practitioners in the field has long been 
to provide evidence-based programming, while the implementation of programs has 
received considerably less attention.  The problem is that oftentimes programs and 
policies are implemented inappropriately, under poor conditions, and can take years to 
institutionalize, all of which may serve as barriers to reform (Boren and Balas, 1999; 
Sherman, 1978; Tansella and Thornicroft, 2009).  For example, Botvin, Baker, 
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Dusenbury, Tortu, and Botvin’s (1990) study of the implementation of a substance abuse 
prevention program in New York schools found that teachers covered between 27% and 
97% of materials, suggesting the program was inadequately carried out in numerous 
locations.  Implementation research now suggests the importance of evaluating the 
success of programs in their implementation, not just their outcomes (Holt, 1998; 
McHugh and Barlow, 2010).   
 While practitioners tend to agree that there is a gap between what should be done 
in program and policy implementation and what is actually done, the way in which this 
gap is bridged is more complex.  Gottfredson (2001) fully outlines these issues in an 
examination of the implementation of programming in schools to prevent delinquency, 
crime, and drug use.  She suggests that eight factors will influence the success of 
implementation including: the organizational capacity (e.g. past success in program 
implementation, staff morale), leadership, resources, organizational support (e.g. 
training), program structure (e.g. quality control, standards), integration of program into 
school day, program feasibility, and level of school disorder.  In some schools, 
implementation is more challenging (e.g. schools that are disorganized, that have low 
parental involvement, where schools where administrators and parents differ in culture, 
and where delinquent peer groups are more prevalent).  In other words, implementation 
of delinquency programs may have a higher success rate in schools where there are fewer 
problems in the first place.  It is also unclear if and how implementation models vary 
across groups under treatment (Proctor et al., 2009).  Proctor and colleagues contend that 
consideration should be given to multiple levels in the process of change including: 
political/policy influences, environmental factors, culture of the organization, and 
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individual behaviors.  Among these four levels, they argue that the most influential level 
for successful policy or program implementation is that of cultural support and 
willingness to change of those within the organization.   
 Research is now also beginning to examine the implementation of policies and 
programs in correctional settings (Castellani, 1992; Lin, 2000; Rudes, Lerch, and 
Taxman, 2011; Taxman and Friedmann, 2009).  In an examination of juvenile 
correctional facilities experiencing reforms, Barton (1994) argued that the most important 
factors in implementing successful policy changes include: clear objectives, theoretical 
foundations to programs, adequate resources, legislation, leadership, a sentiment among 
relevant parties that the program/change is necessary, incentives for compliance, and 
outside oversight.  He claims that it is necessary to have both political support and the 
ability of an organization to carry out changes to institutionalize reforms.  It is necessary 
that employees are able to “adapt the policy to their working realities” (p. 147) or else 
changes will be ineffective.   
 While much of prior implementation research has focused on program 
implementation, a growing body of literature is examining the implementation of consent 
decrees in law enforcement agencies and correctional facilities (Bazemore, Dicker, and 
Nyhan, 1994; Dale and Sanniti, 1993; Holt, 1998; Kupferberg, 2008; McMickle, 2003; 
Stone, Foglesong, and Cole, 2009).  Consent decrees are the result of an agreement 
between two parties in an effort to avoid formal litigation (Goldberg, 1962).  In the 
criminal justice system, consent decrees commonly occur between the federal 
government and law enforcement or correctional facilities to resolve issues such as 
discrimination, racial profiling, civil rights violations, excessive use of force, failure to 
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provide treatment, and other abuses.  Civil litigation that results in agencies experiencing 
such problems is often time consuming and financially costly for both defendants and 
plaintiffs (Anderson, 1986).  As a result, both parties frequently enter into consent 
decrees whereby defendants are required to remedy specific violations.   
Appendix 1 presents research examining the implementation and 
institutionalization of consent decrees in the criminal justice system. There have been few 
evaluations of agencies after consent decrees have been remedied and those that have 
focused primarily on law enforcement agencies.  For example, one study recently focused 
on the process and sustainability of implementing consent decrees among police 
departments (Chanin, 2012).  Chanin examined four police departments—Pittsburgh 
Police Bureau, Washington D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, Cincinnati Police 
Department, and Prince George's County Police Department—that were required to make 
changes to their use of force policies and response to citizen complaints.  He examined 
four areas that influence sustainability including: the initial problem, the proposed 
solution, environmental context, and the agency implementing the change.  Approaching 
change from both an implementation and institutionalization perspective, Chanin found 
that both police leadership and commitment to changing the issues outlined in the 
settlement agreement were the most important factors in institutionalizing the reforms.  
Consistent with Barton’s (1994) conclusions regarding the importance of employees 
adopting changes to sustain organizational changes, Chanin makes a similar argument 
regarding the role of officer commitment to consent decrees.  Factors that hindered the 
internalization of consent decrees included: poor leadership, limited external support, 
turnover of administrators, failure to reevaluate agency after reforms, and no external 
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accountability.  Although consent decrees occur because of concerns by outside 
organizations, Barton and Chanin both indicate that the institutionalization of changes 
cannot come from external pressures, but internal willingness to change.  Such findings 
highlight the importance of considering consent decrees from an implementation 
perspective because poorly implemented reforms can harm the sustainability of changes 
made under consent decrees.    
 The implementation of one consent decree at the Broward (FL) Detention Center 
received much attention in the early 1990s because of the expansive reforms the agency 
experienced (Barton, Schwartz, and Orlando, 1994; Bazemore, Dicker, and Nyhan’s, 
1994; Dale and Sanniti, 1993).  In 1988, reforms were made at the center in response to a 
class-action lawsuit brought against the state for overcrowded facilities, failure to provide 
adequate numbers of treatment staff, limited education, violence among youths, and 
sexual assault of minors (Uhler, 1989).  One examination of the conditions of the Center 
indicates that the agency did in fact make the changes required in the consent decree 
(Dale and Sanniti, 1993).  Their examination of the institution showed that improvements 
had been made to mental health care, housing conditions, crowding levels, and food 
quality.  However, Dale and Sanniti suggest that one critical aspect of maintaining the 
consent decree was that the agency went above and beyond what was required in the 
consent decree.  In addition to facility improvements, reforms also had an impact on 
intake criteria, alternative programming, and services upon reentry, three aspects that 
were not required to be changed under the consent decree.  These changes allowed for the 
appropriate placement of juveniles both in the center and in alternative programs.  In 
contrast, Bazemore, Dicker, and Nyhan (1994) examination of the impact that the reform 
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had on staff in the Broward Detention Center and a comparative center that experienced 
no reform suggested other changes were necessary for institutionalization.  Correctional 
officers in the facility that experienced the reforms treated youths less punitively, 
however, there were no significant differences in organizational factors like trust in 
supervisors, commitment to the agency, or job stress.  These findings suggest that the 
reforms made post-litigation did not influence officers’ perspectives, which is likely 
because additional factors (e.g. wages) also influence perceptions of the organization.  
Effecting such change is necessary for sustaining reforms in the long term, as officer 
attitudes and behaviors shape the organization.   
Implementation is further influenced because employees in organizations are 
commonly resistant to major changes and are weary of outside critiques (Klein, 1979; 
Pisciotta, 1994).  It has been argued by some that continuity, as opposed to change, is 
important to organizations for both bureaucratic and political reasons (Holt, 1998; 
Nathan, 1986).  This is particularly true when there is a shift in leadership and long time 
employees do not respond well to inevitable changes to the organization.  They may 
demonstrate resistance to reform because staff fear changes may result in their own 
harms (e.g. being fired) (Trice and Beyer, 1993).  Employees who are dissatisfied with 
the changing organization are left with few options other than to quit, attempt to counter 
shifting policies, or merely tolerate them (Schmidt and Abramson, 1983).  However, the 
perspectives of such employees are rarely accounted for under shifting administrations.  
Consideration of employee perspectives is particularly important in reforming agencies, 
as they contribute significantly to the organizational culture, ultimately shaping the 
sustainability of change.     
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 Organizations experiencing major changes frequently struggle because of deeply 
embedded cultural beliefs (Trice and Beyer, 1993).  Schein’s (1993) review of prior 
conceptions of culture in organizations led him to formally define culture as “a pattern of 
shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of external 
adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid, 
and therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel 
in relation to those problems” (p. 18).  The primary agents shaping organizational culture 
are the “operatives,” or those working in the criminal justice system (Garland, 1990).  
Once a culture has been established, social controls in place offer either rewards or 
punishments that will then maintain the culture (Stojkovic, Kalinich, and Klofas, 2003).  
Subcultures may also have developed within organizations which will impact reform 
efforts.  One example noted by Stojkovic and colleagues is the relationship in 
correctional institutions between officers and treatment providers.  As both are employed 
to serve very different functions, this can create tension among agencies experiencing 
sweeping changes.   
 The current section has addressed findings from research focused on the 
implementation of consent decrees.  The next section will examine the latter area in more 
depth with respect to the institutionalization of changes in correctional facilities after a 
lawsuit or consent decree.  Initial responses to investigations and reforms in institutions 
of confinement will be discussed and will then transition into a specific mechanism for 
changing prison conditions. 
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Responding to the Civil Rights of Confined Persons 
In response to reports of abuse and deprivation of civil liberties in prisons, 
investigations aimed at reform have occurred since the mid-1800s.  One of the earliest 
investigations occurred in New York in response to reports of crowding and poor 
management, which was supported by the New York Prison Association and the 
governor of New York (Pisciotta, 1994).  Pisciotta outlines the 1867 investigation of 
juvenile and adult correctional facilities across the state whereby investigators concluded 
that there should be a greater emphasis on rehabilitation and education than punishment.  
It was not until the 1970s that the Justice Department became an active participant in 
civil rights litigation when their involvement was requested in litigating for the rights of 
the mentally ill (Dinerstein, 1989; Holt, 1998).  Up until that time, investigations of abuse 
were limited to underfunded prison advocacy groups, thereby reforms were inadequate 
(National Council on Disability, 2005).  It was not until there was a growing concern 
over cruel and unusual punishment in prisons that the courts took action.  Then in the 
1970s there was a growing focus on prison conditions as a whole and defendants’ rights.  
Unsurprisingly, the increase in investigations and formal oversight of prisons was 
unwelcomed by correctional administrators (Austin and Krisberg, 1981).   
The federal government has become actively involved in the rights of confined 
persons since the passage of The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA).  
CRIPA, which is enforced through the Special Litigation Section of the Civil Rights 
Division of the DOJ, has had a long and storied history since it was enacted in 1980.  
Although the federal government had been involved in legislation for the rights of 
confined persons since the early 1970s (e.g. Wyatt and Stickney), it did not have the 
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authority to initiate lawsuits independently (Dinerstein, 1984).  Instead, the DOJ could 
only become actively involved in litigation after an outside agency or group had already 
filed a suit.  In most cases, this involvement was welcomed as the Justice Department had 
the resources to both litigate and monitor compliance of defendants.  Nevertheless, those 
at the DOJ grew concerned over their inability to initiate their own lawsuits, especially 
for failing institutions that were powerless.  Subsequent efforts by the Justice Department 
in United States v. Solomon and United States v. Mattson to file suits against institutions 
for the mentally retarded were rejected on the basis that they had no authority to instigate 
lawsuits (National Council on Disability, 2005).   
Beginning in 1977, the DOJ advocated for a statute to be passed in Congress that 
would formally permit the department to initiate lawsuits (National Council on Disability, 
2005).  This received much support from advocates who recognized the value of having 
an agency with an abundance of resources advocating for confined persons.  However, 
the Congressional debates over CRIPA were heated (Holt, 1998).  The impetus for 
CRIPA stemmed from Senate bill S. 1393 and House bill H.R. 9400.  Opposition from 
Republicans and Democrats on the grounds that CRIPA would allow for greater federal 
control over the states resulted in the bills never being voted on.  Later bills, H.R. 9400 
and S. 10, were presented in 1979 and received bipartisan support.  The National 
Association of Attorneys General opposed the bills because “they viewed [them] as 
strong-arm tactics by the Justice Department in the course of institutional litigation in 
their states” (p. 17).  These arguments led to revisions of the bills to limit the power of 
the Justice Department, including notification that a lawsuit could occur, informing 
agency of issues to be addressed, and the opportunity for informal conciliation.  Although 
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unwanted by many supporters of the bill, the modifications were agreed to in order to 
allow the bill to pass.  The result was that the Justice Department had less discretionary 
powers than were originally sought, but for the first time could advocate for the civil 
rights of confined persons independently. 
Passed in 1980, CRIPA allowed the DOJ to file lawsuits against state and local 
institutions of confinement that had been suspected of a pattern of depriving individuals 
of their civil liberties and/or housing individuals in poor conditions (42 U.S.C. § 1997).  
These included jails, prisons, juvenile correctional facilities, mental health facilities, and 
nursing homes.  Under the act, when reports of abuses are made to the Justice 
Department, it is the discretion of the Attorney General to launch an investigation.  After 
giving seven days notice to the institution, the Attorney General will investigate 
conditions if the institution agrees to cooperate, which occurs in most situations.  One 
representative from the DOJ stated that “if we can verify violations [without gaining 
access], we issue a findings letter, and then we start to negotiate on the issues we found.  
If we still encounter resistance, we’ll file a complaint.  We’d never sign an agreement 
without access to an institution, and once we gain access we can always issue a second 
findings letter” (National Council on Disability, 2005, p. 18).  Consultants who carry out 
the investigation then inform the state’s Governor and Attorney General of their findings, 
recommendations, and remedies to the reported issues.  The institution is then given 49 
days to improve and remedy the issues described in the findings letter.  Defendants may 
enter into consent decrees with the Justice Department, whereby they are subsequently 
monitored and inspected until they are compliant with the findings.  If the defendants are 
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uncooperative and unwilling to reach a conciliation, the Justice Department will file a 
lawsuit to force changes.   
The Justice Department has favored the use of consent decrees or conciliation in 
favor of litigation because they are less costly, public, and entail less confrontation 
(Cornwell, 1988).  Discussed above in regard to the responses of reforming institutions, 
the reasoning behind the federal government relying so heavily on consent decrees is the 
result of “organizational convenience” (Cohen, 1985).  In other words, while formal 
litigation may better serve to bring institutional reforms, constraints on the Justice 
Department prevent litigating in every case of civil rights violations.  Despite the fact that 
consent decrees are negotiated, the government typically has the upper hand, because 
“once a defendant has indicated a willingness to compromise, the government is in the 
superior position in fixing the precise terms of the decree” (Goldberg, 1962, p. 1).  
Getting defendants to agree to a consent decree is also preferred by the defense because it 
allows for a remedy to problems that may not have been achieved if a lawsuit was lost.   
Despite the establishment of CRIPA under President Carter, it was not until 
President Reagan’s administration in 1981 that the first lawsuits were initiated (Holt, 
1998).  This was because of the limited time between the enactment of CRIPA and the 
end of the Carter administration, as well as amount of time that it took to file a lawsuit 
following an investigation.  However, the number of new investigations decreased by 
over 40 percent in the first year of President Reagan’s administration.  When CRIPA was 
first proposed, it was estimated that there would be between 7 to 10 lawsuits per year, 
which would be approximately 40 lawsuits per presidential term.  However, Holt 
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contends that it took six years into Reagan’s administration for the number of lawsuits to 
reach those early yearly estimates. 
The involvement of the federal government in protecting the civil rights of 
confined persons was minimal and received extensive criticism under Reagan 
(Dinerstein, 1989; Holt, 1998).  Some have attributed the lax enforcement at the time to 
William Bradford Reynolds, the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division 
of the DOJ.  The lenient enforcement in the early years of CRIPA was attributable to the 
“procedural safeguards” in the Act, which allowed the federal government to negotiate, 
as opposed to litigate, with institutions.  Although Reynolds had claimed that CRIPA was 
being enforced effectively in its early days, the Reynolds/Reagan era of CRIPA was 
approached much differently than it had been during the inception under Carter.   
In contrast to the perspective under Carter that CRIPA would be used to force 
institutions to maintain humane conditions, Reynolds and Reagan had a much different 
vision as to how the federal government should oversee the civil rights of confined 
persons.  In regard to general civil rights, Reagan had advocated for a decreased role of 
the federal government, as it was seen as an “intrusion” in people’s lives.  Reynolds then 
stated in testimony at a hearing before Congress in the early 1980s that they “must be 
always mindful that it is, in the final analysis, the responsibility of State officials to 
operate and maintain these facilities” (Plotkin, Davison, and Kaufman, 1989, p. 418).  
Under the advisement of Reynolds, CRIPA would only serve to make minimal changes to 
ensure safety, while other issues like overcrowding were neglected.  Similar to the 
current practices of CRIPA, Reynolds did advocate for resolving cases through 
conciliation as opposed to formal lawsuits (Holt, 1998). 
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Critiques of CRIPA 
By the mid-1980s it was becoming clear that little was being enforced under 
CRIPA, allowing poor conditions to be prolonged (Cornwell, 1988; Dinerstein, 1989; 
National Council on Disability, 2005).  At congressional hearings, it was suggested that 
the rights of mentally impaired persons were being neglected because of the Section’s 
failure to file any lawsuits under CRIPA.  In response, the Assistant Attorney General 
claimed that negotiations with institutions had been successful, thereby making it 
unnecessary to formally sue noncompliant organizations.  Similar to Cohen’s (1985) 
perspectives on organizational convenience, Reynolds argued that oftentimes litigation 
was stalled to allow for conciliation, which more quickly improved harsh conditions and 
prevented conflicts with state governments.  Cornwell (1988) contested these claims 
stating that Reynolds offered no proof that litigation was in fact time consuming and the 
involvement of the Justice Department was believed to encourage speedy resolutions.  
His review of multiple conciliations under CRIPA also showed that they were not always 
“quick and effective remedies” as had been suggested by Reynolds.  Others also strongly 
criticized the reliance on informal resolutions because they were unenforceable, as 
opposed to formal litigation (National Council on Disability, 2005).   
The growing dissatisfaction with the direction that Reynolds was taking CRIPA 
was highlighted when a lengthy consent decree with multiple prisons in Michigan was 
drafted by attorneys from the Justice Department (Plotkin, Davison, and Kaufman, 1989).  
Reynolds took it upon himself to revise the consent decree to a five page agreement that 
he argued would help the prisons reform more quickly and made the original agreement 
voluntary.  As a result, the Special Litigation Section of the Justice Department 
  
53 
 
 
experienced an exceptionally high rate of turnover among their legal staff.  Plotkin and 
colleagues report that some staff even declared that the Justice Department was no longer 
committed to ensuring the civil rights of institutionalized persons. 
 One former litigator in the Special Litigation Section of the DOJ contends that 
Congress had been initially supportive of the changes that were to be made under CRIPA, 
however, those providing oversight severely limited the potential of the act (Dinerstein, 
1989).  Dinerstein outlined numerous criticisms of the implementation of CRIPA during 
the 1980s including: 1.) the Justice Department reversed decisions in critical cases, 2.) the 
failure to litigate against any department during the initial years of CRIPA, 3.) 
investigations frequently took too long, 4.) the apparent disregard for protecting certain 
civil rights, 5.) the failure to adapt responses to differing conditions, 6.) the failure to 
maintain relationships with advocacy groups, 7.) the loss of staff, and 8.) neglecting other 
problems resulting from CRIPA.   
Although more recent literature regarding the implementation of CRIPA has been 
limited, it is apparent that concerns over CRIPA have persisted at the national level.  For 
example, advocates continue to raise alarm over the length of time that it takes to resolve 
cases, as this allows poor conditions to persist (National Council on Disability, 2005; 
Puritz and Scali, 1998a).  Criticisms regarding the prevalence of investigations have also 
occurred (Barczyk and Davis, 2009).  The fact that each year there are on average over 
4,500 letters and phone calls
1
 to Congress regarding civil rights violations in institutions, 
                                                          
 
1
 The Department of Justice publishes an annual report regarding activities related to the Civil Rights of 
Institutionalized Persons Act.  An equivalent report of activities by the Department of Justice through the 
enforcement of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Omnibus Crime Control and 
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yet the number of new investigations a year only ranges from 2 to 27 is concerning 
because many cases may be slipping through the cracks.  Because of this disparity, 
“advocates may have lost faith in the effectiveness of CRIPA and have chosen other 
means of vocalizing their complaints” (p. 196).  While these critiques have surrounded 
the initial stages of implementing CRIPA, other concerns surround the later stages of 
implementation. 
One factor that may serve to shape the frequency of investigations is the political 
party in control of the White House (Schlanger, 2006).  Schlanger argues that the 
appointment of Republican or Democratic judges will directly influence the regulation of 
institutions.  Typically, liberal judges are more likely to support consent decrees or 
litigation against a facility and conservative judges are not.  An examination of the 
average number of lawsuits filed or consent decrees entered into lends support this 
perspective (See Table 1).  During the Reagan and first Bush administrations, the average 
number of cases filed was less than four, but this increased to an average of six cases 
being filed under the Clinton administration.  Filings then decreased again under George 
W. Bush.  As of the writing of this paper, Barack Obama was still president, so it is 
unclear how many cases will be filed.  Currently under his administration there has been 
an average of 3.33 cases filed per year.  It is important to note that during the second 
Bush administration, relatively few cases were filed until his last month in office, when  
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
Safe Streets Act of 1968, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reporting on the number of complaints 
regarding abuses by law enforcement officers is not published (Conduct of Law Enforcement Agencies, 
2012).  In fact, Fyfe (2002) points out that it is difficult to obtain similar data for complaints against the 
police because “one would have to study every federal and state civil and criminal court in the country” 
(100).  One very dated comment by the Justice Department suggested an average of 2,500 complaints are 
made to the Justice Department each year for police misconduct (Lewis, 1991). 
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Table 1. CRIPA Lawsuits/Consent Decrees Filed by Fiscal Year by President 
President Year # of Cases Average Number of Cases Per 
Year During Administration 
Reagan- Republican 1981 0 3.71 
1982 1 
1983 2 
1984 3 
1985 5 
1986 7 
1987 5 
1988 3 
Bush- Republican 1989 3 3.00 
1990 3 
1991 3 
1992 3 
Clinton- Democrat 1993 1 6.00 
1994 10 
1995 9 
1996 4 
1997 6 
1998 6 
1999 7 
2000 5 
Bush- Republican 2001 0 5.13 
2002 3 
2003 1 
2004 6 
2005 5 
2006 6 
2007 5 
2008 13 
Obama- Democrat 2009 2 3.33 
2010 3 
2011 5 
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six cases were filed in one month.  This mass of filings has been criticized by advocates 
who claim that “the terms of these last-minute settlements are inexcusably weak and that 
the agreements don’t do enough to make sure the states fix their problems” (Shapiro, 
2009). 
 Concerns have also been raised over the implementation of CRIPA because the 
Justice Department only provides sporadic monitoring while overseeing institutions, 
provides no oversight after the conditions of confinement have been met, and has little 
authority aside from civil rights violations inside facilities.  With regard to the former, 
Cornwell (1988) argues that this is problematic because “the decrees fail to provide for 
any independent monitoring body to ensure compliance; instead, they leave these 
responsibilities to the federal government” (p. 853).  Regarding more general correctional 
reforms, Barton (1994) states that in order for changes to be sustained, institutions must 
allow outside groups the ability to provide oversight, a practice that may be unwanted by 
institutions.  Finally, some critics have claimed that CRIPA does not address more 
national issues with improper confinement.  For example, the National Council on 
Disability’s report examining the success of CRIPA suggested that there are other 
important issues outside the authority of the Justice Department that should be addressed, 
including the improper placement of certain individuals in prisons (e.g. those with mental 
health issues).  Similar arguments may also be extended to the placement of juveniles in 
the adult criminal justice system (Johnson, Lanza-Kaduce, and Woolard, 2011; Winner, 
Lanza-Kaduce, Bishop, and Frazier, 1997).  Others contend that practices like placing 
individuals in the community or in the “least restrictive environment” are not addressed 
through consent decrees focused on improving institutional conditions (Cornwell, 1988). 
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Finally, although not directly related to the implementation of consent decrees, 
one macro-level criticism has been raised over correctional reforms to maintain humane 
conditions (Feely and Rubin, 1998).  Schlanger (1999) has argued that “by promoting the 
comforting idea of the ‘lawful prison,’ the litigation movement may have smoothed the 
way for ever-harsher sentences and criminal policies” (p. 1998).  This phenomenon was 
then coupled with the expansion of prisons in response to overcrowding (Schoenfeld, 
2010).  In other words, the modernization of prisons and appearance that they are safe 
and humane have led to judges increasingly using incapacitation as the solution to crime 
(i.e. a form of net-widening).  This potentially false perception arguably became a 
contributor to increased prison populations.  Schoenfeld contends that the result has been 
long-term reforms that are misaligned with the initial goals of the litigation movement of 
the 1970s. 
 In light of the past and present issues that have been raised with reforming 
institutions through CRIPA, multiple solutions have been presented by corrections and 
legal advocates.  Suggestions for improvement have included enforcing more timely case 
resolutions, shorter conciliation periods, formal litigation if effective reforms are not 
achieved quickly through conciliation, and greater involvement of outside agencies 
(Cornwell, 1988).  Critics have also advocated for greater involvement from community 
organizations to provide some form of oversight and/or support (National Council on 
Disability, 2005).   
In contrast to the claims by some academics, service providers, and those 
employed by the Justice Department, others argue that conciliation serves both the needs 
of institutions and the federal government (National Council on Disability, 2005).  More 
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recent interviews of Justice Department staff suggest that there is less dissatisfaction with 
conciliation than there was in the 1980s.  Some employees found that conciliation was a 
preferred method because litigation can be risky.  As was stated by one spokesperson, 
“you spend lots of time convincing them that they have problems.  During that long 
period of time reform is not happening.  And you’re forcing the state to spend money on 
litigation instead of reform” (p. 24).  Furthermore, institutions are given deadlines to 
follow for reform during conciliation, which means they do not have an unlimited period 
of time to demonstrate a reform has occurred.  The Justice Department has also recently 
revised its policy regarding pre-set deadlines for terminating settlements, which means 
institutions must now be in compliance before a settlement is ended (Department of 
Justice Activities Under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 2009).  Figure 
1 shows that there is in fact a growing trend towards conciliation over time, as 79%, 75%, 
91%, 92%, and 100% of investigations resulted in conciliation during the Reagan, Bush, 
Clinton, Bush II, and Obama administrations, respectively. 
Since the inception of the act in 1980, the Justice Department has investigated 
nearly 500 prisons, mental health facilities, jails, and juvenile correctional facilities 
(Department of Justice Activities Under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 
2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011; National Council on Disability, 2005).  These investigations 
have resulted in about 140 lawsuits and consent decrees between the DOJ and institutions 
(See Figure 1).  Figure 1 identifies cases in which consent decrees were reached quickly, 
cases where consent decrees took longer than one year, cases where a lawsuit was filed 
(i.e. a consent decree could not be reached), and cases that were dismissed.  The 
distinction between immediate consent decrees and those occurring after one year was 
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Figure 1. CRIPA Lawsuits/Consent Decrees Filed by Fiscal Year 
 
 
 
Sources: National Council on Disability (2005); Department of Justice Activities Under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons 
Act (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011) 
Note: The chart identifies cases in which consent decrees were not immediately reached between agencies and the DOJ.  This 
distinction was made because many institutions were slow to agree to a consent decree with the DOJ.  Although a consent decree was 
eventually made, in some cases it took multiple years to reach this agreement.
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
1
9
8
1
 
1
9
8
2
 
1
9
8
3
 
1
9
8
4
 
1
9
8
5
 
1
9
8
6
 
1
9
8
7
 
1
9
8
8
 
1
9
8
9
 
1
9
9
0
 
1
9
9
1
 
1
9
9
2
 
1
9
9
3
 
1
9
9
4
 
1
9
9
5
 
1
9
9
6
 
1
9
9
7
 
1
9
9
8
 
1
9
9
9
 
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
1
 
2
0
0
2
 
2
0
0
3
 
2
0
0
4
 
2
0
0
5
 
2
0
0
6
 
2
0
0
7
 
2
0
0
8
 
2
0
0
9
 
2
0
1
0
 
2
0
1
1
 
Case Dismissed 
Lawsuit 
Consent Decree Reached, but Not 
Immediately 
Consent Decree 
  
60 
 
 
made because many institutions were slow to agree to a consent decree with the DOJ.  
Although a consent decree was eventually made, in some cases it took multiple years to 
reach this agreement, suggesting that these “agreements” may not have been amicable.  It 
is also clear that the overwhelming majority of cases were resolved through consent 
decrees, with 122 cases resolved through consent decrees, 9 through lawsuits, and 2 cases 
were dismissed.   
Since 2000, 95 findings letters have been given to agencies that outline violations 
of civil rights and 46 cases have been filed.  Conditional improvements have addressed 
areas such as mental health, medical care, suicide prevention, education, physical abuse, 
sexual abuse, excessive use of solitary confinement, and physical conditions of 
institutions.  Despite the critiques that the Justice Department has faced, especially in the 
earliest years of implementation, there is little doubt now that the enforcement efforts 
under CRIPA have improved institutional conditions for thousands of confined persons 
across the country (Daly, 2010; Rubin, 2009).  For example, the Baltimore County Jail 
was monitored by the DOJ in 1971, 1976, and 2000 because of reports that juveniles and 
adults were not adequately separated, inmates were deprived of mental and medical 
health services, and constitutional rights were being violated (Department of Legislative 
Services, 2012).  As a result of the lawsuits against the jail, it was proposed that a 
separate detention center for juveniles be built to remedy these issues.  Reports of 
improved institutional conditions are typical, as departments that either enter into consent 
decrees or are sued by the DOJ are legally required to make the necessary improvements.     
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Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections 
 The Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections (ADJC) is one such agency that 
was forced to reform following a consent decree after a CRIPA investigation.  Because 
the agency has endured two agency changing lawsuits, it is useful for examining the 
factors that led up to a federal intervention, the implementation of the intervention, and 
the institutionalization of the intervention.  The first occurred in 1987 and was a class 
action lawsuit, Johnson v. Upchurch, against the Arizona Department of Corrections 
(ADC).  After a brief respite from monitoring following the expiration of the Johnson v. 
Upchurch consent decree in 1997, the department faced a second consent decree in 2004 
following a CRIPA investigation.   
As will be addressed in depth in this dissertation, the failure to reform after the 
initial consent decree strongly shaped departmental responses during the second consent 
decree.  There were clearly failures in the department prior to the consent decree under 
CRIPA, but it was not until the second federal intervention that these failures were 
realized and addressed.  Since the resolution of the CRIPA consent decree in 2007, the 
ADJC has experienced multiple issues that could potentially negatively impact the 
sustainability of the changes made under CRIPA.  These factors, which are further 
examined in the current dissertation, include severe budget cuts in 2010, an 
announcement by the Governor of Arizona that the agency would be closed, and rumors 
of privatizing the agency (Brewer, 2011; Reinhart, 2010).    
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Limitations of Prior Research 
After an institution or agency has remedied the issues outlined by the DOJ, the 
Justice Department no longer has the authority to monitor the conditions of confinement.  
In other words, after the requirements of the consent decree are met, the Justice 
Department has no legal recourse to ensure that the changes are maintained.  This means 
that only until new reports are made to Congress regarding improper care that the federal 
government will become aware of improper conditions and can again require that 
changes be made.  Multiple reports have addressed the process of filing a CRIPA suit and 
issues in achieving compliance with consent decrees.  However, no studies to date have 
systematically examined a correctional organization after the conditions of confinement 
under a CRIPA have been met and the agency is no longer under a consent decree.   
Of the research examining the implementation of consent decrees and litigation 
under CRIPA, the majority has been limited to the 1980s (Cornwell, 1988; Dinerstein, 
1989; Holt, 1998; Plotkin, Davison, and Kaufman, 1989).  Criticisms in early research 
were directed primarily at the sitting Assistant Attorney General for the division for his 
failure to litigate against institutions that violated the civil rights of confined persons.  
Considering that over 30 years has passed since the enactment of CRIPA, nearly 25 years 
has passed since a new Assistant Attorney General took over the division, and the 
number of investigations in the division has quadrupled since the late 1980s, there is 
cause to believe that significant changes have been made in the process of implementing 
change.    
More recent examinations of CRIPA have been limited in their scope.  For 
example, the most comprehensive study to address the process of investigations and 
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institutionalization of changes was limited in two ways (National Council on Disability, 
2005).  First, although the National Council on Disability addressed all types of agencies 
overseen by the Justice Department, there was a specific focus on the institutionalization 
of rights of disabled persons who were confined.  This group represents only a small 
portion of individuals that CRIPA protects.  Second, this report, while comprehensive, 
relied primarily on interviews with current and former representatives from the Justice 
Department.  Although valuable, they fail to consider the perceptions and experiences of 
those working directly in and with the reformed agencies.  Other studies have been 
primarily descriptive or have relied on official reports from the Justice Department to 
derive their conclusions (Barczyk and Davis, 2009; Puritz and Scali, 1998b).  This has 
left a gap in the literature where the opinions of those experiencing change both within 
and outside a reformed agency are not considered.   
Achieving compliance with CRIPA lawsuits or consent decrees is only a small 
fraction of these correctional reforms.  Following years of change and federal monitoring, 
agencies that have fulfilled the requirements of CRIPA are left with no outside oversight 
or official guidance.  The real challenge in these cases is ensuring that long-lasting 
reforms have been made in protecting the civil rights of confined persons once federal 
oversight is lifted.  To explore this issue, the following section will examine the methods 
and data used.  Then, attention will be paid to the external factors (e.g. pressures to 
maintain legitimacy in the institutional environment) that shaped the ADJC’s responses 
to the consent decree during implementation and following the cessation of the consent 
decree.  Internal factors (e.g. agency culture, punitive controls, and preventive controls) 
also will be explored for their influence both during and post-CRIPA.  Finally, 
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conclusions will be discussed along with policy recommendation for the implementation 
of future consent decrees. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
Research Questions 
 Hundreds of correctional institutions (i.e. jails, prisons, juvenile facilities) 
nationwide have been forced to reform in order to ensure that the civil rights of inmates 
are upheld (See Figure 1).  Arizona is one of the few states that have been subject to four 
CRIPA investigations.  Following these reforms, the federal government no longer has 
the authority to ensure that agencies remain compliant with the civil rights of 
institutionalized persons.  In other words, changed agencies may subsequently revert 
back to practices that deprived inmates of their constitutional rights.  The current 
dissertation addresses this issue and examines how changes under CRIPA are sustained 
once monitoring ceases.  Three questions are specifically addressed that guide the 
dissertation.  Does federal involvement in forcing correctional reforms result in long-
term, sustainable changes?  If changes are made, do they occur because the organization 
strives to maintain legitimacy by the institutional environment?  In contrast to the 
concerns of administrators to maintain legitimacy, the dissertation also asks, does change 
occur because employees are deterred from practices that deprive inmates of their civil 
rights?  
 The responses of an institution to a CRIPA investigation will shed light on how 
future investigations should be conducted and changes maintained.  A case study 
methodology was adopted, as it allowed for an in depth contextual analysis of 
institutional reforms.  The following section will examine the participants, data collection 
strategies, methodology, data analysis, and methods to ensure reliability and validity in 
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the dissertation.  Background information will also be provided regarding the state of 
Arizona (e.g. demographics, politics) and the ADJC (e.g. demographics, population, 
budgets) to provide additional context as to how the ADJC became the subject of two 
federal investigations, lawsuits, and reforms. 
 
Research Setting 
 The research setting of the current dissertation is the state of Arizona.  It is 
important to first consider the location in which the reform is occurring, as the unique 
characteristics of Arizona could influence the sustainability of the reform (Scharf, 2012).  
In 2011, there were approximately 6.5 million persons living in Arizona and 25% of the 
population was under the age of 18 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012).  The majority of the 
population is white (85%), with an additional 5% black, 5% Native American, and 3% 
Asian.  Thirty percent of the population identifies themselves as being Hispanic or 
Latino.  Arizona has a high foreign-born population compared to other states, with over 
14% of residents being foreign born.  The foreign-born population is predominantly from 
Latin America (68%).  The percent of foreign-born persons in Arizona has increased 
nearly 65% from 3.4 million to 5.6 million residents being foreign born.  Discussed 
below, these shifting demographics have impacted crime control responses against 
certain people in the state.  
The majority of Arizonans reside in Maricopa County (60%), followed distantly 
by Pima (15%), Pinal (6%), Yuma (3%), Yavapai (3%), and Mohave (3%) Counties.  
This uneven distribution will be discussed in more depth throughout the case study, as it 
has greatly impacted the operations of the ADJC.  For example, a facility in Pima 
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County, the only facility not in Maricopa County, was closed in 2011 in part because 
there were not enough juveniles from Southern Arizona being committed to ADJC.  The 
unemployment rate in Arizona in 2012 was approximately 8.2%, which was only slightly 
higher than the national unemployment rate of 8.1% (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2012).  Industries employing the greatest number of persons included education/health 
care (21%), retail (12.2%), professional/scientific services (11%), and arts/entertainment 
(10%)
2
 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011a).  In 2011 nineteen percent of families reported that 
they are living below, however in families with a female head of household (i.e. no 
husband is present), 29% of families were in poverty.  This is in contrast to only 15% of 
families nationwide reporting living in poverty (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011b).  This high 
rate of poverty in Arizona is concerning when considering the strong linkages between 
living in impoverished neighborhoods and juvenile delinquency (Farrington, 1994; 
Peeples and Loeber, 1994).     
 Arizona had the 18
th
 highest violent crime rate in the United States in 2010, with a 
rate of 408 incidents per 100,000 and the 8
th
 highest property crime rate, with 3,534 
incidents per 100,000.  Juveniles accounted for 15% of arrests in the state and about 7 
juveniles per 1,000 were arrested (Arizona Department of Public Safety, 2011).  The 
number of juveniles referred to court had remained stable from 2000 to 2007, but then 
decreased by 15% from 2007 to 2010, with just over 41,000 juvenile referrals in 2010 
(Arizona Criminal Justice Commission, 2011).  Somewhat different patterns have been 
exhibited among the number of juveniles committed to the ADJC.  More specifically, 926 
                                                          
 
2
 This data comes from the U.S. Census’ American Community Survey from 2006-2010 (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2010).  The recession in 2008 may have impacted the distribution of occupations. 
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juveniles were committed to ADJC in 2003, but the number of commitments was in the 
800s from 2004 to 2006.  Then again in 2007 the number of commitments reached 926, 
yet declined ever since to a new low of 751 in 2010.  Multiple events occurred across 
Arizona that may have directly impacted some of these trends.  Most notably, in 2003 
and 2004, multiple suicides occurred in ADJC facilities and the CRIPA investigation 
began in 2004.  It is possible that patterns of committing juveniles may have shifted over 
this time due to county judges’ concerns over safety of the juveniles they were sending to 
the state.  This theory is given more credibility because in 2007 the number of 
commitments increased in the same year that the CRIPA investigation ended.  The 
number of commitments remained the same in 2008, but then declined in later years.  The 
more recent declines occurred during the Great Recession starting in 2008.  Declining 
resources on the part of juvenile courts may have resulted in less juveniles subsequently 
being brought into the system.   
 Arizona is a fairly typical conservative, Western state.  Arizona has been 
nationally recognized as being tough on crime and has been increasingly becoming more 
punitive towards undocumented immigration (Lynch, 2010).  Most notably, Arizona’s 
response to immigration has been in national headlines because police officers have been 
granted increasing freedom to question drivers regarding immigration statuses (Eagly, 
2010).  The tough on crime stance in the state has also been demonstrated in the 
treatment of jail detainees by Sheriff Joe Arpaio (Attwood, Mini, and Papa, 2011).  For 
example, the sheriff has been known to house jail inmates in tents with no air 
conditioning, provides them with pink underwear, still uses a “chain gang,” and has 
racially profiled against Hispanics in the community (Romero, 2011).  Practices in 
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Arpaio’s jails have continued despite research conducted in the agency suggesting that 
extremes in punitive treatment result in “defiant responses” by inmates (Griffin, 2006).  
The harsh treatment went so far that the jails were subject to a CRIPA investigation in 
1997 due to the use of excessive force by correctional officers and lack of adequate 
medical care (Madison, 2006).  The agency was also subject to investigations under the 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 and the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 again in 2008.  This investigation was later closed in 2012 without a lawsuit being 
brought against the agency, although no reason for the dismissal has been given (Montini, 
2012).  In contrast, Pima County stands as a notable exception to the conservatism in the 
state, as is evidenced by the liberal stance of most residents and the push to treat 
criminals in their communities.  This is evidenced by the fact that Pima County residents 
account for 15% of the population, but only 8% of the population at the ADJC. 
 Although a more in depth review of the Arizona Department of Juvenile 
Corrections is presented in Chapter 5, it is important to briefly examine the demographic 
characteristics of the institutions and juveniles.  During the time of data collection in 
2011, the ADJC housed 399 youths, although the operational capacity was 403 and the 
design capacity was 623 (Just the Facts, 2011).  An additional 461 juveniles were 
supervised in the community.  Prior to commitment, 50% of juveniles had been referred 
to juvenile court 10 or more times (See Table 2).  Juveniles were typically committed to 
ADJC for less serious offenses, including: property (33%), drug (12%), public order 
(11%), and parole violations (11%).  Only 25% of juveniles were committed for a crime 
against another person.  Offenses committed by juveniles tended to be  
Table 2. Demographic Characteristics of Juveniles (n=399) and Institutions in 2011 
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% of Juveniles 
Age 17 50 
 
16 28 
 
15 19 
 
14 4 
 
13 1 
Gender Male 86 
 
Female 14 
County Maricopa 58 
 
Yuma 11 
 
Pima 8 
 
Pinal 6 
 
Cochise 5 
 
Mohave 4 
Race/Ethnicity Hispanic 49 
 
Caucasian 28 
 
African American 12 
 
Native American 6 
Offenses Property 33 
 
Crime against 
person 25 
 
Drug 12 
 
Public order 11 
 
Parole violation 11 
 
Other 6 
 
Weapon 3 
Seriousness of Offense Misdemeanor 29 
 
Parole violation 12 
 
Felony 59 
Programming Offered New Freedom 100 
 
Sex Offender 11 
 
Mental Health 6 
 
Substance 
Treatment 40 
# of Prior Referrals to Juv. Court 1-3 10 
 
4-6 17 
 
7-9 24 
 
10-12 16 
 
13 or more 34 
Risk Level High 33 
 
Medium 28 
 
Low 40 
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felonies (59%) and misdemeanors (29%).  Once committed to ADJC, all juveniles 
received treatment under the “New Freedom” program, while 40% of juveniles received 
substance abuse treatment, 11% sexual offender treatment, and 6% mental health 
treatment.  Most juveniles (61%) were considered to be medium or high risk within the 
institution. 
Juveniles who were held at ADJC were typically Hispanic males from Maricopa 
County. Eighty-six percent of juveniles were male and nearly 50% of juveniles were 
Hispanic, followed by Caucasians (28%), African Americans (12%), and Native 
Americans (6%).  This breakdown was not very representative of the population in 
Arizona, as only about a third of residents in Arizona are Hispanic and 5% are African 
American.  The majority (78%) of juveniles was 16 years or older, while only .5% of the 
population was under 14 years of age.  Nearly 58% of juveniles were sent to ADJC from 
Maricopa County, followed by 11% from Yuma, 8% from Pima, 6% from Pinal, 5% from 
Cochise, and 4% from Mohave Counties.  In other words, while the majority of juveniles 
are housed relatively close to home (i.e. Maricopa County), there is a large percentage of 
juveniles who are placed in ADJC from geographically distant counties.  Although the 
ADJC has attempted to alleviate the strains of being housed long distances from home to 
an extent (e.g. video conferencing), the reality is that most families from outlying 
counties are unable to make the long commute.  As will be discussed in later chapters, 
this distance has also provided severe challenges to parole officers across the state tasked 
with supervising juveniles in their communities and connecting them with community 
resources. 
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At the start of data collection in June 2011, the ADJC operated three safe schools; 
Adobe Mountain School (AMS) for boys and Black Canyon School (BCS) for girls were 
in Phoenix and Catalina Mountain School (CMS) for boys was in Tucson.  A fourth 
facility in Buckeye, Eagle Point School, had closed in early 2010.  CMS closed in 
October 2011 and many juveniles and staff were transferred to AMS and BCS.  The 
number of new juvenile commitments to the ADJC has been steadily decreasing since 
early 2001.  From 2001 to 2010, the population decreased by 40%, with the population 
being nearly 900 in 2001 and dropping to 535 by 2010.  The percent of juveniles returned 
to custody (i.e. percent of juveniles who recidivated) was 33% in 2008 (A.R.S. § 41-
2802).   
 The estimated budget for the ADJC in 2011 was approximately $57 million, a 
substantial decrease from the budget of $84 million the agency operated with in 2007 and 
2008 (A.R.S. § 41-2802).  The budget includes annual salaries for youth corrections 
officers (YCOs) ranging from $30,857 to $57,892 (Arizona State Service, 2007).   A 
portion of the budget also includes training of new YCOs, which is comprised of a 32 day 
academy and 8 additional days of on the job training (Arizona Department of Juvenile 
Corrections, 2008).  The budget cuts faced by the ADJC beginning in 2010 are not 
surprising when it is considered that these occurred around the time of the Great 
Recession.  However, many in Arizona were concerned when Governor Jan Brewer 
announced in the budget for Fiscal Year 2011 that the budget for the ADJC had been 
eliminated (Brewer, 2011).  In the budget, it was stated that in light of the budget crisis, 
“it is appropriate to reconsider [ADJC’s] mission, scrutinize the probability of achieving 
desired outcomes, and seek to minimize duplication of functions” (p. 22).  The Governor 
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further argued that the ADJC no longer housed the serious and violent offenders that it 
had before transfers to adult court were prevalent.  In other words, juveniles committing 
relatively minor offenses and those with mental health issues were inappropriately and 
unnecessarily being taken out of their communities and placed in state custody.  
Furthermore, the cost of running the state agency had been increasing at the same time 
that the average daily population was decreasing (see Figure 2).  This gap between state 
spending and the declining need for custody were further used to justify the closure of the 
agency.  
 In their annual reports, the ADJC outlines the vision, mission, and role of the 
agency.  The vision of the ADJC is to provide “safer communities through successful 
youth.”  The mission is to “enhance public protection by changing the delinquent 
thinking and behaviors of juvenile offenders committed to the department.”  Lastly, the 
role of the agency is to be  
Responsible for juveniles adjudicated delinquent and committed to its jurisdiction 
by the county juvenile courts.  It is accountable to the citizens of Arizona for the 
promotion of public safety through the management of the state’s secure juvenile 
facilities and the development and provision of a continuum of services to 
juvenile offenders, including rehabilitation, treatment, and education. (Arizona 
Department of Juvenile Corrections, 2011a, p. 5)   
 
This vision of the ADJC is still in effect because the Governor announced in 2011 that 
the ADJC would not be closed.  The implications of both budget cuts and the potential 
for closure will be discussed in more depth in later sections. 
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Figure 2. ADJC Facility Population vs. Budget  
 
 
Study Participants 
 After identifying an initial sample of participants from a variety of sources (e.g. 
government websites, newspapers), snowball sampling was used to identify additional 
participants (e.g. former employees) (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981; Wright, Decker,  
Redfern, and Smith, 1992).  Snowball sampling was employed because it was important 
to contact employees who had differing levels of experiences and roles within the agency.  
For example, some employees had worked in multiple safe schools (e.g. transferred from 
Catalina Mountain School in Tucson to Adobe Mountain School in Phoenix), while 
others had a greater involvement in the CRIPA investigation than others (e.g. long time 
employees vs. recent hires).  Using a semi-structured questionnaire, 47 interviews were 
conducted with individuals intimately familiar with juvenile corrections across the state 
of Arizona.  Twenty-seven interviews were completed with current and former 
employees of ADJC, 12 interviews were conducted with court officials from 7 counties 
across the state, and 7 individuals who were identified as community advocates for 
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juvenile justice were interviewed.  In all, 75 individuals were contacted for interviews for 
a response rate of 61%.  Of those that did not participate, 7 declined to be involved and 
22 did not respond to repeated emails or phone calls.  Among those who declined to 
participate, one individual stated that just discussing the problems at ADJC would bring 
up too many negative emotions. 
 
Data Collection 
 Data collection for the current dissertation consisted of interviews, reviews of 
documents, and reviews of newspaper articles (See Table 3).  After multiple visits (e.g. 
tours of the safe schools) to ADJC and negotiations over the content of the project, full 
access was granted to interview all willing employees.  This access was not without its 
challenges.  First, in order for the ADJC to agree to allow interviews of employees, the 
research team was required to also investigate any influences that CRIPA may have had 
on the operations of the community corrections aspects of ADJC.  Although the focus of 
the current dissertation is the operation of institutions of confinement, it is also important 
to address how the ADJC’s growing focus on treatment in communities impacts the 
institutions.  A second issue that arose was the changing of agency directors right as data 
collection was set to begin.  In the same week that full approval was given for interviews 
with ADJC employees, the director that had granted the access resigned.  The timing of 
these events may suggest that the approval to begin interviews was artificial and merely 
done for appearances, although this is unclear.  Fortunately, the incoming administration 
of the ADJC remained supportive of the project and agreed to allow interviews to begin.   
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Table 3. Data Collection 
Type of Data # of 
Interviews/
Documents 
Date of 
Interview 
Document 
Dates 
Interviews    
Current ADJC Employees 23 10/2011-
3/2012 
 
Former ADJC Employees 4 9/2011-
12/2011 
 
Community Advocates 7 6/2011-
11/2011 
 
Court Representatives 12 7/2011-
10/2011 
 
Documents    
ADJC Documents 43  1/2003-8/2012 
Newspapers 96  7/1990-8/2011 
Government Documents 41  12/1989-
9/2012 
 
Interviews of juvenile corrections officials, county court employees, and 
community advocates for corrections were conducted in Arizona between June of 2011 to 
March of 2012.  Typically, participants were sent an initial email requesting their 
participation in the project (see Appendix 2).  It was made clear that the project was  
being independently conducted through Arizona State University (ASU) and was in no 
way a new investigation of the agency.  Non-respondents were sent two more emails in 
the weeks following the initial email, which were then followed by phone calls.  Included 
in the requests for participation was a statement outlining that all information shared 
between the interviewer and participant was voluntary and that they could stop the 
interviews at any time.  They were informed that all information would be confidential 
and their names and/or positions would not be identified.  Although reports would be 
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given to ADJC administrators, participants were assured that their unique responses 
would not be identifiable in the report.  Signed informed consent forms were not 
collected; however, passive consent was obtained through the information letters.   
Each interview lasted between 45 and 75 minutes and they were held in locations 
selected by participants, typically their place of employment.  Participants were assured 
that their identities would remain confidential and that no names or titles would be 
identified.  Open-ended questioning was used in order to determine what participants 
thought and felt about the ADJC’s response to CRIPA.  During most of the interviews, 
field notes were taken regarding anything of note that occurred before, during, or after the 
interviews took place.  In some cases, these were conversations that occurred in the 
hallways between officers about what they thought about their jobs or frustrations that 
they may have had with how the agency was operating.  In the cases where field notes 
were not taken, interviews occurred at locations outside of correctional or detention 
facilities (e.g. coffee shops and libraries).  
 Interviews were not tape recorded; instead notes were taken with pen and paper.  
This method was used to make participants feel more comfortable and willing to speak 
freely with interviewers.  At the time of the interviews, the agency had been experiencing 
hundreds of layoffs and it became clear throughout the project that many participants 
were still cautious of losing their jobs.  Efforts were made to write down most quotes 
verbatim, but naturally, this was not always the case.  For this reason, some of the quotes 
presented throughout the paper may contain slight variations from their original 
statements, however the researchers made all attempts to report these as closely as 
possible to their original statements.  Following each interview, both field and interview 
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notes were transcribed as soon as possible, typically within two to three hours after the 
interviews took place.   
 Due to the fact that most employees at the ADJC had been with the agency during 
one or more lawsuits, severe budget cuts, recent layoffs, and a threat of closure, it was 
recognized that administrators and line staff may be leery of participating fully with 
interviews.  In order to allay these fears, multiple steps were taken.  First, the project was 
described to participants.  They were reassured that the interviews were going to be used 
for a dissertation, and in no way were a reflection of any new problems within the 
agency.  Although they were informed that the ADJC would be receiving a copy of the 
final paper, they were again told that identifying information would not be included in the 
project.  Multiple participants feared that despite these assurances, that the information 
they gave would make it possible for an insider to identify their interviews.  For example, 
one participant stated that based on the dates of employment, identification would be 
possible.  In such cases, participants were informed that their responses would be 
included with many other responses and that specific identifiers (e.g. dates of 
employment) would not be included.  Second, in nearly all interviews, I discussed my 
professional background for participants.  More specifically, I informed them that while I 
was currently a graduate student at ASU, I had been previously employed as a juvenile 
correctional officer in California.  I believed that by divulging my background as both a 
student and former correctional officer, participants would be more forthcoming than if I 
was in a more “intimidating” position that could jeopardize their jobs (e.g. correctional 
administrator).  I believe that these reassurances and background allowed participants to 
become comfortable with divulging information.  Additionally, all of the employees 
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interviewed at the Central Office (i.e. a building off-site of the “Safe Schools” where 
ADJC administrators work) were made aware that I had been granted the use of an office 
at the building.  It was believed that the fact I had an ADJC sanctioned office would 
increase my legitimacy with administrators. 
Interviews were conducted with both current and former employees of the ADJC 
(i.e. administrators, line staff, treatment providers, and educators), judges, 
detention/probation administrators, and community advocates.  As a result, although the 
purpose of the interviews was to answer specific questions regard the sustainability of 
CRIPA, interviews were highly tailored based upon individual positions (Appendices 3 
and 4).  For example, a former correctional officer would have very different experiences 
and knowledge than would a judge making decisions on committing a juvenile to ADJC.  
This meant that while questions were asked regarding similar topics, the wording of the 
questions would vary (e.g. “Has your agency (e.g. detention) made any changes in 
sending juveniles to the ADJC because of conditions at the ADJC?” versus “How has life 
at the ADJC changed for youths/staff since the investigation?”).   
Participants were informed that there were six broad areas that were being 
examined.  The first was the conditions leading to the CRIPA investigation and the 
process of the investigation.  The second issue examined was the changes that took place 
during the CRIPA investigation and how the institutions were changed while the agency 
was being monitored.  The third purpose was to determine how the agency had 
maintained the changes made during CRIPA after monitoring ceased.  In 2008, the 
United States began experiencing the effects of the Great Recession.  Because of this, the 
fourth purpose was to examine how the agency was able to maintain the previous changes 
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in spite of the recession.  County courts made the decision on whether or not to place a 
juvenile on probation in their respective counties or to refer them to the ADJC.  It was 
expected that juvenile courts may modify their referral practices based upon their 
perceptions of conditions at the ADJC.  Changes in referrals would then also directly 
impact the management of the safe schools, so the fifth purpose of the study was to 
examine how the six juvenile courts that send the most juveniles to ADJC perceived and 
responded to changes.  The final purpose of the study was to examine how changes may 
have resulted to juveniles supervised under community corrections.  This last purpose 
was not one of the original purposes of the current study, but was a required area of study 
in order to gain the cooperation of the ADJC.  Because this latter purpose has little 
relation to civil rights while confined, this dissertation does not address the issue. 
 
Documents    
 In addition to the interviews with relevant juvenile justice actors, numerous 
documents were reviewed to shed light on the historical context of the agency and how 
this shaped the implementation of the changes post-CRIPA.  The primary purpose of the 
documents was to fill in the gaps from the interviews, serve as a method to confirm the 
information provided in the interviews, and provide further insight into both the process 
of implementation and sustainability of change.  These documents included 96 newspaper 
articles from 1992 to 2011, 41 government documents pertaining to the agency, and 43 
reports/documents found online that were created by those within Arizona’s juvenile 
corrections agency.   
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One of the “richest” sources of data that served to guide both the interviews and 
analysis were articles in a local paper, the Phoenix New Times, which published dozens 
of articles surrounding the conditions of the ADJC over the past twenty years.  Although 
some of the research participants later discounted the accuracy of some of the paper’s 
reports, it was nevertheless the impetus for the CRIPA investigation, suggesting there 
was validity in the reports.  Other newspaper articles were gathered from the Arizona 
Republic, the Arizona Daily Star, and the Arizona Daily Sun.  Word searches were 
conducted directly through Arizona newspaper websites using the search terms of 
“ADJC,” “Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections,” and “Arizona Juvenile 
Corrections”.  Only articles that did not directly discuss the agency were excluded.  For 
example, articles that discussed a crime committed by a juvenile who was then sent to the 
ADJC, but included no additional information regarding agency functions, were 
excluded.  Some articles were no longer accessible directly through newspaper websites, 
so these were accessed through Lexis Nexis. 
The second source of document data were documents obtained directly from the 
ADJC website.  The agency publishes multiple reports through the website including an 
annual report, a five-year strategic plan, a program overview, institutional handbooks, a 
history of the agency, and organizational chart.  Additional documents were located 
through the Arizona State Library, Archives and Public Records, which included ADJC 
newsletters and older reports that had been distributed throughout the agency.  The 
research department at the ADJC also maintains a repository for documents related to the 
CRIPA investigation.  Open access to this repository was restricted for confidentiality 
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reasons; however, it is believed that the majority of documents included in the repository 
were found elsewhere (e.g. reports by CRIPA monitors).   
The third source of document data were other government documents obtained 
from outside government agencies.  These included the Department of Justice’s annual 
publication of “Department of Justice Activities Under the Civil Rights of 
Institutionalized Persons Act,” semi-annual reports made by the DOJ regarding progress 
at the ADJC during monitoring, and a Sunset Review of the ADJC by the Arizona 
Auditor General.  Additional documents not directly pertaining to CRIPA or the ADJC, 
but more general juvenile justice issues in Arizona were also examined.  This was 
because the functioning of juvenile detention has a direct influence on state corrections.  
For example, documents from the Arizona Juvenile Justice Commission (AJJC) were 
collected, as they included funding decisions that impacted the ADJC.  Other types of 
documents included presentations made by ADJC representatives at conferences or 
juvenile justice meetings.  For example, at one meeting for the Arizona Children’s 
Executive Committee, an ADJC representative discussed how the agency responded to 
juveniles released on community corrections.  
 
Researcher’s Bias 
 Qualitative researchers have suggested that one way to maintain internal validity 
in qualitative research is to present researcher biases upfront (Creswell, 1994; Merriam, 
1988, 1995).  My perception of juvenile correctional institutions has been highly shaped 
by both my personal experiences as a juvenile correctional officer and my knowledge 
gained from courses examining juvenile justice and organizational theory.  In regard to 
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the former, before starting the doctoral program, I was a juvenile correctional officer in 
California.  My training for the position consisted of 8 weeks of training regarding 
policies, institutional operations, suicide prevention, responses to juveniles with mental 
health issues, physical restraints, and separation (i.e. solitary confinement).  In other 
words, I had been trained in all of the areas that had been raised as issues in the CRIPA at 
the ADJC.   Based on statements made by employees at the ADJC, this training was very 
similar to the training experienced by correctional officers at the agency.  Many of the 
issues brought up by participants were issues that I had personally confronted (e.g. 
suicidal juveniles).  In additional to professional experience, my training in graduate 
school has also addressed many of the issues that were raised during data collection.  
More specifically, I have taken courses in corrections, juvenile justice, and organizational 
management, all of which informed various aspects of the project.   
I do not believe that these potential biases were harmful to data collection, and in 
fact, I believe they were useful in data collection.  More specifically, I was mindful 
throughout data collection not to project my personal experiences on participants.  Aside 
from the initial mention of my background, very rarely was it brought up at later points in 
interviews.  However, there were some cases where my background was used to establish 
rapport with the participants.  For example, a juvenile had committed suicide at the ADJC 
two years prior to data collection.  This was an extremely difficult subject for many of the 
officers and employees to discuss.  In one instance, when a participant was asked about 
the incident, it was obvious to the interviewer that the question was ill received.  I then 
disclosed that a juvenile at the agency I was employed at had committed suicide, so I was 
aware that it could happen without any staff misconduct or wrongdoing.  The participant 
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then responded that he was glad I was able to sympathize with the traumatic event.  This, 
and other examples, were used frequently to suggest to participants that I was not passing 
judgment or blame, and was only attempting to determine the situation of the agency.  
 
Case Study Research Methodology 
Adopting a qualitative research methodology was crucial for the current project 
because it focused on understanding the process of reforming an agency over multiple 
years.  In particular, qualitative research aims at “understanding how people interpret 
their experiences, how they construct their worlds, and what meaning they attribute to 
their experiences” (Merriam, 2009, p. 5).  To explore the responses of an agency 
reforming following a consent decree, a case study research design was used.  A case 
study was an appropriate method because of the broadness of the area being studied, the 
importance of the context in which such decisions were taking place, and the multiple 
data sources (Yin, 2003).   
Case studies provide context to research projects by examining both historical and 
chronological aspects of an issue that may not be captured in quantitative research 
(Creswell, 2006).  Furthermore, qualitative research is able to contextualize a case study 
in a broader framework and develop themes to help analyze the data.  Case studies are 
particularly advantageous over other methods because they allow for multiple forms of 
relevant data to be collected (Neale, Thapa, and Boyce, 2006), which “can strengthen the 
evidence for case studies” (Yin, 2012, p. 182).  Using an intensive case study method, it 
was possible to develop a deeper understanding of both the research setting and 
theoretical explanations to explain outcomes (Cunningham, 1997). 
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Data Analysis 
Data analysis is arguably the stage in qualitative research that is most different 
from quantitative studies (Maxwell, 1996).  It is suggested that “the core of qualitative 
analysis lies in these related processes of describing phenomena, classifying it, and seeing 
how…concepts are interconnect[ed]” (Dey, 1993, p. 31).  Initial themes were developed 
to explore the process of CRIPA implementation and sustainment.  During the review and 
coding of the interviews, field notes, and document review, these were further developed 
and expanded.  The qualitative software program Dedoose v. 4.2.79 was used to assist in 
the organization of the data.  The coding of all relevant documents in the Dedoose 
program allowed for the identification of patterns across the multiple data sources.  Two 
general analytic strategies were used at the onset to examine how the agency reformed 
following the consent decree—relying on theoretical propositions and thinking about 
rival explanations (Yin, 2003).   
Yin (2003) suggests that two of the three most valuable strategies for analyzing 
case study data are to rely on theoretical propositions and to consider rival explanations.  
The former is useful for organizing the case study around a theory and identifying 
explanations other than the theoretical proposition.  In the current dissertation, 
institutional theory was drawn upon to explain how a correctional department responds to 
a potential lawsuit.  As has been previously argued, criminal justice organizations rely on 
financial support, resources, and perceptions of legitimacy from external agencies in 
order to survive.  As a result, they are forced to comply with the rules and beliefs 
instituted by such agencies (Dacin, Goodstein, and Scott, 2002; DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  In other words, conforming to the rules and norms of 
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the external agencies results in organizations being “rewarded for establishing correct 
structures and processes” (Scott and Meyer, 1983, p. 149).  The current dissertation 
proposes that the changes made during CRIPA were shaped in large part by the 
organization’s reliance on external agencies for funding, legitimacy, programming, and 
the juveniles that are sent to the agency.   
To further examine the proposition that the ADJC produced long term reforms as 
a direct result of conforming to the demands of external environments, two rival 
explanations were considered as to how the ADJC institutionalized change—the deterrent 
impact of punitive and preventive controls.  Although these controls were the result of the 
CRIPA investigation, it is important to consider them separately from institutional 
concerns.  More specifically, punitive (e.g. punishments against officers) and preventive 
(e.g. removing opportunities for officer corruption) controls were directed specifically at 
line level staff, who likely gave little consideration to the external pressures that are felt 
more by correctional administrators.  Yin suggests that this strategy is useful in case 
studies, as it allows for the consideration of the influence of additional independent 
variables.  In this case, the dependent variable would be the sustainability of change, 
while the independent variables would be the external influences of the organization 
environment, CRIPA monitoring, and the internal influences of punitive and preventive 
controls.  These analytic strategies were used to examine how an institution changes as a 
direct result of a CRIPA investigation, competing explanations for sustaining reform, and 
barriers that may compromise the reforms process.   
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Reliability and Validity 
 Qualitative research has long received criticisms because of perceptions that there 
are inherent difficulties in producing valid and reliable findings.  The major issue in 
applying concepts of reliability and validity to qualitative research is that they are derived 
from quantitative methods.  Merriam (1995) presents some of the questions that have 
been asked of qualitative researchers including: “How can you generalize from a small, 
non-random sample?” and “If somebody else did this study, would they get the same 
results” (p. 51).  In response, Merriam argues that these are inappropriate questions to be 
asking for assessing reliability and validity of qualitative research because the purpose of 
qualitative studies is to understand phenomena, build theory, and provide a fresh outlook 
on issues.  Similarly, Eck (2006) argues that case studies and randomized controlled 
experiments both have value in evaluations.  Instead of discounting the value of case 
studies because of threats to internal validity, Eck suggests that they are in fact valuable 
because they are less expensive, they can begin after program implementation, they help 
explain the results of unique interventions, and they can be used without controls or 
comparisons with other similar programs.  In other words, Eck makes the argument that 
case studies are more useful than a study that didn’t occur because of potential threats to 
validity.   
 One of the overarching questions of ensuring reliability and validity, or rigor, is 
what is the tradeoff in reaching reliable and valid findings?  In most cases, the methods to 
obtain reliability and validity are in stark contrast to the very essence of qualitative 
methods.  As Sandelowski (1993) argues, being forced to abide by rigid methods in order 
to achieve requirements like replicability, prohibits the artistry and flexibility of 
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qualitative research.  Quantitative methods generally require threats to validity to be dealt 
with at early stages of research by setting up control groups, performing randomization, 
and other designs.  On the other hand, qualitative studies are rarely afforded the luxury to 
set up experimental controls or use other methods to tackle threats to validity early on.  
As many qualitative studies are conducted in such a way as to allow for adaptability 
based upon issues confronted in the field, the rigidity required by quantitative methods is 
not worth the cost.  While the solutions to threats to validity developed by qualitative 
researchers (e.g. triangulation, member checks, ruling out threats over time) may appear 
less formal and rigorous, they allow for both flexible methods and validity. 
Many suggestions have been made to ensure internal validity in qualitative 
research studies (Merriam, 1988).  These include triangulation (i.e. multiple sources of 
data used to confirm findings), peer and colleague examinations (i.e. obtaining feedback 
from colleagues on findings), researcher presenting biases at the beginning of the study, 
and submersion in research (i.e. obtaining data over a long term).  Each of these 
suggestions were observed and practiced during data collection.  First, triangulation was 
accomplished by relying on multiple forms of data (i.e. government documents, 
newspaper articles, and interviews) when coming to conclusions.  Second, informal 
meetings frequently occurred and email exchanges occurred nearly each week during 
data collection between researchers to discuss findings that were emerging.  Third, 
researcher’s potential biases were addressed earlier in the current chapter.  Finally, 
interviews occurred over a 10 month period and articles were collected over a 20 year 
period, allowing for a more in depth understanding of the agency and how it responded to 
CRIPA. 
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 Case studies have also been criticized for the difficulties in generalizing findings 
past the case being examined, which threatens external validity (Creswell, 1994; Yin, 
2003).  Flyvbjerg (2006) has argued that social scientists view case studies as being 
useful for informing future research, but that they criticize case studies for limited 
generalizability.  Flyvbjerg instead suggests that they can allow for both depth and 
generalizability when multiple case studies are conducted.  Although conducting multiple 
case studies was not feasible in this case, generalizability was improved by providing a 
rich description of the case study, allowing for future replications (Lincoln and Guba, 
1985; Schoenfield, 1993).  Yin also suggests that comparing qualitative with quantitative 
methods is inappropriate in this case because “survey research relies on statistical 
generalization, whereas case studies rely on analytical generalization” (p. 37).  In other 
words, the generalization occurring in a case study is to a theory and not a larger 
population.   
 Finally, the reliability of qualitative research ensures that future researchers could 
replicate the same case study again based upon the data collection methods described by 
the first researcher (Yin, 2003).  The main concern with reliability is that the initial 
researcher(s) thoroughly documented their methods for data collection in order to 
“minimize errors and biases in a study” (p. 37).  Yin suggests that documentation should 
include an overview of the project, procedures used in the field, questions used in the 
case study, and providing a guide for the case study that is incorporated into the case 
study protocol, all of which were included in earlier sections of the current dissertation.     
 In sum, the current study will rely on a case study methodology to examine the 
sustainability of a consent decree in the Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections.  A 
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review of the ADJC in chapters two and three has provided only a brief glimpse of the 
agency reforms from 2004 to 2007.  Although the reforms were portrayed to an extent in 
newspaper articles covering the suicides and CRIPA monitor reports suggesting the 
agency was making successful changes, these documents provided only a brief glimpse 
of the process of long-term organizational reform.  By employing a case study method, 
this dissertation is able to provide a more in depth contextual analysis from the 
perspectives of multiple actors in the criminal justice system of the sustainability of 
CRIPA reforms.  Chapter four examines in detail how the agency responded to each of 
the areas that were reformed under CRIPA and how changes made in those areas have 
been sustained.  Chapter five outlines how the agency worked to reform the culture 
following the consent decree.  Chapter six then presents two rival explanations for 
correctional reform.  First, chapter six addresses reform from an institutional theory 
perspective and will examine if pressures to maintain legitimacy in an institutional 
environment have encouraged the sustainment of change.  Then, internal correctional 
change will be examined to determine how punitive and preventive controls implemented 
during CRIPA have encouraged sustainability by deterring misconduct.  Finally, chapter 
seven will present conclusions and discuss policy implications for the implementation of 
future consent decrees.  
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Chapter 4 
Long Term Reforms Following CRIPA 
 Providing treatment and rehabilitation to confined populations, especially 
juveniles, is difficult to accomplish.  More specifically, suicide prevention, health care, 
and security of juveniles have been found to be particularly challenging to provide in 
institutions nationwide (Guarino-Ghezzi and Loughran, 2006; Parent, 1993; Parent, 
Lieter, Kennedy, Livens Wentworth, and Wilcox, 1994).  These challenges have been 
further complicated in facilities where juveniles face abuse by staff and find it difficult to 
file grievances against abuse.  In fact, relatively few institutions have been found to be in 
full compliance with national standards of care.  Despite these difficulties, institutions are 
obligated to provide a minimum standard of care and prevent the deprivation of civil 
rights of inmates (Puritz and Scali, 1998a).  Institutions that are found to exhibit a pattern 
or practice of abuses can now be sued by the federal government under the Civil Rights 
of Institutionalized Persons Act. 
 The current chapter examines the changes at the Arizona Department of Juvenile 
Corrections that occurred following a consent decree under the CRIPA.  The semi-annual 
reports by the CRIPA Consultants Committee
3
 demonstrated that the ADJC was able to 
come into full compliance of the Memorandum of Understanding within a three year  
 
 
 
                                                          
 
3
 The terms CRIPA monitors, investigators, and consultants committee are used interchangeably 
throughout this dissertation. 
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Table 4. Progress of the ADJC in Achieving Compliance with the MOU 
 
Substantial 
Compliance 
Partial 
Compliance 
Non-
Compliance Not Rated 
# of Issues 
Evaluated* 
3/15/2005 23 91 9 13 136 
9/15/2005 55 70 1 0 126 
3/15/2006 107 19 0 0 126 
9/15/2006 118 10 0 0 128 
3/15/2007 120 3 0 0 123 
9/15/2007 120 0 0 0 120 
      *The total number of issues that fell into compliance does not total 136 during each 
report because areas where the agency was found to be in substantial compliance over 
an 18 month period were terminated from the agreement.  Furthermore, some of the 
issues were combined or separated over the course of monitoring. 
Source: Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections (2009) 
 
period (Table 4).  In March of 2005 the agency was in substantial compliance
4
 with 23 of 
the identified issues in the MOU, but by September of 2007 they were in compliance with 
all 120 issues that were required to be resolved.  The first semi-annual report 
demonstrated that the consultants overall were very satisfied with how the ADJC was 
responding to the investigation.  For example, they reported that “at the conclusion of site 
visits…debriefings were held with Director Branham and his leadership team.  The team 
was completely receptive to recommendations of the Consultants Committee and in many 
cases instituted remedial measures prior to the termination of the visit” (Hayes, Kraus, 
Leone, Van Vleet, 2005, 1).  The committee reported that this cooperation by the ADJC 
director and staff continued until the final report in September of 2007.   
The DOJ outlined several areas that needed improvement, including suicide 
prevention, juvenile justice, special education, medical care, and mental health care.  
                                                          
 
4
 Substantial compliance was defined by the consultants as being in “compliance with all components of 
the rated provision” (Hayes, Kraus, Leone, Van Vleet, 2005, p. 2). 
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Each section will present specific issues noted in the initial investigation by the CRIPA 
monitors, the first semi-annual report in 2005 by the monitors, the sixth semi-annual 
report in 2007 by the monitors, performance audits in 2009 by the Arizona Auditor 
General examining conditions at the ADJC, perspectives of ADJC staff that were 
interviewed for the dissertation, and documents describing current conditions of the 
institutions.    
 
Suicide Prevention and Treatment 
Reforming Suicide Prevention and Treatment During CRIPA 
 Following the completed suicides of juveniles in 2002 and 2003 at ADJC 
facilities, the U.S. DOJ entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the 
ADJC to make over 120 specific changes.  Many of these changes related directly to the 
prevention of and response to suicide.  To satisfy the MOA, the ADJC improved training, 
building structures, and policies in order to prevent juveniles from committing suicides.  
In response to an audit of the ADJC by the Arizona Auditor General (AG), the director of 
the ADJC outlined the changes that were made.  These included: “all four facilities were 
retrofitted and remodeled to reduce the opportunity for juvenile suicide, the Department 
implemented a comprehensive new suicide prevention program,…the Department 
developed and implemented or revamped virtually all of its secure care operations and 
programming,…[and the Department] revamped both its Pre-service Academy and the 
delivery of in service training” (Branham, 2009, pg. 1).  Interviewees participating in the 
present study confirmed that each of these reforms did in fact occur.   
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 The most notable and visible change to preventing future suicides was the 
retrofitting of the institutions.  Specifically, the agency “suicide proofed” lights, doors, 
vents, and beds to prevent future incidents.  Limitations on what juveniles could have in 
their rooms were also imposed.  For example, juveniles were no longer allowed to wear 
belts or bring plastic bags into their rooms.  All of the participants spoke positively of the 
retrofitting, with the exception of one community representative.  This participant felt 
that other states have been successful at keeping low suicide rates without modifying the 
structure of the institutions.  For example, in Missouri, staff have been able to keep 
juveniles safe because of changes in staff and training.  One article about the retrofitting 
echoed this sentiment by stating that “you can’t suicide-proof a kid, not even with fancy 
vents and bunk beds fused to the cinder block wall of the cell” (Silverman, 2009).   
In addition to modifying building structures, the department also provided more 
intensive training to prevent suicide and changed how it responded to potentially suicidal 
juveniles.  Following the CRIPA, new employees were trained in how to make 
appropriate room checks, how to identify risk factors for suicides, the importance of 
starting “red folders” for juveniles (i.e. used to monitor juveniles under suicide watch), 
and were informed about the history of the agency and the CRIPA intervention.  
Refresher trainings are also given to all correctional officers each year, as was suggested 
in the MOA.  As a result of CRIPA, the department began closer monitoring of suicidal 
juveniles through more consistent room checks and better documentation.   
Due to changes at the administrative level in quality assurance, the ADJC has 
maintained a closer adherence to these room checks than it had in previous years.  
Discussed in more depth in Chapter 6, the department’s initiation of a COMPSTAT 
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program has allowed for increased supervision of staff to ensure compliance with policies 
for monitoring juveniles.  Although monitoring of suicidal juveniles was mandated prior 
to CRIPA, the investigators noted numerous incidents where room checks would exceed 
the maximum time limits.  The current supervision levels for juveniles who are a danger 
to themselves are constant supervision, 10 minute room checks, and 15 minute room 
checks, depending upon the severity of the threat.  The department has also improved 
documentation of suicidal juveniles.  Juveniles at risk of suicide are placed on a “red 
folder,” which signals to officers the enhanced monitoring of the juvenile.  As noted in 
the final report by the CRIPA monitors, staff placing a juvenile under suicide watch must 
“document the initiation of the precautions level of observation, housing location, and 
conditions of the precautions” (Hayes, Kraus, Leone, and Van Vleet, 2007, p. 13).  
Overall, officers and monitors reported a high level of satisfaction with the changes made 
post-CRIPA and the adherence to the revised policies.  Exceptions to these practices are 
discussed below.   
The only lingering issue related to suicide prevention that was noted in the final 
CRIPA report by the DOJ monitors was that once juveniles were removed from suicide 
precautions, their Continuous Case Plans (CCPs) should be revised to reflect changes in 
future treatment.  However, the report notes that the department has only achieved 
“‘paper’ compliance with CCPs, [and] the consistency of quality treatment planning for 
youth discharged from suicide precautions remains uneven” (Hayes et al., 2007, p. 5).  
This has led to poor implementation of methods to reduce suicidal behaviors.  Very few 
participants discussed this as a major concern of suicide prevention in the agency.  While 
some recognized that the CCPs were ineffectively written and carried out prior to CRIPA 
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or that staff shortages prevented effective case management, no participants expressed 
any concerns directly related to poor case management following removal from suicide 
precautions.     
 
Sustaining Reforms in the Treatment of Suicidal Juveniles 
To examine more recent conditions at the ADJC, the Arizona Auditor General’s 
(AG) audit of the ADJC in September of 2009, a part of the decennial sunset review, was 
assessed.  Following a lengthy audit, they concluded that the issues relating to suicide 
addressed in the CRIPA report (i.e. inadequate training for suicide prevention, inadequate 
assessments/treatment, inconsistent communication, unsafe facilities, placing suicidal 
juveniles in isolation, poor interventions, and inadequate follow-ups) greatly improved as 
a direct result of the investigation.  Changes that were noted in the report include: 
increased training for suicide prevention (e.g. annual trainings, reviews of policies), 
better monitoring of juveniles, improved communication between units, improvements in 
rooms to prevent suicides, trainings on how to intervene in potential suicides, and follow 
up of all suicide attempts.  At the time of the report, it was noted that since the three 
suicides in 2002 and 2003, the ADJC had not had a completed suicide.  Despite these 
positive improvements noted in the report, there were multiple suggestions made by the 
AG as to how the ADJC could continue reforming.  Through departmental audits from 
April 2008 to March 2009, the AG found that treatment plans did not always address 
youths with suicidal behaviors, suicidal juveniles were inappropriately placed in 
separation, suicide-proof smocks were commonly used before mental health assessments 
at Catalina Mountain School (not addressed in this report because CMS had closed by the 
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time interviews at ADJC began), and 51% of eligible juveniles for a suicide incident 
report did not have a report completed.    
 Overall, it appeared based upon reports from both those employed by the ADJC 
and those external to the agency that improvements had been made in suicide prevention 
and responses to suicidal juveniles.  Then in December of 2009 the Phoenix New Times, a 
local weekly newspaper that published articles about the abuses at ADJC and ultimately 
led to the CRIPA investigation, published a new article—Suicidal Tendencies: The 
Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections is a Bloody Mess (Silverman, 2009).  In the 
article, incidents of suicide attempts or cutting were reported on February 14
th
, April 3
rd
, 
April 4
th
, April 14
th
, May 17
th
, and September 21
st
 of 2009.  These attempts are 
unsurprising, as the Auditor General reports that from January of 2007 until mid-2009, 
there was about one serious suicide attempt per month.  While the New Times article 
acknowledged the report, it stated that “the report was largely glowing, leading the 
Arizona Republic, the state’s newspaper of record, to hand out high-fives in a story 
headlined, ‘Arizona’s Juvenile Jails Free of Suicides Since ’03.’  The story and the audit 
didn’t mention how close some of the calls were.”  The article cites multiple examples, 
including a boy who was unconscious after strangling himself with his pants, a girl who 
tied a shirt around her neck to choke herself, and a boy with a towel around his neck who 
“was turning red and then blue.”  As will be discussed later in this chapter, Silverman 
notes that the ADJC has improved since CRIPA, but that “the agency is clearly unable to 
provide adequate care for seriously mentally ill kids.”   
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Completed Suicide of Juvenile Following CRIPA 
 Unfortunately, the ADJC experienced a completed suicide in May of 2010, only 
five months after the Suicidal Tendencies article was published.  Multiple participants 
both internal and external to the ADJC reported on the suicide and confirmed many of the 
details that had been released in Silverman’s (2010a; 2010b) articles immediately after 
the incident.  The male juvenile who committed suicide was reportedly a Native 
American and homosexual, two factors that could potentially predispose the juvenile to 
suicide.  It was also reported that he had additional risk factors for suicide including 
family issues, alcoholism, mental health problems, and prior suicide attempts.  Multiple 
participants stated that the juvenile had made comments while at ADJC about suicide, but 
the juvenile said “he wouldn’t try to commit suicide because they watched him so well.”  
The juvenile was on close observation “just because,” although he never made any direct 
threats.  Despite these general concerns, he was not on a red folder, which would have 
resulted in more intensive supervision.  The justification for this was that “it wasn’t like 
he threatened to kill himself a couple of days before he did it…it had been a while.”  This 
incident highlights the point made by the Auditor General that suicidal behaviors were 
not always addressed in treatment plans.   
Shortly before the juvenile committed suicide, it was reported that he had 
received adult charges for an assault, meaning that he would be transferred into the adult 
system.  Some speculated that the potential for transfer “may have impacted his decision 
because of adult charges.  The outcome for his going to court was he was relieved, but 
there is some question about if he was happy about this outcome or just faking it.”  Days 
prior to the suicide, the juvenile was transferred from a mental health unit to a unit for 
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violent and assaultive juveniles.  This was a unit that he was unfamiliar with where he did 
not know the staff well.  It was reported that it was policy that if juveniles are moved 
from one unit to another, mental health staff were required to have a meeting with the 
staff in the unit.  This was “kind of done, but wasn’t a formalized review.  We don’t 
move many kids from a special unit to another and this problem highlighted exactly why 
we don’t do this…In hindsight he should have never been taken off of a red folder ever.” 
On the night of the incident, the juvenile used a plastic bag to cover his face and 
ultimately suffocated himself.  Although the Youth Correctional Officer (YCO) working 
the night shift in the unit checked on the juvenile multiple times that night, the officer 
failed to follow protocols and training because he never checked whether  the juvenile 
was breathing or that the juvenile’s face was visible.  Instead he merely counted the 
number of juveniles in the unit rather than shining a light on their faces.  In fact, the YCO 
admitted that he had not observed the juvenile’s face that night when questioned by 
administrators.  The window on the door of the room the juvenile occupied was also 
reported to be heavily scratched, which made it even more difficult to view the juveniles.  
The juvenile was deceased for nearly six hours before it was realized that he was not 
breathing.   
The majority of those interviewed reported that the third shift YCO had been 
negligent in ensuring the safety of the juveniles that night, but not all officers felt this 
way.  Those that perceived negligence reported that the officer “should have seen it 
sooner.”  Most felt confident that the suicide prevention/detection practices in place were 
effective and best practice, and that this incident was an “individual lapse and not 
necessarily indicative of the system as a whole.”   
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Long Term Reforms in Suicide Prevention 
As a result of the incident, the officer working that night was first placed on leave 
and ultimately resigned from his position.  The suicide also had many long-term effects 
on the agency.  First, it demonstrated to staff that they always needed to be vigilant of 
suicides.  It was apparent that because the agency had gone so long without a suicide that 
concerns had waned over the risk of suicides.  One of the COMPSTAT meetings 
(discussed in depth in chapter six) during data collection highlighted this point.  In a 
meeting in October 2011, areas where the department was out of compliance included: 
staff could not see into some windows because of scratches, a welfare check occurred 
after 23 minutes for a level 3 juvenile, and one juvenile had been inappropriately put on 
suicide watch.  With regard to the juvenile being placed on suicide watch, it was reported 
that a red folder to indicate the juvenile needed to be closely monitored was not started 
when the juvenile was placed in separation, as it should have been.  What this meant was 
that the juvenile was being checked at appropriate intervals according to protocols, but 
that timesheets were not completed to document these.  At the meeting, it was reported 
that there was a breakdown in communication between the mental health staff and YCOs.  
When it appeared that staff were blaming one another for the lapse, one administrator 
stated that “everyone should take ownership…This is especially concerning considering 
where the agency has been that there would be a problem with tracking a suicide.”  In 
order to address the issue immediately, one administrator announced that in the future, 
the psychologist who recommends having a level (i.e. increased monitoring of suicidal 
juveniles) should obtain the name of the officer starting the red folder so that a similar 
incident did not occur again.   
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Other long term changes have included: juveniles now must see a psychologist 
before and after they visit court, staff meetings must occur if a juvenile is going to be 
moved from one unit, superintendents can no longer move juveniles to a different unit 
without first consulting with clinicians or mental health professionals, staff have high end 
flashlights to observe juveniles through windows, staff must see juveniles moving under 
their blankets, juveniles can no longer have anything over their necks at nighttime, glass 
on the windows was changed, managers and security now do occasional room checks 
during the third shift,  juveniles cannot have plastic bags, and lights in the hallways are 
now kept on.  One ADJC employee noted that many of these policies after the suicide 
weren’t necessarily new, but that they hadn’t always been followed after CRIPA.  As a 
result, “the suicide really opened our eyes again.”  For the most part, the adherence to old 
and new policies for suicide prevention has been received well within the department.  
One exception to this is not all YCOs have responded well to managers being required to 
do room checks during the night shift.  It is reported that some of the night shift felt 
undervalued and that the importance of their roles was being overlooked in the 
department.   
 Staff varied greatly in their perceptions over how preventable the suicide in 2010 
was.  On one hand, some employees suggested that not all suicides can be prevented and 
placed the majority of the blame on the juvenile.  In one interview when a correctional 
officer was asked to describe the incident, the response was that “a kid took a plastic bag 
and put it over his head… what else do you want to know?”  With additional probing this 
participant then admitted that he heard the plastic bag over the juvenile’s head was visible 
and that the night staff did not see the juvenile in time.  The participant went on to say 
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that the department “already had a really good suicide prevention program in place and 
that they didn’t need to change what they were doing.”  Others felt that even with the best 
of care, treatment, and supervision, juveniles will commit suicide.  For example, one 
respondent stated that  
I had the feeling of what more can you do because we had put so much into 
suicide prevention.  The suicide was very hard on staff and they felt responsible.  
It wasn’t a problem with the policy/training.  The problem was with people not 
doing what they were supposed to be doing.  The administration can’t watch 
everyone all the time.  This comes down to human beings doing what they are 
supposed to do.  Staff are not paid well and they have difficult jobs.  It is also hard 
to keep people alert.  
 
 In contrast, other staff felt that multiple factors led to the suicide, not just the 
desire of the juvenile to commit suicide.  These factors included: the negligence of the 
YCO working the unit that night, the scratched windows that made it difficult to see in 
the room, and moving the juvenile from one special unit to another.  With regard to the 
latter point, multiple staff questioned the decision of the assistant superintendent and 
movement coordinator to remove the juvenile from a unit he was reportedly comfortable 
in to a unit for violent juveniles.  As one staff reported, “moving him was just a way for 
them to be assholes to a kid who was being an asshole…They were not talking to people 
who knew the kid the best…[this] is an awful practice.”  Based upon these responses, it 
was evident that line staff were holding both the individual officer and administrators 
responsible for the suicide.    
 One issue that was also noted in the Auditor General’s report was that “suicidal 
juveniles were inappropriately placed in separation.”  Surprisingly none of the 
respondents expressed concerns over this issue.  In fact, one ADJC employee felt as if it 
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was a positive practice and allowed juveniles to be removed from stressful situations.  
More specifically 
They would receive a referral for self harm and would then see a mental health 
professional and go to a facility run by a mental health team.  There would be a 
concentration of mental health professionals in the unit.  The juvenile would then 
be away from the distractions of their units and could be monitored on camera.  
The health unit was also adjacent to them, so if there was a problem they could be 
rushed there right away. 
 
Although this respondent believed that separation was beneficial for suicidal juveniles, 
multiple respondents did express concerns over the excessive use of separation in the 
department.  These concerns arose as a direct result of CRIPA ending and the lack of 
monitoring of this practice because “during CRIPA we were watched like hawks.”  This 
participant did not specify exactly what these concerns were over; just that staff say 
juveniles are being “admitted for things they should not be there for.”   
Although the suicide in 2010 was a glaring misstep in an agency that had sought 
to improve practices since 2004, overall ADJC employees appeared satisfied with the 
extent of changes in suicide prevention and felt that a closer adherence to policies had 
successfully reduced the number of incidents at the agency.  Changes to physical 
structures of buildings, policies, and training all contributed to an overall improved 
perspective in the departmental response to suicide.  The following section will further 
examine changes that had a direct impact on suicide prevention (e.g. grievances, use of 
separation) and how juvenile justice has been maintained following the cessation of the 
consent decree. 
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Juvenile Justice 
 At the close of the CRIPA investigation in 2007, the CRIPA investigators 
appeared very satisfied with how the department responded to the recommendations to 
improve juvenile justice in the facility (i.e. grievances, sexual abuse, physical abuse, 
supervision, abuse investigations, disciplinary confinement, and unsanitary living 
conditions).  In their final report, the investigators declared that “ADJC has developed an 
administrative infrastructure that would allow the agency to provide services to youth 
while protecting them from harm.  The development of this infrastructure, over the last 3 
years, has been very impressive and is a major accomplishment for Director Michael 
Branham, his leadership team, and all staff throughout the agency” (Hayes et al., 2007, p. 
14).  In every juvenile justice issue where civil rights were deprived prior to CRIPA, the 
ADJC was in substantial compliance with each required change by the end of the consent 
decree.  The following section will examine each of the aspects of juvenile justice in 
more depth.
5
   
 
Grievances 
 During the initial investigation, the CRIPA investigators found so many issues 
with the juvenile grievance system that they categorized the grievance process as 
“dysfunctional,” while the juveniles described it as “a joke.”  Two specific issues were 
noted with how the ADJC handled juvenile grievances.  The first was that grievances 
                                                          
 
5
 An 8
th
 juvenile justice issue was identified in the CRIPA investigation, but is not addressed in the current 
report.  There was reportedly inadequate security at the Catalina Mountain Facility, but this facility closed 
prior to data collection and was not discussed in interviews. 
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made by juveniles are reviewed by the cottage supervisor where the juvenile is housed.  
This means that “many grievances include allegations of abuse against the very cottage 
staff for whom the supervisors are responsible” (Acosta, 2004, p. 15).  This process 
resulted in many juveniles being unwilling to report issues to staff.  Second, many 
juveniles were either not allowed to submit grievances or the grievances they filed were 
responded too slowly.  In fact, the investigators found that one-third of grievances over a 
three month period at one facility had not been resolved.  
 During their first semi-annual review in 2005, the DOJ investigators noted that 
the agency was in partial compliance with the majority of recommendations for 
grievances.  Although a grievance system had been implemented and efforts were made 
to inform juveniles of the new process, some criticisms remained.  Issues noted by the 
investigators included: officers were not accepting of the Youth Rights Specialist (YRS) 
in charge of collecting the grievances, officers occasionally tore up grievances, the YRS 
was not included in facility meetings, officers were unaware as to how the grievances had 
been resolved, the YRS was not included in resolution meetings, juveniles were still 
unsure of the grievance policies following orientation, there was a failure to verify the 
status of grievances with juveniles, and juveniles were not informed of the “resolution of 
their grievance.”  The department acted quickly to remedy the grievance issues noted in 
the investigators’ report.  In fact, in the sixth semi-annual review in 2007, the CRIPA 
monitors did not address any inadequacies in the grievance system.  Because the agency 
had been in full compliance in all grievance related areas for an 18 month period, 
monitoring had been terminated.  The Auditor General’s 2009 Sunset report did not shed 
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any new light on changes in the grievance process, but did report that in 2008, 98% of 
juveniles “felt satisfied with the outcome” of the grievance. 
 This satisfaction with the response of ADJC to the juvenile grievance process was 
further reflected in interviews with ADJC employees and community representatives.  
Although participants suggested that prior conditions and the use of grievances prior to 
CRIPA were poor, they had improved significantly as a result of CRIPA.  For example, 
one participant described how juveniles were placed in separation for long periods of 
time, exercise was limited, and that policies were not being enforced.  These problems 
had become so “normalized that kids weren’t even complaining about the conditions… it 
was toxic at the time.”  Because of this, “kids weren’t using the grievance system, which 
can be a problem if kids don’t believe grievances will be heard.”  This participant further 
described how none of the juveniles who committed suicide prior to CRIPA had filed 
grievances.  Before CRIPA, staff misconduct was occurring daily.  Respondents note that 
as a result of the grievance system that was put in place, juveniles can report if staff 
misconduct is ever a problem.  The grievances are also now numbered, so staff can no 
longer just rip up grievances that they did not agree with.   
During the time of data collection, it appears as if the reports of staff misconduct 
are much lower than they had been prior to CRIPA. At one staff meeting in October 
2011, it was reported that there had not been any staff misconduct grievances filed in the 
previous 6 months in any ADJC facilities.  At the boys’ facility, there was an average of 
2.92 grievances per week for other issues, which was down 11.76% from previous weeks.  
In contrast, the girls’ facility only had an average of 1.21 grievances per week, which was 
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up 12.5% from previous weeks.  The grievances that were made in the facilities were 
primarily for issues pertaining to food and property, not staff misconduct or abuse.   
 Although the grievance process has been met with much satisfaction, the agency 
is in the process of changing to an automated system.  It was reported that “one problem 
is that they have so many different systems where information goes that it can get 
cumbersome and fragmented.  They need to streamline their reporting systems…to have 
information consolidated.”  Having an effective and efficient grievance process has a 
direct impact on maintaining civil rights of confined juveniles, especially with respect to 
sexual and physical abuses that may occur while institutionalized. 
 
Sexual and Physical Abuse 
During the CRIPA investigation, numerous incidents of alleged physical and 
sexual abuse were uncovered.  It was found that “sexual abuse by staff and other 
juveniles occurs with incredibly disturbing frequency at Adobe, and that ADJC 
management does not affectively address this serious problem” (Acosta, 2004, p. 11).  
Issues cited in the report include at least two female employees who engaged in 
relationships with juveniles, a male employee who was too affectionate with the male 
delinquents, and sexual violence occurring between juveniles.  Similarly, juveniles were 
physically abused by both staff and other juveniles.  In some cases, staff would allow and 
encourage juveniles to fight with one another.  The physical abuses occurring from staff 
were highlighted when a juvenile was hit in front of the DOJ investigators.  They report 
that “we even observed a staff member slap an Encanto youth hard on the side of his head 
because he was moving ‘too slowly’ back to the housing unit after dinner” (p. 13).  Many 
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of the incidents of abuse were never investigated.  Despite these incidents of abuse noted 
in the investigation, the DOJ monitors noted difficulties in obtaining the full scope of 
abuses because of poor monitoring and investigations of abuse.   
In the first report by the CRIPA consultants on the status of the agency changes, 
they found the ADJC had made significant improvements to protect incarcerated 
juveniles from harm.  They found that the  
State has made significant efforts to improve the policies, procedures, and 
practices for the reporting and investigation of allegations of abuse of a youth 
made by any person, including youth… The State shall continue to make all 
reasonable efforts to ensure that all youth are protected from harm and that all 
allegations of abuse, including but not limited to physical and sexual abuse, are 
investigated in a timely and thorough manner by ADJC’s Investigations and 
Inspections Unit (I&I), and other appropriately trained investigative personnel, as 
designated by the ADJC director. 
 
The process of I&I and the impact that it has had on ADJC operations will be discussed 
in more depth in chapter 6, but it should be noted that the process brought about a more 
systematic way to report and investigate cases of abuse, as well as monitor correctional 
officers.   
Overall the investigators were satisfied with the steps the ADJC was taking to 
improve the agency.  There were a few notable exceptions where the department was 
only reported to have partial compliance with the changes.  Related to the grievance issue 
reported above, juveniles were unclear on how to report instances of abuse following an 
orientation to the institution.  Other issues that were noted included: “minor differences in 
processing” incident reports, failure to track referrals to CPS, failure to include 
documentation of injuries in incident reports, limited number of staff completing crisis 
intervention training, and the failure to evaluate training using quality assurance data.  In 
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the final report by the CRIPA monitors in 2007, it was reported that the ADJC was in 
substantial compliance with all recommended suggestions to protect juveniles from 
physical harm.  The monitors found that allegations of abuse were being effectively 
investigated by the I&I division and they believed incidents of abuse would decrease as 
the agency continued changing.   
Sustaining Reforms in Sexual and Physical Abuse.  In line with the beliefs of 
the CRIPA monitors that incidents of violence at the ADJC would significantly decrease 
as the agency continued to reform, data presented by the AG suggests that this did in fact 
happen (Figure 3).  As reported in the AG report, juvenile on juvenile assaults and fights 
both decreased substantially from 2007 to 2009.  Nevertheless, the AG still recommended 
that the ADJC continue to be aware of violence in the facilities and “assess whether its 
actions and practices are having a positive impact on reducing violence, and adjust when 
necessary if it finds these actions and practices no longer help to sustain reduced levels of 
violence” (Office of the Auditor General, 2009a, p. 25).   
 The AG report also indicates that, consistent with recommendations made by the 
CRIPA monitors, the ADJC has continued to monitor, investigate, and take action against 
employees that physically or sexually harm incarcerated juveniles.  They report that in 
2008, there were 329 investigations of misconduct, with 21% of the investigations being 
substantiated.  In 2008, 13% of the 78 employees who were fired from the ADJC were 
found to have either sexually or physically abused juveniles.  Legal actions were being 
taken against three of the staff who were fired in 2008.   
No specific reports of juveniles being physically abused by staff were reported 
after the CRIPA investigation ended.  However, multiple participants from the county  
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Figure 3. Juvenile-On-Juvenile Violence by Quarter First Quarter 2007 through Second 
Quarter 2009 
 
Source: Office of the Auditor General (2009) 
courts that send juveniles to the ADJC reported concerns over fighting and physical 
harm.  Many were concerned about juveniles being sent to the ADJC because they feared 
the juveniles would be assaulted by other juveniles.  For example, one participant noted 
that the ADJC 
Touted they cleaned up and it was a state of the art facility, yet they just had an 
officer and juvenile commit suicide and kids are still afraid of fights.  These 
issues have all occurred after the monitor was lifted.  These were not publicized, 
so it is possible that they are keeping these new issues private because they were 
supposed to have changed. 
 
Other county representatives had lesser fears over the issue of fighting and believed these 
were just “kids fighting” and that these were understandable because the kids were just 
using fists and not shanks. 
During interviews, reports of sexual abuse on the extent of sexual abuse were 
sketchy at best.  However, many participants believed sexual abuses occurred both during 
and after the CRIPA investigation.  For example, one participant noted that during the 
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investigation a female delinquent had been engaging in a sexual relationship with an 
officer and that “everyone including the kids knew about this.”  The reported decreases in 
sexual relationships were likely impacted by the legal action that would be taken by the 
administrators if abuse was discovered.  One participant noted that during training, the 
director told the class that “if you have sex with the kids I will see you serve prison 
time.”  That participant reported that he no longer hears of problems related to abuse.  
Following the CRIPA investigation it was reported that there is a greater focus on 
appropriate boundaries with juveniles.   
Others reported that occasionally relationships still occur and that they continue to 
be punished punitively in the department.  While numerous participants reported some 
instances of sexual abuse following the CRIPA investigation, the details on the incidents 
were vague.  Specific information seemed to vary from person to person, suggesting that 
rumors of abuse were being talked about, yet were not officially discussed in the 
department.  Also, in most cases where participants would mention a case of sexual 
abuse, they would discuss one or two incidents.  No participants made statements along 
the lines of, “that happens all the time.”  Instances of abuse that were discussed included 
a teacher who had a sexual relationship with a juvenile after he was released but still on 
parole and an officer who had a relationship with a female juvenile around 2009.   
Participants from the counties also had general concerns over sexual violence at 
the ADJC.  One respondent stated that “one kid in [juvenile hall] was making sexual 
advances towards a female guard.  When the kid was confronted on this, he said 
something to the effect of, ‘Well that happens at Adobe Mountain and it’s not a big 
deal’…The kid just said it so nonchalantly, like it was no big deal to make sexual 
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advances, which made me think that it was true.”  This participant went on to say there 
was a report in 2010 of a female staff at ADJC having sexual relations with a minor, and 
feels that the issue of sexual relationships should be examined at the ADJC.  Another 
described an incident in 2010 or 2011 of “finding out about a kid who had been 
physically and sexually assaulted only after the mother had told the kid’s lawyer, who 
then contacted the county.”  One participant also expressed concerns that there were 
“sexual grooming behaviors,” where juveniles were “grooming” other juveniles.   
National Survey of Youth in Custody.  Because juveniles were not interviewed 
during data collection, it is difficult to have a clear understanding of the extent of sexual 
abuse in the facilities.  However, the National Survey of Youth in Custody conducted in 
2008 and 2009 by the Bureau of Justice Statistics demonstrates that the ADJC did in fact 
have relatively high rates of sexual misconduct against juveniles both by staff and other 
juveniles in the facilities (Beck and Harrison, 2010).  Juveniles were surveyed in state 
facilities with a population over 90.  In facilities with a population over 240, a random 
sample of males was collected and all females were surveyed.  The total sample for the 
survey was 26,551 confined juveniles.  Nationwide, 12% of juveniles surveyed reported 
experiencing a sexual victimization in the previous 12 months in the facilities.   
In Arizona, three facilities were surveyed regarding sexual victimization: Adobe 
Mountain School (AMS), Catalina Mountain School (CMS), and Eagle Point School 
(EPS) (Table 5).  Although these surveys capture the majority of juveniles housed at 
ADJC, they fail to capture the female population at Black Canyon School.  Nevertheless, 
the overall percentages of juveniles reporting sexual victimization either by staff or other 
juveniles were 17% (AMS), 24% (CMS), and 24% (EPS).  These figures decreased  
  
113 
 
 
Table 5. Sexual Violence in Youth Correctional Facilities 
 
 
All 
Facilities in 
Survey 
Adobe 
Mountain 
School 
Catalina 
Mountain 
School Eagle Point 
Number of youth sampled 25896 276 98 162 
 
% of juveniles reporting  
sexual victimization 12.1 16.9 23.8 23.5 
 
% of youth reporting 
victimization by another youth 2.6 5.6 4.8 0 
 
% of youth reporting 
nonconsensual sexual acts by 
another youth 2 2.9 4.8 0 
 
% of youth reporting staff sexual 
misconduct 10.3 14 19 23.5 
 
% of youth reporting staff sexual 
misconduct, excluding touching 9.2 14 19 23.5 
 
Source: National Survey of Youth in Custody (2010) 
  
dramatically when examining only juveniles who were reportedly victimized by other 
juveniles, with 6% (AMS), 5% (CMS), and 0% (EPS) of juveniles reporting some form 
of sexual victimization.  In contrast, 14% (AMS), 19% (CMS), and 24% (EPS) of 
juveniles reported sexual misconduct by staff.  When comparing these figures with the 
other 196 facilities surveyed, it is apparent that victimization occurs at a relatively high 
rate.  When examining the overall percentages of sexual victimization nationwide, the 
median was 11% and the average was 12%.  AMS was in the top 70
th
 percentile and 
CMS and EPS were in the 75
th
 percentile of facilities with sexual victimizations 
nationwide.  Although an in depth analysis of how and why each of the facilities differed 
is beyond the scope of the current dissertation, it is concerning to note that the 
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percentages of sexual violence were so high in a facility that had been under a consent 
decree, in part, to reduce sexual victimization one year prior.   
One notable example of the ADJC failing to protect juveniles comes from the 
State of Arizona’s Board of Behavioral Health Examiners (AzBBHE) credentialing 
meeting in December 15, 2009.  At this meeting, the decision was made to suspend an 
ADJC therapist’s license for two years and receive training on sex offender grooming 
behaviors (Board of Behavioral Health Examiners, 2011).  In the AzBBHE’s action 
tracking report in 2010, the details of the case are outlined as follows: 
For approximately 9 years, the professional was the primary therapist for 
approximately 16 youth incarcerated in a juvenile sex offender program. The 
professional indicated that there were 5 youth that she suspected had been 
victimized by Youth K, and 2 youths who felt victimized by Youth K. The 
professional disclosed specific incidents where it appeared that Youth K sexually 
victimized 2 youth. The professional acknowledged that she did not file an 
incident report ("IR") regarding these incidents and others where she suspected 
that Youth K had engaged in inappropriate sexual conduct with other inmates. 
The professional indicated that she responded to incidents involving Youth K by 
confronting the youths involved, discussing the issue in group, giving Youth K 
extra help, a disciplinary action, and offense cycle paperwork, and providing 
individual counseling. The Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections ("ADJC") 
found that the professional's failure to report sexual misconduct incidents 
involving Youth K violated multiple ADJC policies. (p.6) 
 
Although no participants at the ADJC made mention of this incident, it is clear that the 
failure of the therapist to make an incident report of a juvenile having sexual contact with 
other juveniles is a clear violation of ADJC policies.  Documentation from the AzBBHE 
did not outline the dates in which this negligence occurred, it is very likely that the 
incident took some place near the end of the CRIPA monitoring or post-CRIPA 
monitoring.  Overall, it is apparent based upon participant responses that occurrences of 
sexual and physical abuse have decreased since the CRIPA investigation began, there is 
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concerning evidence that it has persisted since the end of the consent decree.  The next 
section shifts into the issue of confinement, which the ADJC has struggled to remedy 
since its inception in 1990.   
 
Confinement 
 The CRIPA monitors investigation of the ADJC in 2004 found that officers had 
been inappropriately confining juveniles.  More specifically, juveniles were held in 
separation units (i.e. solitary confinement) or held in their rooms for extensive periods of 
time.  In some cases, entire units would be confined to their rooms as part of “large 
group” exclusions.  The investigators noted that “over the explicit objections of mental 
health staff, one Catalina youth was confined in a Separation Unit for 33 days.  Four 
other youth were confined in a Separation Unit for more than 18 days, again over the 
objections of the mental health staff” (Acosta, 2004, p. 18).  Many of these lockdowns 
and separations were done without reason or documentation and in some cases led to 
juveniles “engaging in sexual behavior[s] and fights.”  For example, a juvenile “who was 
very upset about the recent death of her mother was confined in the Separation Unit for 
three consecutive days.  There was no documented justification for her isolation and, 
when we asked facility staff about this incident, no explanation whatsoever was offered” 
(p. 19). 
 In the first semi-annual report in 2005, the CRIPA monitors found that the agency 
was in significant compliance with the recommendation to have a due process hearing 
within 24 hours of a juvenile being placed in separation.  They also determined that the 
majority of juveniles placed in separation are there less than 24 hours.  However, the 
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agency was only in partial compliance of the requirement to implement best practices in 
separation and the development of policies that do not harm youth.  One issue of note 
was the failure to rewrite separation policies that had been written in the 1990s, although 
it was acknowledged that these were slated to be rewritten prior to the next semi-annual 
report.  The investigators were also concerned over the use of “slow down,” which was a 
practice used at Adobe Mountain where uncooperative juveniles were placed in a chair 
outside their rooms.  This way they could be supervised while the group was also 
supervised.  Some officers advocated for the practice as a “group management tool,” but 
the monitors remained concerned that “the use of such techniques needs to be continually 
reviewed since the use of exclusion or separation has, in the past, created management 
problems for this agency” (Hayes et al., 2005, p. 41).  They report further concerns that 
practices like “slow down” are used for “staff convenience rather than group 
management.”   
 By the time of the sixth semi-annual report in 2007, the ADJC had come into 
substantial compliance with all requirements of the MOA.  The investigators noted that 
visits to the separation units showed the officers were now following proper protocols 
and procedures.  They further believed that the adherence to these policies was now 
plausible because of the efforts to now monitor separation.  One issue that did appear to 
be a concern was that some juveniles were deemed “frequent fliers,” who accounted for 
the bulk of the time that separation was used for.  They noted that this practice is 
concerning, as it is unclear if placement in separation is an appropriate response to 
misbehavior.   
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Current Perceptions of the Use of Separation.  Another issue related to 
separation that concerned the DOJ investigators had been the practice of sending suicidal 
juveniles to separation, as this can lead to feelings of alienation.  In the final CRIPA 
report, it was noted that only juveniles with the most serious risk of suicide would be 
placed in separation.  Furthermore, separation was only supposed to be initiated after the 
juvenile had been seen by a mental health professional who decided on placement.  The 
Auditor General’s review of separations from March 2009 to May 2009 found that this 
practice was no longer being followed.  Instead, the majority of juveniles with suicidal 
issues were immediately sent to separation because the mental health professional was 
either occupied with another juvenile or was not at the facility.  When a mental health 
professional was not available for an evaluation, staff felt the juvenile would be safer in 
separation where constant monitoring would be standard.  The auditors also found that 
many of the staff did not actually know that the proper procedures were to first allow the 
juvenile to speak with mental health staff.  Instead they would immediately send the 
juvenile to separation.   
 Overall, ADJC employees were supportive of the new policies for placing 
juveniles in separation.  Although some initially believed that the use of separation was 
acceptable because that was how they were trained, they later acknowledged the 
problems associated with long-term separation.  In regard to the practice of large group 
exclusions, the ADJC reportedly no longer practices this form of confinement (Arizona 
Department of Juvenile Corrections, 2007a).  Not a single participant remained 
concerned over the length of time that separation was being used for.  Staff report that 
most juveniles are in separation for less than 24 hours and that it is a time for juveniles to 
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cool off.  However, some did acknowledge the issue of juveniles who were “frequent 
fliers,” who were repeatedly going back to separation.  In other words, even though the 
duration of separation has shortened significantly since CRIPA, there are still some 
juveniles who spend a lot of time in separation. 
 Some of the participants agreed with the use of separation for a variety of reasons, 
and were dissatisfied that the usage of separation had been limited following CRIPA.  As 
noted in the earlier section detailing suicides, one participant noted that separation was 
useful for suicidal juveniles because they had more resources.  Some educators were also 
concerned that separation could no longer be used for most problematic juveniles.  Prior 
to the budget cuts, educators had the option of sending disruptive youths to Alternative 
Education (AE), but this was no longer an option.  This means that teachers have 
extremely limited options in how they can respond to class disruptions.  One participant 
discussed an incident where juveniles were yelling across a classroom to one another.  
Because they were not causing physical harm to themselves or others, they could not be 
placed in separation.  This results in challenges for teachers who have standards to teach 
but are unable to conduct lesson plans because of interferences.  The following section 
will further examine the challenges of providing education to an incarcerated population 
and how the ADJC responded to the requirements of CRIPA.    
 
Education 
 Following the CRIPA monitors’ investigation of the ADJC in 2004, they 
determined that “the facilities are in clear violation of the statutory rights of residents 
with disabilities by failing to provide these juveniles adequate special education 
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instruction and resources” (Acosta, 2004, p. 20).  Six specific issues were noted 
including: poor screening of juveniles with special education needs, failure to provide 
individualized education plans, an insufficient number of special education teachers, 
related services were not provided (e.g. speech therapy), accommodation plans are not 
given to juveniles with mental impairments as is required by the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, and the department did not accommodate for the reading levels of special education 
youths in treatment programming. 
 In the first semi-annual report, the monitors reported that the ADJC had “made 
great strides to improve special education” and was in substantial compliance with 
multiple parts of the Memorandum of Agreement.  The department made significant steps 
to hire special education staff and assist teachers in obtaining special education 
certificates, but by the first report there were still over 30 vacancies for special education 
positions.  Other areas where the ADJC had made progress, but was only in partial 
compliance with the MOA included: all special education students need access to newly 
developed vocational classes, fostering involvement of parents with educational 
programming, and filling vacancies because this “will make it difficult to achieve 
compliance and maintain compliance” (Hayes et al., 2005, p. 48).  The department was 
also out of compliance with developing protocols to communicate with local schools for 
juveniles upon reentry. 
 By the final report in 2007, the CRIPA monitors found that the department had 
been committed to creating sustainable changes and that the department had successfully 
hired an adequate number of staff, had developed and improved policies, and was better 
able to communicate with schools for the exchange of records.  The issue of maintaining 
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an appropriate level of staff was an issue highlighted throughout the CRIPA agreement, 
and the monitors concluded that “sustaining compliance in this area requires on-going 
vigilance by central office administrators as well as school principals.  ADJC education 
staff has demonstrated good attention to this provision of the Settlement Agreement” 
(Hayes et al., 2007, p. 30).  One way that this has been accomplished is the department 
grew committed to retaining teachers by providing incentives, “staff development 
activities,” and modifying the school schedule.6   
   As noted above, there were six specific issues that the CRIPA monitors stated 
needed to be addressed with regard to education.  Most of these issues were not touched 
on by the participants, instead the primary concerns of those at the ADJC concerned 
classroom sizes and ratios.  These ratios particularly have impacted special education 
juveniles.  For example, there are over 100 special education juveniles at the facilities, 
but only four teachers to provide special education to them.  Special education students 
are placed in the same classrooms as other students, so the department uses a team 
teaching method where both teachers participate.  Because resources are spread thin, 
special education teachers are typically only available in math and English classes.  In 
many classes, the number of special education in a class makes it difficult to maintain 
quality. 
 Others report more general issues with class sizes.  For example, one participant 
noted that classrooms  
Are sometimes so crowded that you can hardly walk through them with all of the 
desks.  It is also a safety concern that teachers don’t want to walk through…Kids 
                                                          
 
6
 The Auditor General did not address issues of education of confined juveniles in their 2009 report. 
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are now disengaged with the larger classes and it makes it more difficult when 
there are fights in the classrooms.  The department says that the maximum 
classroom size is 20, but this is clearly not the case. 
 
Others report that these classroom sizes allowed for mentorship and a true focus on 
teaching.  Some classes now have up to 30 juveniles at one time. 
 In addition to classroom sizes, some participants report that the co-ed classes that 
were implemented as a result of budget cuts have been particularly challenging.  While 
some participants felt this was a beneficial practice because it taught juveniles to engage 
with those of the opposite sex, it has also made providing education more difficult.  Many 
of the girls in the facility reportedly have low self esteem and came from backgrounds of 
abuse, so when they are in classrooms with males they may go into a “protective mode 
because it is males that previously sexually assaulted them.”  The girls can also be 
disruptive and in some cases have fought with the boys in class.  It is apparent that many 
of the problems currently occurring in education surround the inability to maintain low 
ratios of teachers to students.  Although many of the concerns that arose about education 
during CRIPA have since ceased, this has persisted and appears to be worsening over 
time. 
 
Mental Health 
Providing mental health treatment at ADJC has been a challenge as evidenced by 
concerns raised in both Johnson v. Upchurch and CRIPA.  During the initial DOJ 
investigation at the ADJC, numerous inadequacies in mental health care included 
“inadequate group and individual therapy, interventions, interdisciplinary 
communication, and discharge planning” (Acosta, 2004, p. 31).  Most notably, the 
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investigators found that individualized treatment of juveniles was neglected in favor of 
group therapy.  This was even more concerning when it was “painfully apparent that, 
while the facilities’ staff were well meaning, they did not have sufficient training to lead 
groups in a therapeutic manner” (p. 32).  One reason for the limited use of individual 
therapy is that the program used at the time was designed for sex offenders, which are not 
representative of the general population of ADJC.  The limited staff and resources 
resulted in a “one size fits all” method that had been very ineffective.  A second issue was 
that the agency was not providing a therapeutic milieu (i.e. “staff deliberately plan and 
structure a youth’s interpersonal and physical environment” (p.33)), as had been claimed.  
The failure of staff to recognize suicidal behaviors, and in some case to encourage 
suicidal behaviors, suggested that the therapeutic approach had not been implemented.  
Third, these issues were exacerbated by the fact that there was poor communication 
between staff responsible for treatment.  Fourth, discharge planning documentation was 
very limited and did not include “information regarding a youth’s mental status, 
educational level, placement, or progress summary” (p. 34).  Finally, the CRIPA 
investigators noted overall satisfaction with psychiatric services, but did note that there 
was little monitoring following the use of a medication that had serious side effects.   
The first semi-annual report showed that the ADJC was in substantial compliance 
with only one area of the mental health requirements of the MOA—hiring a Deputy 
Director tasked with overseeing mental health treatment.  The investigators determined 
that the ADJC was in partial compliance with the three remaining areas.  First, the 
department was lacking in implementing appropriate mental health and treatment for 
juveniles.  The investigators remained concerned because officers with little to no 
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experience in mental health care were running therapy groups, there was a lack of 
Spanish speakers to provide therapy to Spanish speaking juveniles, therapy sessions were 
rarely conducted because psychology associates were given too many responsibilities, 
separation was being improperly used, mental health professionals were being supervised 
by those with no mental health experience, there was poor documentation, and juveniles 
in restrains were not assessed by nurses.  Furthermore, the department had yet to fully 
develop and implement a program for quality assurance to monitor mental health 
treatment.  Nevertheless, the CRIPA monitors recognized that the ADJC was making 
important steps to remedy many of these issues. 
By the final semi-annual report in 2007, the CRIPA monitors had found that the 
ADJC was in substantial compliance with all of the previous recommendations made 
regarding mental health treatment and rehabilitation.  The department was able to come 
into compliance with the requirements of the MOA because of new staff being hired, 
improved intakes and assessments, and better monitoring of juveniles on psychotropic 
medications.  They concluded that “the complexities of everything that has gone into 
these treatment plans are quite impressive…As time progresses, using the information at 
hand to develop well-structured plans regarding education, mental health, behavioral 
interventions and transitions to the community should be the ultimate goal.  The current 
plans are currently going in that direction” (Hayes et al., 2007, 44).  One issue that did 
raise some concerns was that there had been much turnover in mental health staff, which 
could potentially lead to inconsistencies in treatment or derail the progress that had been 
made.   
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Recent Perceptions on Providing Mental Health Treatment 
The Arizona Auditor General’s Performance Audit of the ADJC’s rehabilitation 
and treatment programs found that the ADJC was using best practices, but they 
concluded that their “delivery needs improvement” (Office of the Auditor General, 
2009b).  More specifically, “treatment programs do not adhere to program design,” 
“treatment frequency and duration do not meet expectations,” “customized elements of 
core treatment program not provided,” “poor behavior management disrupts treatment,” 
and “specialty treatment not consistently provided to all who should receive it” (p. 12).  
For example, in “only one of the eight core treatment groups auditors observed had 
juveniles who substantially cooperated and participated.  No group was without 
disruptive behaviors, and four were significantly disruptive, with constant discussions, 
shouting, or other negative behavior that distracted treatment…During one core treatment 
process group, juveniles talked back, ignored redirection, and called the group leader a 
‘loser’” (p. 16).  In most units, staff were unable to redirect juveniles who were overly 
disruptive, which made treatment extremely difficult.  Several recommendations were 
made so that the ADJC could continue providing quality care for juveniles.  These 
included: “department needs to follow treatment programs’ designs,” “department should 
develop adequate program guidelines,” “department should enhance staff training,” 
“qualified professionals should deliver treatment,” and “better monitoring and evaluation 
of treatment delivery” (p. 20).  Many of these issues parallel those that were raised during 
the CRIPA investigation, including the poor delivery of services and inappropriately 
trained staff providing treatment. 
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 Mental health treatment at ADJC also received criticism from ADJC employees, 
county court representatives, and juvenile justice advocates because of concerns that 
providing mental health treatment in correctional facilities is inappropriate.  In other 
words, the overall disdain for mental health services at ADJC was not directly related to 
the quality or quantity of services; instead it was the result of more general perceptions of 
where juveniles are best rehabilitated.  Many suggest that the placement of certain 
juveniles in the ADJC has been the result of few mental health treatment options in the 
state of Arizona.  One such option for housing and treating juveniles with severe mental 
health issues was the Arizona State Hospital (ASH), but this facility close in 2009.  
Following the closure of ASH, participants questioned whether juveniles were being 
inappropriately placed at ADJC.  For example, one participant suggested that  
we need some kind of ASH-like facility.  Our youth here would overrun staff at a 
hospital because they commonly have the unique combination of substance abuse, 
mental health issues, and delinquency.  ASH didn’t have the staff for corrections 
whereas here [at ADJC], they are less focused on medicine and more on 
corrections.  This is a disadvantage because they don’t have a full medical staff at 
ADJC.  For example, they can’t do sedation in case a kid gets out of control.  
Here they can be restrained.  There is now a criminalization of the mentally 
ill….So without ASH, youth don’t have a lot of other options and ADJC becomes 
the treatment provider of choice.  This becomes the place of last resort.  Do I 
believe some of those youth should be here?  No, but there are no other options in 
the community.  Here they give safety and security their due. 
 
One ADJC administrator echoed this same sentiment in a local news article by stating 
that “it’s not an appropriate place for these kids.  Those kids that are significantly 
mentally ill, they end up decomposing here…You’re seeing the justice system becoming 
almost the new asylums.”   
Despite the overall reticence that many juvenile justice practitioners have about 
juveniles being treated in a correctional facility, the ADJC still must provide quality 
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services aimed at rehabilitation.  Interviews for the current study revealed mixed feelings 
towards how the CRIPA reforms to mental health have been sustained.  One concern that 
was raised in the Attorney General’s report was that treatment materials for the mental 
health programs were not actually being used in therapy.  It was found that “none of the 
nine housing units auditors reviewed provided the expected, customized core treatment” 
(Office of the Auditor General, 2009b, p. 14).  This sentiment was expressed by 
numerous participants who are currently employed at the ADJC.  One such program is 
New Freedom, which is supposed to be provided to all juveniles, while more specialized 
treatment is given to at risk populations (e.g. sex offenders, drug addicts).  New Freedom 
provides workbooks and activities to juveniles focused on self-discovery, self-awareness, 
skill building, and reintegration.   
The program was criticized by both juveniles and staff because it was repetitive, 
expensive (i.e. staff had to make copies of each of the 174 packets for juveniles to 
complete), boring, and was written at a 6
th
 grade level that insulted some of the juveniles.  
As a result of these issues, the department is getting rid of the packets.  What the 
department “tries to do now is differentiate between the letter of the law and the spirit of 
the law and look at the theme of the packet.  They will then talk and journal about an idea 
so they can digest information.”  They now have the chance to “take the best of those 
packets and use those as a base and pull in other resources.”  Some like this new flexible 
approach because it is less repetitive and can be more customized.   
Shortly after the consent decree was lifted on the ADJC, the Great Recession 
occurred.  As a result, multiple staff, especially those in more specialized positions (e.g. 
therapists, clinical staff, psychologists), either quit or were laid off.  The response of the 
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ADJC to the recession and shifting roles will be discussed in more depth in the next 
chapter, but it is important to note that the loss of certain positions made it difficult for 
the agency to provide all services.  For example, substance abuse treatment had 
“languished for a bit” when they lost a key staff member that provided services.  At one 
point, the agency was providing mental health treatment to Catalina Mountain through 
video conferencing with Adobe Mountain staff.  Although the juveniles were not 
complaining over this, some staff reflected the importance of providing personal 
interactions.  These budgetary constraints may also be impacting treatment for females as 
well.  One participant noted that the “mental health girls are getting lost in the shuffle” 
mostly because the boys are getting more resources.  Related to this issue, multiple 
respondents noted that the training of staff in the mental health unit is inadequate.     
It is apparent that the ADJC has been doing the best they can to provide mental 
health services in a less than ideal environment.  The department has also struggled to 
keep qualified and trained staff in light of severe budget cuts.  Recent reports have 
criticized the department for its failure to maintain enough mental health professionals 
and the lack of adherence to well developed treatment programs.  At the same time the 
department was reforming mental health, sweeping changes were also made in medical 
treatment at the ADJC.  The next section will examine the initial problems and current 
status of health services. 
 
Physical Health 
 Finally, the CRIPA investigators’ initial investigation revealed that the ADJC was 
providing inadequate medical care to confined juveniles.  Medical treatment was 
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described as “grossly deficient and exposes youth to significant risks of harm” (Acosta, 
2004, p. 25).  First, the investigators found that nurses were inadequately documenting 
vital signs and basic information regarding health, which are standard nursing practices.  
One example of this practice was a juvenile who had reported “seeing stars” after being 
restrained by staff.  This juvenile never had vital signs or a neurological exam 
documented, making it unclear whether or not these practices occurred or not.   
 Medical staff were also not available for seven hours during the night shift, with 
the director being on call during that time.  The monitors concluded that “the absence of 
medical staff during the overnight shift, coupled with the lack of training for unit staff, 
places youth at serious risk” (Acosta, 2004, p. 28).  The problem with this situation was 
highlighted in an incident at Black Canyon School in 2002 when a girl fell and hit her 
head.  Medical staff during the day suggested that the girl be checked every 30 minutes.  
Later that night, 
The youth was found disoriented and difficult to arouse.  The on-call medical 
provider instructed that the female unit staff perform breastbone thrusts to rouse 
her.  Such an over-the-phone medical consult ordering chest thrusts is a clinically 
unacceptable practice and a potentially dangerous treatment for the youth.  Once 
the chest thrusts were done, the youth became more alert, but within 25 minutes 
began vomiting and shaking.  The youth was then transported to the community 
hospital.  Our review revealed no documentation that the youth had been checked 
every 30 minutes.  Moreover, because unit staff lacked training to take vital signs, 
they were unable to provide that relevant information to the on-call medical 
provider.  (P. 28) 
 
Some of these issues also spill over into the day shift, as it is reported that short-staffing 
has occurred. 
 The monitors also found that the distribution of medicine has been “woefully 
inadequate.”  In numerous cases, juveniles were not observed swallowing their 
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medications by nurses, which made it possible for them to “cheek” their medications.  
This allowed them to later barter the pills and in some cases resulted in juveniles 
overdosing on a stockpile of medications.  Poor documentation of medication distribution 
also made it unclear what medicines had or had not been given out. 
 Other issues that were noted included inadequate dental care at Catalina 
Mountain, the lack of a quality assurance program to monitor staff, and the lack of an 
infection control program.  Furthermore, the department only employed one pharmacist 
based at Catalina Mountain who was not involved in a Pharmacy and Therapeutics 
Committee.  The monitors argue that a committee is important for management of 
medication because they are responsible for “reporting and monitoring adverse 
medication reactions and errors, making decisions on the facility formulary, developing 
and reviewing treatment guidelines and protocols, developing medication policies and 
procedures to meet regulatory standards, and conducting drug use evaluations” (Acosta, 
2004, p. 31).   
 By the first semi-annual report in 2005, the monitors determined that the medical 
system was in substantial compliance in half of the noted issues in their investigation.  
The monitors appeared highly satisfied with the direction the medical staff was taking in 
ensuring documentation.  In fact, one of the monitors acknowledged that there were 
likely documentation procedures in place that he had not reviewed, suggesting that this 
issue could have been over emphasized in the initial investigation.  The department had 
also reportedly implemented system “for the pharmacist to document alerts to the 
physicians regarding information about any youth’s medication issues” (Hayes et al., 
2005, p. 54). 
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 One issue that remained a concern was the employment of an adequate number of 
nurses.  This included the lack of a nurse manager at Catalina Mountain.  The reason for 
these deficiencies was that the  
reimbursement for staff nurses were below what their counterparts at the state 
hospitals received and as such, even though they had positions available which 
potentially could care for their shifts, these positions were not filled.  In addition, 
strong concern as expressed as when they were able to get agency nurses to fill in, 
they could only fill in half of the needed spots due to the cost of agency nurses. 
(Hayes et al., 2005, p. 52) 
 
However, it was noted that recent salary increases and bonuses served as incentives to fill 
these positions.  A second issue of concern was that nurses needed to adopt better 
practices for handing out medications, as they were not maintaining confidentiality or 
warning about side effects.  Third, one issue that had recently been remedied was the 
practice of males performing pap smears on females, as a female doctor was assigned to 
complete all pap smears.  Also, the monitors reported no concerns with dental and that 
juveniles were being seen consistently.  Finally, the department still needed to establish a 
system for quality assurance. 
 By the final report, the monitors had declared the ADJC was in substantial 
compliance with all of the required changes to medical care.  The review of the progress 
made in medical care was positive.  They found that “after interviewing a multitude of 
staff, reviewing pertinent files, reviewing policies and procedures, there has been 
wonderful growth and stability regarding medical service and service delivery.  There are 
some staffing concerns which continue to be addressed in a consistent manner” (Hayes et 
al., 2007, p. 36).  These problems had been somewhat remedied by the end of the consent 
decree.  For example, Black Canyon and Catalina Mountain were only allocated 280 
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hours per week for nurses.  The actual number of hours worked in these facilities 
exceeded the original about by about 100 hours, so an “outside evaluation” had been 
tasked with determining the appropriate number of hours.  Furthermore, the department 
had been able to hire an additional nurse and a new medical director to help fill in 
staffing gaps.  The department was also able to finally provide 24/7 nursing care in the 
facilities.
7
   
 Research participants had overwhelmingly glowing reviews of the medical 
treatment of juveniles at ADJC.  In fact, participants could only point to relatively minor 
issues with medical care (e.g. juveniles are removed from class for medical treatment), 
and none pointed to the serious issues that had been identified during CRIPA.  Nurses are 
now available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, as was suggested in the MOA.  When asked 
about the quality of medical treatment, typical statements were: “medical is doing a good 
job,” “nurses do a good job and see kids quickly after they have a sick call,” and “I have 
no concerns over medical care.  Similar statements were made about dentistry at the 
agency.  One issue discussed by one participant was that there is not a full medical staff 
at ADJC, so they are unable to do certain practices that are available at mental health 
facilities (e.g. sedation).  Nevertheless, this was not one of the issues raised in CRIPA 
and appears to be more a limitation on legal abilities than on performance.   
 Others raised concerns that the budget cuts have made it difficult to hire and 
retain medical staff.  For example, when the Governor of Arizona was considering 
closing the ADJC many medical staff left for more secure jobs, including the pharmacist.  
                                                          
 
7
 
7
 The Auditor General did not address issues of medical treatment of confined juveniles in their 2009 
report. 
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As a result the department hired a temporary pharmacist who became so frustrated with 
the computer system that he quit.  The department was able to hire a pharmacist after this, 
but it was reported that the department has had to do some “creative things” to keep 
everything functioning properly.  Compared with many of the other areas reformed under 
CRIPA, the changes made in medical appear the most successful and well received.  
 
Examining Why Change Occurs 
The current chapter has examined five general areas that were reformed in 
response to the CRIPA intervention at the ADJC.  Since the end of the consent decree 
between the DOJ and ADJC ended in 2007, the department has overwhelmingly been 
able to comply with the bulk of modifications that were required in the Memorandum of 
Understanding.  Despite the positive reform over the past ten years, there have also been 
important deficiencies that have marred the ADJC’s progress.  These include sexual 
abuses by staff and juveniles and the completed suicide of a juvenile in 2010.  The 
following chapters will examine why the department has been able to maintain these 
changes, with direct comparisons made between the first consent decree in 1990 and the 
second in 2004.  Chapter 5 will specifically focus on the cultural transformation that 
occurred during CRIPA and has continued to this day.  To provide context to more recent 
changes, an in depth examination of the formation of the agency is first conducted.  
Specific issues to be discussed will include the conflicting ideologies guiding the 
department, how the recent fiscal crisis has impacted the agency, and the current 
direction of the ADJC.  Chapter 5 will highlight deficiencies that have resulted in many 
of the problems noted throughout the current chapter.    
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Chapter 5 
Reforming Institutional Culture through CRIPA 
 Correctional institutions have historically been plagued by poor conditions and 
the deprivation of civil liberties.  Many facilities where conditions have become so severe 
have been forced to reform under federal lawsuits.  One area that is frequently examined 
when making such reforms is the culture of the organizations.  Maintaining a strong 
institutional culture is essential for ensuring the safety of officers and inmates and 
contributes to the rehabilitation of inmates.  Correctional facilities that have been 
successful at maintaining reforms “require an organizational culture that is committed to 
‘change rather than stability’” (Johnson, 1996, 259).  Such changes must occur on the 
part of both leadership and line level officers.  However, forcing institutional cultures to 
reform through litigation has been particularly challenging because of difficulties in 
pinpointing cultural aspects that have led to abuses (Brooks, 1996).  An important aspect 
that has shaped many prison cultures is the philosophy of either treatment or 
rehabilitation that guides institutional management.   
 One such institution is the Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections, which 
was under a consent decree with the U.S. Department of Justice from 2004 to 2007.  The 
ADJC has had a long and storied history with considerable conflict.  Appendix 5 presents 
a timeline of this history from when juveniles were monitored under the adult system, to 
the first consent decree under Johnson v. Upchurch, the second consent decree under 
CRIPA, and the subsequent reforms of the agency.  As a result of the CRIPA consent 
decree, the agency set about to reform nearly all aspects of the department, from 
responses to suicidal juveniles to mental health treatment.  During this time, the agency 
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was monitored by four Federal investigators who determined if the ADJC was in 
compliance with over 100 required changes.  Once the ADJC was in compliance with all 
aspects of the consent decree, the consent decree had to be lifted.  This meant that 
beginning in 2007, the ADJC was no longer being monitored by the federal government 
or any other agency that it was responsible to.  In other words, the ADJC could 
potentially begin depriving juveniles of their civil rights, just as it had following the 
Johnson v. Upchurch consent decree.  In order to prevent a third lawsuit from occurring, 
ADJC administrators during the time of CRIPA set out to fully reform the culture of the 
agency.  The current chapter examines the culture of the agency over time to determine if 
meaningful changes have occurred.  First, the culture of the ADJC prior to the CRIPA 
intervention will be studied, and will then transition to how the culture changed during 
the intervention, and will conclude with how the culture reformed after the monitoring 
ceased.  
 
Formation of the Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections 
The early foundation of the ADJC began in 1901 with the formation of the 
Territorial Industrial School in Benson, AZ and later a school in Fort Grant, AZ in 1927 
(ADJC History, 2009).  During this period, responsibility for delinquent and criminal 
juveniles was given to the Superior Courts.  With the establishment of the ADC in 1968, 
juvenile corrections came under the jurisdiction of the adult system.  The facilities that 
would eventually be used by the ADJC to house boys and girls were subsequently built, 
with Catalina Mountain School of Tucson opening in 1967, Adobe Mountain of Phoenix 
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in 1972, and Black Canyon of Phoenix in 1988.  These facilities are referred to as “Safe 
Schools” by the ADJC. 
 Public reports of misconduct and violence at the juvenile facilities were rare until 
the late 1980s.  One notable exception was the murder of Officer Paul Rast in 1975 by 
three juveniles at Adobe Mountain School (ADC Staff Killed in the Line of Duty, 2012).  
However, it was not until the reported mistreatment of a young boy named Matthew 
Johnson in 1986 that brought the Arizona Department of Corrections into a national 
spotlight for the handling of juveniles (Johnson v. Upchurch, 1986).  The Johnson v. 
Upchurch suit lodged against the Superintendent of Catalina Mountain and others at the 
ADC ultimately led to a class action lawsuit.  The suit alleged that solitary confinement 
cells were being used for months at a time, there were poor conditions in the confinement 
cells, staff denied services and treatment to those in solitary confinement, staff 
improperly used handcuffs, staff were using cruel and harsh punishments, youths were 
denied appropriate medical treatment, educational services were inadequate, and youths 
were inappropriately placed based upon their needs.  For example, some of the plaintiffs 
in the suit reported that they were confined for so long in their cells and had been denied 
use of the restroom that they were forced to urinate and defecate on the floors.  Those in 
separation, or solitary confinement, were also frequently denied the same educational 
resources as other youths, denying them the ability to complete the Graduate Equivalency 
Degree Examination.   
It was clear that the agency was going to lose the lawsuit (Bortner and Williams, 
1997).  One of the solutions brought forth by ADC administrators and the Governor to 
remedy the lawsuit was to separate the juvenile system from the ADC, a decision that 
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was eventually approved.  The separation from the adult system also occurred in part 
because of the difficulty in providing resources to juveniles when the primary focus of 
the ADC was that of adult corrections.  As was reported by those employed at the ADC 
and community advocates who were involved with the decision to separate the agencies, 
both financial and staff resources would frequently be diverted from juveniles to adults.  
For example, one employee noted that the “juvenile side was only a tiny portion of the 
agency and they weren’t providing proper training for officers to be working with 
juveniles.  One problem was an officer could work on the adult side for a few days, then 
would work on the juvenile side for a couple of days.”  The director of the ADC and the 
Governor of Arizona, Rose Mofford, were supportive of the decision to separate the 
agencies.      
 
Culture of the ADJC Prior to CRIPA 
The events following the separation of the juvenile and adult correctional systems 
in Arizona contributed to a negative departmental culture.  The first director of the 
agency was appointed from the ADC and many of the officers who had once primarily 
worked in the adult prisons were allowed to transition to the juvenile system (Christian, 
1993).  Prior to the formation of the ADJC, all staff received similar training which 
resulted in juveniles being treated like “mini adults.”  For the present study , 
approximately one-fourth of the participants expressed concerns over this practice 
because they had heard rumors that the bad administrators and officers had been 
“dumped” on the ADJC “to get them out.”  Many felt that the correctional environment 
of the first officers and administrators of the ADJC had carried over, allowing for a 
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culture where juveniles were readily subjected to abusive conditions.  One ADJC 
employee noted that following the split “it was a strange mixture and some of the clinical 
staff had begun to buy into what the more crime control staff were putting out there.”   
Shortly after the establishment of the Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections 
on July 1, 1990, the agency changed its name to the Department of Youth Treatment and 
Rehabilitation in mid-1991.  During this time, John Arredondo from the Texas Youth 
Commission (now named the Texas Juvenile Justice Department) was appointed as 
director to continue the department’s new focus on treatment and rehabilitation.  The 
second director began to take action towards meeting the requirements of the Johnson 
consent decree.  Christian (1993) reports that under the advisement of Arredondo, the 
Governor’s Task Force overseeing the reforms “began to enjoy a true partnership with 
the Department for the first time” (p. 14).  
However, his methods of bringing rehabilitation to the ADJC were strongly 
criticized.  On the one hand, some believed that Arredondo was bringing much needed 
programming and treatment to the agency, while others felt that his methods were 
extreme and ineffective.  The strategy Director Arredondo adopted was to improve 
individual units by devoting resources to specific units.  An ADJC employee at the time 
noted that “he rewarded those who shared in the ideals of his team and the new system” 
with resources, remodeling their units, and a van.  Some units and staff reportedly began 
to adopt a philosophy of rehabilitation because they observed the benefits they would 
receive.  However, not all employees were as accepting of this practice.  One long time 
employee noted that Arredondo’s strategy resulted in animosity between the staff who 
were the “chosen ones” and those who did not receive the rehabilitative programs.  
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Another tactic used by Arredondo to make the ADJC less corrections oriented and more 
rehabilitative was to take officers out of uniforms and have them wear polo shirts.  This 
practice was also met with disdain from many officers.  Juvenile justice advocates 
characterized Arredondo as doing an “impossible job” because he did not receive external 
support from the governor or internal support from employees.   
Some of the methods used for rehabilitation were poorly received by many 
employees whose punishment and treatment philosophies contrasted with the director.  A 
county representative noted that  
The culture of the officers was one of the major reasons why Arredondo was not 
successful at providing a rehabilitative model.  Arredondo would be confronted 
by small groups of people who had links to the legislature saying that he was 
running the institution poorly and that he shouldn’t be coddling the kids.  There 
was the feeling that next the kids would be having color TV’s in their cells and 
other luxuries.  He came in with the concept that the state was sincere about 
instituting reforms, but was confronted with an impossible culture that did not 
want such reforms. 
 
Others described the agency as being split and corrections oriented.  Some of the officers 
reportedly reviled treatment providers and believed that treatment was “stupid.”  Despite 
a push from juvenile justice advocates to bring more rehabilitative services to the agency, 
the director of the ADC who still had a strong influence on the ADJC and the ADJC 
superintendent of facilities disapproved of the new direction.  
One of the most blatant examples of the clash between the methods used by “old” 
and “new” employees was the controversy over a play that was performed for the 
juveniles (Sowers, 1994; Swenson, 1994).  In late 1993, a church group was permitted to 
enter the “safe schools” with real weapons and allowed to perform a graphic play 
depicting multiple criminal acts including gang and sexual violence.  After ten employees 
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raised issue over the play to the director and Governor of Arizona, one correctional 
officer was suspended for complaining about the incident.  The inappropriate suspension 
of the officer, concerns over weapons in the facilities, and the director’s requests for more 
state funding, led the Governor to encourage the resignation of the director.  Following 
Arredondo’s resignation, Eugene Moore from Arizona’s adult prison system was 
appointed as director in 1994.   
The move from a director who was, for the most part, focused on the 
rehabilitation of juveniles to a director experienced with the confinement of adults 
signified a growing focus in Arizona on treating juveniles from an adult perspective 
geared towards punishment.  The changing sentiment towards juveniles in Arizona was 
solidified in January of 1995 when, “a bill renaming Arizona’s juvenile justice agency 
was approved…changing the Department of Youth Treatment and Rehabilitation back to 
the Department of Juvenile Corrections [because] Governor Fife Symington wanted a 
name that reassures the public its safety is uppermost” (Noyes, 1995, p. 1B).  The 
Governor also wanted the “‘automatic transfer’ of juveniles, which would send all teens 
accused of violent crimes to adult court…and suggested moving juvenile justice from the 
court system to the executive branch” (p. 1B).  Voters in Arizona approved of the 
punitive treatment of juvenile offenders by allowing for more transfers to adult court in 
1996 (ADJC History, 2009).   
By the mid-1990s, the direction of the ADJC was questioned by both employees 
of the agency and counties that placed juveniles there.  Many raised concerns about the 
multiple changes in the name of the agency.  However, ADJC employees appeared less 
concerned with the name change and referred to the name as “a window dressing” and 
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stated that the “name doesn’t matter.”  In contrast, county and community representatives 
made statements along the lines of “these changes formally and informally signaled the 
shift from a rehabilitative to a crime control model” and “a new message was put in place 
that there was a new way for the department to be run.”  One ADJC employee noted that 
“a number of factors contributed to this including: internal issues with directors, the 
national outcry against juveniles in the 1990s, partly symbolic, and the newly appointed 
director, Eugene Moore, had received direction from the governor’s office to bring back 
to the middle.”   
These shifts in both departmental administration and ideologies were occurring as 
federal monitoring resulting from the Johnson v. Upchurch consent decree was playing 
out.  Signed in 1993, changes required under the consent decree included: improvements 
to risk assessments instruments, adherence to maximum capacities of institutions, 
increased programming (e.g. substance abuse, sex offender treatment), implementation of 
a “continuum of care,” and the evaluation of treatment effectiveness (Christian, 1993).  
To achieve compliance with the consent decree, the Governor of Arizona diverted 
resources to the agency, federal monitors evaluated the “safe schools,” and agency 
administrators began implementing the required changes.   
In late 1994, “the monitors said the state ha[d] met population reduction standards 
in the past 18 months, but they remained concerned about officials’ commitment to 
provide juveniles with a full range of treatment” (Federal Monitors: State’s Youth 
Correctional Facilities Improving, 1994, p. 3A).  These concerns were not unfounded, as 
numerous reports during the time the agency was under the consent decree indicated that 
the agency had failed to resolve the issue of overcrowding.  Reports suggested that the 
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“safe schools” were so overcrowded that a federal judge announced population caps, 
fines were imposed on the agency, and the ADJC was eventually forced to begin 
releasing juveniles to comply with the caps (Cook, 1997; Federal Judge: No More 
Juveniles to be Put in State’s Juvenile Centers, 1996; Juvenile Corrections Plans to Defy 
Judge’s Order on Population Cap, 1997; McKinnon, 1997).  Less than two months after 
the department was fined for overcrowding, the population was reduced and the ADJC 
became in compliance with the consent decree (Dougherty, 1996).  The consent decree 
was then allowed to expire in 1997 and the ADJC was no longer under federal 
monitoring (Rotstein, 1997).   
 
Failure to Reform Leads to Federal Investigation 
Immediately following the resolution of the consent decree in 1997, few reports 
were made regarding poor conditions at the ADJC.  Of those that referenced continued 
problems, issues apparently stemmed from overcrowding, as the agency sought 
alternatives to confining youths in the “safe schools” (Cook, 1998a).  One such 
alternative that was met with much controversy included housing youths in an adult 
prison in Tucson (Cook, 1998b; Correction Plan Irks Judge: Proposal Would Temporarily 
House Juveniles in Prison, 1998).  Other reports suggested that the agency was making 
positive reforms by opening facilities for parole violators to be re-evaluated at the safe 
schools (ADJC History, 2009) and had reduced recidivism rates (Few Juvenile 
Delinquents are Back in Custody a Year Later, 1999).  During that time, the Arizona 
Legislature allowed for the elimination of an advisory board that was created during the 
consent decree to monitor the agency (Silverman, 2001a). 
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Eight months after the Johnson consent decree expired, ADJC’s Deputy Director, 
David Gaspar, was appointed as the next director of the ADJC (ADJC History, 2009).  At 
the time of his appointment, Director Gaspar had a 20 year history of working in 
corrections and had been involved in mental health treatment in Tucson.  This experience 
was lauded as important in an agency that was seeking to reform.  As reported by the 
ADJC, “Director Gaspar continued the ambitious reform agenda that led to completion of 
Johnson v. Upchurch” (ADJC History, 2009).   
In contrast to the perspective of Director Gaspar put forth by the ADJC, the 
overwhelming majority of respondents participating in the current study strongly felt that 
his direction harmed the agency.  For the most part, current and former ADJC employees, 
county court representatives, and community advocates perceived Director Gaspar as an 
ineffective leader who was unaware of what was occurring within the agency.  
Statements like, “it was rare to see him come out of Central Office,” “I would rarely see 
him,” and “it was a big event for the director to go out to the facilities” were typical.  
Many were hopeful that the Director’s experience with rehabilitation and corrections 
would set the agency on the right path to continue reforming and providing humane 
conditions for juveniles.  Very quickly perceptions of Gaspar shifted, as he became 
viewed as “a snake oil salesman who was giving the perception he would focus on 
rehabilitation but was not.” 
Opinions were mixed about how much responsibility was placed upon Gaspar’s 
shoulders for the CRIPA consent decree.  On one hand, some believed Gaspar was the 
primary reason why conditions at the ADJC quickly declined following Johnson v. 
Upchurch.  Some felt that the short time between Gaspar being appointed director and 
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juveniles committing suicide suggested a correlation and not a causal relationship.  Part 
of the reason for the disenchantment with Gaspar was that what he was saying publicly 
about the success of the facilities didn’t always coincide with how juveniles were 
reportedly being treated behind the fences.  Participants felt that they had been 
“snookered” and “bamboozled” because Gaspar would report that no problems occurred 
at the ADJC and that it was a model agency.  For example, one participant noted that “the 
CRIPA hit the judges and others by surprise.  They felt they had been snookered by 
Gaspar.  It was commonplace to have ADJC meet with the judges.  At the meetings 
Gaspar had said they had made so much progress, they were now a model agency, and 
how they had such a great system.”  Because Director Gaspar had put so much faith in 
the leaders of institutions and rarely visited the facilities himself, he too had a limited 
perception of the institutional conditions.  He had assumed that officers would correctly 
carry out their responsibilities, but the quick decline in conditions indicated this was not 
occurring. 
Gaspar’s lack of knowledge of what was really happening made some participants 
feel slightly sympathetic towards him because he had good ideas that were never able to 
get off the ground.  Some county representatives also speculated that there was a poor 
institutional culture that pre-dated Gaspar’s term as director that made it difficult for him 
to gain the support of his staff.  For example, it was speculated that “the majority of the 
problems [were the result of] the culture, but Gaspar also should shoulder some of the 
responsibility for the problems that happened under his watch.  He did make efforts to 
change the culture…but Gaspar was faced with a culture that didn’t want to change.”   
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The lull in reports of abuse and poor conditions at the ADJC was short lived.  
Four years after the consent decree was lifted and federal oversight vanished, countless 
reports began surfacing of serious problems at the agency.  A series of articles published 
in the New Times, a local Arizona newspaper, by Amy Silverman revealed that problems 
had persisted with little public attention despite a reform that had lasted nearly a decade 
(Silverman, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d, 2001e, 2001f, 2001g, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 
2002d, 2002e, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2004, 2006, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c).  Silverman 
(2001d) reported that advocates who had raised concerns previously “assumed all was 
well under Gaspar, whose extensive background in corrections and mental health 
treatment made him a natural to lead the agency” (p. 2).  Following a lengthy 
investigation, Silverman found that the “ADJC no longer follows the practices put into 
place by a federal court order in 1993 that were designed to ensure that proper conditions 
are maintained for youth in detention” (p. 1).  These failures included youths being held 
in separation for long periods of time, youths being kept in their rooms for long periods 
of time, poor mental health services, increased staff-to-youth ratios, improper use of 
violence by staff upon youths, sexual abuse by staff, and poor supervision.  One internal 
memo uncovered in the investigation revealed that in 1999, less than two years after the 
consent decree was lifted, a youth rights ombudsman for the agency informed the director 
of the excessive use of solitary confinement and improper housing.  Silverman concluded 
that “in many cases, children detained in Arizona are treated more harshly than their adult 
counterparts in the state” (p. 2).  Silverman’s series of reports once again brought the 
ADJC to the attention of the Justice Department. 
  
145 
 
 
Concurrent to the release of the Silverman articles, many ADJC administrators, 
legislators, and individuals from the Governor’s office were reporting that the agency 
was still in compliance with the court order.  For example, one member of the AZ Senate 
Judiciary Committee had claimed that “nothing’s wrong at the ADJC, [which he knows] 
because he’s toured Adobe Mountain School” (Silverman, 2001, p. 3).  An ADJC 
administrator made similar claims, stating that the agency had improved tremendously 
after Johnson, in large part because millions of dollars were invested in the agency, and 
that the department had continued to experience improvements (Silverman, 2001f).  The 
director of the ADJC in early 2000 further acknowledged the increased use of mental 
health and substance abuse programming and the hiring of new employees.  The positive 
reforms that were touted by the agency and government even led to the nomination of the 
director of ADJC for the American Correctional Association Board of Governors, where 
it was stated that the ADJC was a model for juvenile justice programs (Candidates for the 
2002 ACA Election, 2002).   
By late 2001, the abuses uncovered in the Silverman articles raised concerns with 
community advocates and monitors from the Johnson v. Upchurch case, with one 
monitor stating that “I think they need an outside agency to come in once again and 
review procedure” (Silverman, 2001d, p. 1).  The concerns that had been raised since 
Johnson came to a head in April of 2002 when the first of three juveniles within a one-
year period committed suicide at the ADJC.  Already on the verge of a federal 
investigation because of the New Times series, the three suicides led to the DOJ 
investigation under CRIPA.  Following investigations by consultants in late 2002 and 
early 2003, the DOJ concluded that “certain serious deficiencies at these facilities violate 
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the constitutional and federal statutory rights of the youth residents” (Memorandum of 
Understanding, 2004, p. 2).  The ADJC subsequently entered into a consent decree with 
the DOJ to remedy these issues.   
The fact that the ADJC was placed under federal monitoring within just a few 
years after reforms under another consent decree suggests that changes were either not 
adequately made or were not effectively institutionalized into the departmental culture.  
Christian (2010) argues that one reason for the lack of effective reform was because, “the 
legislation…aimed at treatment…passed in Arizona because we had a lawsuit.  We had 
not changed the hearts and minds of our citizens” (p. 42).  Similarly, many ADJC 
employees reported that the culture of the agency had changed very little.  During the 
initial years of the ADJC, it was evident that an institutional silo mentality had developed 
across the agency.  There was reportedly minimal communication occurring between the 
various service providers in the institutions (e.g. mental health, education, line staff).  
ADJC employees expressed frustrations that these silos had developed and remained 
following the Johnson consent decree, but there appeared no remedy to mend the distance 
between staff.  One potential solution would have been to implement a system of checks 
and balances to ensure that staff had to comply with changes in policies and practices, but 
this was not the case.   
One ADJC employee stated that reports of abuse began surfacing quickly after the 
Johnson consent decree ended.  The reason the reforms to the agency had been 
unsuccessful was because the ADJC  
Didn’t change the culture of the agency.  Staff never really accepted a new way of  
business.  Once they stopped being under the monitor, they didn’t have a system  
in place to monitor the agency.  Many of the issues would get to the  
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superintendent and were not passed on to inspections and investigations.  There  
were no checks and balances at all and what was happening in the institutions was  
all a matter of trust that it was going right.  There was not a lot of emphasis on  
procedure. 
 
Additionally, background checks were not being done on incoming employees, leading to 
a poor quality of officers who were hired to supervise juveniles.  In fact, there was 
reportedly a joke in the department that “you could just tackle someone outside the fence 
and if they were breathing you could hire them.”  
 
CRIPA Forces ADJC to Reform Culture 
During the time the CRIPA investigators were conducting tours of the ADJC in 
October of 2003, Governor Janet Napolitano replaced Director Gaspar.  Napolitano was 
reportedly very concerned about the CRIPA and treatment of juveniles, so she “made it a 
priority to fix the ADJC.”  As a result, she heavily invested resources into the agency and 
formed a task force of community advocates and correctional experts.  The goals of the 
task force were to “provide oversight to the Department of Juvenile Corrections on the 
implementation of the recommendations in response to the CRIPA report and advise the 
Department on broader juvenile justice system issues, including cross system integration, 
youth reentry into the community, and the possible formation of an external review 
process for youth committed to ADJC.”  She also decided not to fight the CRIPA lawsuit 
and willingly set about to make the changes within the agency.  Multiple administrators 
were hired from outside of Arizona because of their experience with correctional reforms 
and juvenile justice.   
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A search committee made up of ADJC employees and community advocates 
decided upon hiring Michael Branham as Interim Director and Dianne Gadow as Deputy 
Director.  Although Director Branham had planned on staying with the agency until a 
new director was officially appointed, he eventually accepted the position of Director.  
Director Branham was reported by the ADJC to be “the guiding force behind the 
department’s organizational culture change.  This transformation is the foundation in 
building a solid organization which provides a safe and secure environment while 
addressing treatment, education, and rehabilitative needs for youth committed to ADJC.”   
Prior to his tenure as Director, Branham had a thirty-year career in law 
enforcement and had minimal correctional experience (Arizona Department of Juvenile 
Corrections, 2011a).  He was also the Executive Director of the Arizona Criminal Justice 
Commission (ACJC).  This commission serves  
As a resource and service organization for Arizona’s 480 criminal justice agencies 
on a myriad of issues...[It also] works on behalf of the criminal justice agencies in 
Arizona to facilitate information and data exchange among state-wide agencies by 
establishing and maintaining criminal justice information archives, monitoring 
new and continuing legislation relating to criminal justice issues and gathering 
information and researching existing criminal justice programs. (Arizona 
Criminal Justice Commission, 2013)    
 
This means that his experiences were not just limited to law enforcement, but that he had 
the capability of dealing with a variety of situations and was familiar with legislators and 
policy makers.  These skills and relationships helped him considerably in responding to 
the challenges of the CRIPA.  
The overwhelming perspective among respondents participating in the current 
study was that someone so committed to law enforcement would not be able to transition 
into a correctional setting with juveniles.  On the one hand, these fears were confirmed 
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when Director Branham began using policing type strategies to gain control of the 
agency.  For example, drug sniffing dogs were brought in to search for drugs among 
juveniles.  On the other hand, many participants quickly began changing their perceptions 
of the Director, as they were able to see positive changes associated with his more 
punitive methods.  For example, he was described as being “a perfect fit at the time to 
bring structure, organization, and focus to the agency.”  Strategies used by the Director to 
change the culture of the agency will be discussed in depth in Chapter 6, but it is 
important to note here that the reception of these strategies was mixed.   
Although Branham’s direction was initially questioned, the overall perspective 
gleaned from interviews was that he had very effectively instilled long-term changes 
within the department and was successful at changing the agency.  While some 
participants were critical of individual aspects of Branham’s changes, his efforts were 
generally well received and reportedly led to the elimination of the consent decree in 
2007.  In multiple instances, participants would give interviews that were highly critical 
of the decisions Director Branham had made.  However, they would then finish with a 
statement about how they didn’t want to appear overly critical of the Director and that 
they felt most of the changes were done well and that he was well respected.  As was 
evident in Chapter 4, an extensive reform occurred at the ADJC following CRIPA, which 
was very much attributable to the direction that was taken by Branham. 
One decision made by Director Branham that was received with overwhelming 
support was his firing of staff who were found to have abused juveniles.  As stated 
earlier, only minimal background checks were done on employees and many line staff 
had been previously employed in the adult correctional system, resulting in a pattern of 
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abusive and inappropriate staff being tasked with supervising juveniles.  It was reported 
that staff who were hired prior to CRIPA would never have been hired after CRIPA.  In 
an effort to root out employees who contributed to the negative culture of ADJC, the 
Director had investigators review all old complaints of abuse.  In cases where the abuse 
was substantiated, the staff were fired.  In many cases, staff were prosecuted if they had 
abused kids in the past.  One administrator reported that upwards of 200 out of 
approximately 1,200 employees were fired, and that he eventually stopped counting the 
number of firings that occurred.   
Over a three year period, staff were fired “for contraband, sex with kids,…a 
whole spattering of excessive force, and sexual harassment.”  Current employees felt that 
this was the correct step to take in order to reform the culture once and for all because 
“they had brought in new blood who weren’t tied to the past.”  During the previous 
lawsuit, new policies were implemented, yet the staff who were implementing the 
policies remained the same.  Furthermore, the Director reportedly conducted background 
checks after the fact on all employees and fired those that did not meet the appropriate 
standards.  To then effectively change the culture, the Director initiated more formal 
hiring practices and more extensive training.   
In contrast to Director Gaspar, Director Branham made frequent visits to the Safe 
Schools and was more knowledgeable about what was occurring at the institutional level.  
Some staff were initially concerned that the Director was observing them on these visits 
and that he was going “overboard.”  Because of their experiences with the previous 
directors, staff “had gotten relaxed thinking the director wouldn’t show up.”  These fears 
appeared to fade away over time because “there was a general feeling that he had the 
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right to check on the facilities at any time.”  The fact that Branham visited the facilities 
was even more surprising when he would visit in the middle of the night and on holidays.  
Others reported that Branham “was around all the time and would sit and talk to see what 
was going on.”  Branham further encouraged communication between administrators and 
line level staff by implementing a zero tolerance policy for abuses.  A website was used 
to have a direct line of communication between the line staff and the Director, which 
further eliminated abuses that were occurring.  It was perceived that Branham had a true 
“open door policy,” which allowed for staff to convey any of their problems. 
To further improve departmental culture, Branham set out to provide greater 
transparency between the department and the external environment.  At the beginning of 
CRIPA, the lack of transparency was particularly evident with the monitoring done by the 
Governor’s task force.  It was reported that as the CRIPA investigation progressed over 
time, the “agency was much more open, transparent, and the task force had more access 
to kids…Mike really did open it up and make it a transparent process.”  The CRIPA 
monitors also found this transparency to have emerged in the agency and declared that if 
the ADJC was to continue the reforms, transparency would have to remain. 
Another strategy adopted by Director Branham that will be discussed further in 
the next chapter was improving communication between departments, administrators, and 
line staff.  More specifically, interdepartmental meetings increased in frequency.  One 
administrator noted that “directors of different units (e.g. medical, education, housing, 
psychology) met together as a team so there was a coordinated effort…Before there had 
been a lot of autonomy—they shared the same kids, but didn’t share information.”  
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Currently formal meetings are held five days a week between administrators and specific 
juveniles are discussed in these meetings.   
Despite all of the changes that occurred within the agency, there was some degree 
of pessimism exhibited among staff about how sustainable the changes would be.  
Administrators reported that it was relatively easy for the entire department to comply 
with the CRIPA at the time because “you really have to do your best when being 
watched.”  As was outlined in chapter 4, the Department of Justice investigators reported 
that ADJC was in compliance with all aspects of the Memorandum of Agreement by 
2007 and was no longer going to have any official external oversight.  One question that 
lingered in the minds of many within the ADJC was whether they would be able to 
maintain the changes when there was no one looking over their shoulders.   
 
Maintaining Reforms Following Cessation of Monitoring 
 In their final report, the CRIPA monitors noted that “the ADJC is much safer now 
than when this process began.  This is due to the outstanding effort of Director Branham 
and his staff to come into compliance with the MOA provisions and the institutional 
culture change created by the monitoring of the settlement agreement.  The most difficult 
part of this process is just beginning.”  The difficulties of this change were echoed in the 
responses of participants for the present study who were employed by the ADJC and 
county courts.  Although the overall perspective of participants was that the ADJC had 
changed the culture and had been more focused on sustainability than the agency was 
during Johnson v. Upchurch, the degree of satisfaction with reforming the culture varied.  
In particular, two outlooks stood out—the agency had made sustainable changes because 
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they were focused on the long-term outcomes of the agency and the CRIPA changes had 
been good for the agency but would be difficult to sustain. 
Following the end of monitoring, “staff were extremely aware of CRIPA 
ending,…[but] there was no dramatic change because there was such a focus on the main 
points of CRIPA.”  Although Director Branham himself reportedly felt that it was 
difficult to change cultures, he was taking steps to actually make it possible for the ADJC 
to reform.  Most notably was the improvement in quality of staff who were employed by 
the agency.  The removal of staff who had physically or sexually abused juveniles or who 
failed subsequent background checks, along with the hiring of well trained staff who had 
a greater awareness of the importance of treatment and rehabilitation, signaled a shift in 
the behaviors of staff overall.  Furthermore, modifications in separation policies have all 
but eliminated the long-term use of separation, which was one of the most concerning 
issues during CRIPA.   
These improvements strongly contributed to the ability of the ADJC to adhere to 
the requirements of CRIPA following the cessation of the consent decree as was 
evidenced in chapter 4.  However, perceptions of the extent of cultural reform varied 
between line staff and ADJC administrators.  Most notably, administrators pointed to the 
improvements in communication between departments and staff and how this has 
eliminated “camps” within the agency.  They suggested that openness within the 
department will prevent future fallbacks from CRIPA.   
In contrast, many line staff remained critical of the agency even after the reforms 
made because of CRIPA.  Many expressed fears that the changes made under CRIPA had 
not been fully institutionalized into the agency.  They also felt it would take longer than 
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four years to have long-term meaningful cultural change.  In fact, this was one of the 
biggest concerns of Director Branham during his time with the agency.  Although in 
some cases this led to frustrations among the staff, Branham maintained the perspective 
that they always needed to be concerned about CRIPA, even after the DOJ left.  ADJC 
employees believed that Branham was both “satisfied and dissatisfied with the progress 
they had made by the end of CRIPA.  Branham never believed they were finished…The 
real push was for fixing the department to make it better and Branham wanted people to 
think that they would have done the same things even if the feds hadn’t been there.”  As a 
result, he continued to bring in programming for juveniles, continued with investigations 
of staff who had reportedly abused kids, and remained a consistent presence at the 
facilities. The efforts that Branham made to change the culture were in large part because 
he did not want the agency to endure a third lawsuit.  As a result, Branham maintained 
the perspective that changing the ADJC was a continuing process and they could never 
become lax in their roles.  The following section will examine lingering concerns of the 
ADJC including the perseverance of the conflict between rehabilitation and control, harm 
to the agency culture following severe budget cuts, and a new direction of the agency 
over the past two years.    
 
Conflict Between Rehabilitation and Control Philosophies  
The cultural reform of the ADJC was made difficult because of conflicts that 
arose between director Branham and other administrators who were focused on bringing 
rehabilitation to the agency.  Following the Johnson v. Upchurch consent decree, the 
ADJC experienced a time of turmoil, where it was unclear if the goal of the agency was 
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to provide rehabilitation to juveniles or to provide them with punishment and control.  
When the agency was under a second consent decree from 2004 to 2007, this issue was 
raised again.  On the one hand, crucial aspects of the Memorandum of Agreement forced 
the ADJC to provide rehabilitation to juveniles.  On the other hand, the director who had 
been appointed to lead the change of the agency was from a law enforcement background 
and had a crime control mentality.  In order to achieve compliance with CRIPA it was 
clear that both crime control (i.e. for both juveniles and staff) and rehabilitation were 
crucial to reforming the agency.  While Director Branham was primarily tasked with 
instilling control aspects of the agency, Deputy Director Dianne Gadow was hired to 
fulfill the rehabilitative aspects of the CRIPA agreement.  Although her hiring was very 
expensive for the department, her presence was important for the reforms because she 
had previously been involved in organizational reforms related to juvenile justice.   
In theory this pairing seemed like an ideal match where the ADJC would be 
reformed to provide treatment in a safe and professional environment.  In reality, it 
became evident that this paring would evoke conflict between departmental divisions that 
had conflicting goals.  Although Branham and Gadow were both vying for the director 
position, it was speculated by some that Branham’s friendship with Governor Napolitano 
was what ultimately garnered him the position.  In the end, Branham became director and 
Gadow was the deputy director whose primary focus was on treatment.  With regard to 
the dynamics of this relationship, one county court representative noted that: 
The theme was that the ADJC was bringing in experts to the highest levels of 
ADJC, but this wasn’t translating into rehabilitation.  Branham was more punitive 
and had a paramilitary approach, while the mid level employees who were 
brought in were rehabilitation oriented, but the line staff still had a punitive 
culture.  The paramilitary approach has been shown to be ineffective.  I am not 
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saying people were lying about providing treatment, but I thought people didn’t 
know how to do rehabilitation and ran into problems with the state because they 
didn’t want to appear too lenient.  What you have because of pressure from 
CRIPA is that ADJC recognized they needed to bring in treatment oriented 
professionals, but the head of the agency sets the tone. 
 
In other words, as rehabilitation was being tested and tried at the ADJC, there were 
difficulties in getting a full commitment from all employees because the Director was 
really the one who made the decisions in the agency. 
 Branham received a tremendous amount of respect and recognition for his part in 
reforming the ADJC and bringing it into compliance with the MOA.  However, others 
also pointed to Gadow and the Director of Clinical Services, Kellie Warren who had also 
been hired to bring increased treatment to the agency, as being two key players in ending 
the consent decree.  When asked why Gadow ultimately left the ADJC, participants 
reported that this was in large part a result of the conflicts with Branham.  It was 
observed that “once through CRIPA, the two philosophies didn’t mesh and Gadow could 
not make an impact anymore.  Branham’s priority was compliance and these kids are 
criminals and that’s the way they should be treated.” 
The gap in philosophies between the two highest ranking persons at the ADJC 
resulted in tensions that were evident to many within the agency.  One ADJC employee 
described how Branham and Gadow had very different perspectives on who the juveniles 
were that they were treating.  “Gadow was very kid oriented and believed the [juveniles] 
can change and just need to be redirected…Branham was from a policing standpoint—he 
believed they were criminals and they should be treated accordingly.”  Gadow herself 
alluded to the clash between treatment and control in institutions during a speech at the 
National Prison Rape Elimination Commission.  She outlined how  
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One of the things that we have really been struggling with and working hard and 
focusing on in Arizona is actual agency cultural change.  Many times, because 
your agencies are in different systems, the mentality—and it’s impacted also by 
your legislature and your governor—but the mentality more is of lock the youth 
up, security is the major focus, and if that kind of a culture is the only thing that’s 
prevalent within your institution, it doesn’t matter how beautiful the building is or 
how much money you put forth, that’s what it’s going to be…We’re working very 
hard to change the culture and expectations down to our staff members who in 
many instances consider themselves guard. (196) 
 
Similar issues arose when Kellie Warren who had been the Assistant Director for 
Programs and Institutions was appointed Deputy Director in 2007.  Another ADJC 
employee described how 
Warren had a different philosophy about how to run the facilities and this led to 
ongoing conflict all the time.  Branham would attack Warren’s divisions.  This 
was a problem because Warren would tell staff to do things one way, while 
Branham would tell them to do it another way, and this led to conflict.  [In 
contrast] there was a good balance happening during CRIPA between 
rehabilitation and crime control. 
 
Despite these reported conflicts that endured following the end of the consent decree, no 
participants stated that these had persisted after Branham and Warren left the agency in 
2011, suggesting that this is no longer an issue within the agency.   
 
Responding to Budget Cuts 
 Following the ending of the consent decree between the ADJC and DOJ in 2007, 
the future of the ADJC was once again questioned in 2010 as budget cuts began to 
severely impact the agency.  In 2007, the Arizona Executive Budget for ADJC reached its 
peak at nearly $80 million being allotted to the ADJC.  By 2011, only $51 million was 
given to the ADJC in the Executive Budget.  The 36% reduction in budgets resulted in 
the layoffs of both line level and administrative staff, the closure of two safe schools, and 
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the consolidation of resources in the department (e.g. boys and girls began to attend 
school together).  The strains of the budget cuts culminated in 2010 when the Governor 
of Arizona, Jan Brewer, announced that the ADJC would be closing and juveniles in state 
care would be released back to their respective counties.  In other words, this would 
result in the layoffs of all ADJC employees.  The effect of these struggles has had a direct 
impact on the roles of employees in the agency.  The following section will examine this 
issue in more depth, as the budget cuts had the potential to eliminate the progress made at 
the ADJC during the CRIPA intervention.   
One repercussion of the budget cuts has been the loss of valuable staff resulting in 
employees being forced to adopt multiple roles in the institutions and Central Office.  
Institutional employees expressed concerns that their time is being stretched too thin, and 
as a result, are unable to provide appropriate care for juveniles.  For example, in one 
news article in 2010, an individual reported on the struggles faced by her husband who is 
a line level officer at the ADJC, stating that 
He is asked to work an 8 hour grave shift, come home and sleep for 5 hours at 
best, and then is expected to go back to work for another 8 hour swing shift. 
Scheduling is inconsistent at best, routinely changes without warning and leaves 
guards, at the very least, tired and agitated. Not the best combination for taking 
care of mentally ill children…They treat there [sic] employee's [sic] as if they are 
criminal's [sic] as well. I have had calls in the middle of the night, just 30 minutes 
after my husband has returned from work, from management instructing him to 
come back in. 
 
 In the Arizona Legislature’s performance audit of the ADJC in 2009, concerns 
were raised regarding the adherence to the staff-to-juvenile ratios that had been outlined 
in the CRIPA MOU (Office of the Auditor General, 2009a).  In order to come into 
compliance with CRIPA, the ADJC had to maintain a staff-to-juvenile ratio of 1:12 in the 
  
159 
 
 
mornings and night and a 1:8 ratio in the afternoons.  However, the Legislature’s report 
reveals that staffing ratios for the night shift reached as high as 1:33 and exceeded the 
1:12 ratio 45% of the time during a 2 week period in 2009.  The report suggested that the 
ADJC needed to either hire more staff or use other means to avoid staff shortages.   
Interviews in 2011 and 2012 suggest that the ADJC have followed both of these 
suggestions, albeit at the expense of staff and juveniles.  Caseworkers and other 
institutional staff report that they are pulled from their duties to fill in for line level 
officers.  This prevents them from building solid relationships with the juveniles, which 
causes them difficulties when they need to provide treatment.  Staff feel that this time to 
get to know the juveniles has been replaced with paperwork and supervision.  One ADJC 
employee states that “staff are expected to be line staff and expected to be caseworkers 
and expected to be unit managers.  Too many things get in the way of me doing my 
actual job.”  In contrast, a couple of staff reported they enjoyed the opportunity to work 
line level positions because this gave them time to observe the juveniles, which could be 
beneficial when providing casework.  Attempts to make the agency more efficient (e.g. 
layoffs, elimination of overtime) have made it increasingly difficult to have enough line 
officers to cover officers who call in sick to work, resulting in other strategies to ensure 
enough officers are supervising the juveniles. 
Nearly all individuals in administrative positions at the ADJC reported they have 
had to take on the responsibilities of laid off employees.  In many cases, the adopted roles 
were dissimilar to the original responsibilities.  In contrast to the perspectives of 
institutional employees reported above, employees at Central Office appeared more 
accepting of their newly adopted roles.  For example, one employee reported that the 
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department is “now doing more with a lot less,…[but] they are still focused on doing the 
right thing with kids.”  Others believed that their newly adopted roles helped them to be 
more efficient in their work, even though it has been stressful on the employees.  The 
reductions in budget have reportedly made jobs more difficult, but the implementation of 
the Investigations and Inspections unit, continued training of line staff, reminders of staff 
and juvenile boundaries, a focus on efficiency, holding employees accountable, and the 
continued focus on culture change among staff have made this possible.   
 
Current Direction of the ADJC 
One final issue to address in the culture of the ADJC is the current direction of the 
agency.  In July of 2011, Arizona Governor Jan Brewer appointed Charles Flanagan to be 
the Director of the ADJC.  Prior to his appointment, Director Flanagan was the Deputy 
Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC).  This was concerning to both 
ADJC employees and county court representatives because of the problems that resulted 
when ADC officers were transferred to work with juveniles.  Perceptions of the direction 
taken by Director Flanagan have been mixed, as some perceive him as a welcomed 
change from Director Branham and others strongly disagree with the direction he is 
taking the agency.  Specific issues that will be discussed include the treatment of line 
staff and reforms to education.   
 For example, one participant reported that Flanagan has been transparent and 
inviting.  As a result, the employee felt that Flanagan was less likely to fire staff who 
reported problems in the agency, as had been feared under Branham.  Other line staff 
praised Flanagan because of his experience in corrections.  One employee noted that “it is 
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refreshing to have someone who knows something about corrections in charge…he’s 
really helping us.  It is good to talk to someone who has the same language as you…I 
also like that he is cutting down on central office people and getting us staff.”  This 
statement was reflected by many line staff who had been fearful of losing their jobs 
during the budget cuts, but saw Director Flanagan as someone who wanted to downsize 
Central Office instead of line staff. 
 Juvenile justice advocates and county court representatives also had somewhat of 
a positive perspective of Flanagan because he has been more focused on providing 
treatment to juveniles in the community.  It was reported that due to the budget cuts 
across Arizona, Flanagan was hired because he had experience with keeping correctional 
costs low.  One way that he has been able to accomplish this is by investing more 
resources into community corrections than those in the institutions.  Furthermore, some 
juvenile justice advocates felt that Flanagan was very oriented towards programming, so 
it would be unlikely that he would make severe cuts to this part of the ADJC. 
 In stark contrast to the few ADJC employees who were optimistic about 
Flanagan’s appointment, many have become concerned over his treatment of staff.  
Multiple participants reported being fearful of being laid off, that the director was overly 
critical, and does not value all staff.  One area in particular where ADJC employees note 
that Director Flanagan has been particularly harsh is his handling of education for 
juveniles.  Generally, most reported that the agency has been effective at maintaining 
compliance with the CRIPA requirements, even in spite of recent budget cuts, but that 
education has been hurt by the budget cuts.  While part of the concern in education has to 
do with the budget cuts causing class sizes to increase, another aspect directly involves 
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the management of the schools.  One participant described recent changes that pre-dated 
Flanagan’s arrival at the agency, but have persisted.  Prior to the closure of the school at 
Black Canyon School, class sizes were approximately 10-15 juveniles per class, but now 
some classes have close to 30 juveniles in one class.  This employee notes that: 
The department really supported education then and there weren’t too many 
behavioral problems…it was really the ideal of teaching where they had small 
classes, there was a focus on kids passing classes, and a lot of mentorship.  They 
kept boys separate from girls and had very small class sizes…The reality now is 
that education is no longer a priority and the educational system at ADJC is 
disrespected.  There are still some isolated pockets of the teams that you used to 
see, but not anymore. 
 
 These concerns about how education is viewed at the ADJC have persisted with 
the hiring of Director Flanagan.  For example, one employee reported that Flanagan is 
“tearing people apart with the negative environment.  He says the things we are doing are 
wrong.  This has created a negative environment for some staff… He is always saying 
that we are slacking, not doing a good job of directing kids, and their appearance is 
poor.”  At the same time that he is being critical of staff, many report that he has yet to 
observe the schools fully, so they feel as if they are being unfairly judged.  This judgment 
of staff so early on in the director’s tenure has reportedly made some staff feel insecure 
that they are not doing anything right, so they are “walking on eggshells” around the new 
director.  Furthermore, concerns of layoffs have instilled fears that central office staff can 
paint the employees at the Safe Schools in a poor light to avoid being laid off themselves.  
In other words, one employee notes that “central office staff may be saying things to the 
director to ensure that if layoffs do happen, they will still be employed at central office.”  
Some ADJC employees believe that educators are now being pushed to the brink and will 
eventually start quitting as a result.   
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 Staff also reportedly became very concerned when there were rumors of charter 
schools being brought to the agency by Director Flanagan.  Many questioned why it was 
necessary to have charter schools when there was a fully functioning school already in 
place.  It was speculated that this was another cost saving tactic (e.g. online classes) that 
would result in the loss of teachers at the agency.  As a result, an anonymous letter was 
sent to the director asking what was going on with the schools.  Director Flanagan 
reportedly responded that they were planning on providing vocational programming 
through charter schools as a supplement to the existing services.  Despite the director’s 
reassurances that the charter schools were going to be an addition to services as opposed 
to a replacement, fears have remained that they will eventually replace the ADJC schools.  
Somewhat ironically, after the efforts the director made to cut the education budget, one 
employee noted that Flanagan was trying to require teachers to wear uniforms and only 
abandoned the plan when it was found to be too costly.   
 
Ensuring Reforms Are Sustained 
The current chapter has examined the changes in ADJC culture following its 
formation in 1990 to today.  This is an important aspect of the agency to examine how the 
changes made during CRIPA are able to be sustained.  The next chapter examines why 
administrators and line staff appeared more committed to ensuring the reforms following 
CRIPA than they had been after Johnson v. Upchurch.  First, chapter 6 will explore the 
possibility that the ADJC reformed because of concerns that valuable resources would be 
lost if they did not appear legitimate by external agencies.  Responses of counties as a 
result of the CRIPA investigation are also briefly examined.  The chapter will then 
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examine a second reason why the culture and agency made more progress during the 
second reforms—the Investigations and Inspections unit.  A detailed examination of the 
punitive and preventive controls that were implemented following the CRIPA will be 
used to demonstrate these had a direct impact on reforms.  
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Chapter 6 
Competing Reasons for Why Culture Changed 
Based upon the results in Chapters 4 and 5 there is clear evidence that after the 
second lawsuit, the agency changed numerous aspects of management and culture.  The 
question now is why did the agency and culture change?  One possibility that will be 
explored in the current chapter is that the agency reformed either for rational reasons or 
because of a desire to maintain legitimacy by the institutional environment.  On the one 
hand, the agency could have reformed management and culture because employees 
realized the changes would be beneficial to the treatment of juveniles and keeping them 
safe (e.g. suicide prevention, rehabilitative programs).  On the other hand, institutional 
theory suggests that when organizations depend on their external environments for 
resources, they will reform to avoid losing critical resources.  In the case of the ADJC, 
the agency may have reformed because of a dependency on external agencies for 
resources (e.g. financial, juveniles).  Because they could potentially have lost those 
resources if the agency failed to reform, this may have led to the institutionalization of 
changes.  Related to this issue, there will be a review of how counties and community 
advocates perceived the ADJC, as this directly impacts their responses to the agency.   
A second possibility that will be examined is that the agency reformed because of 
the implementation of a formal checks and balances system.  Prior to CRIPA, 
investigations of staff were inconsistently conducted and were minimally investigated.  In 
response to this issue, Director Branham developed a more thorough and active 
Investigations and Inspections (I & I) unit.  This unit served to investigate both staff and 
juvenile issues.  The current chapter will first examine whether employees reformed for 
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rational reasons or to maintain legitimacy.  It will then explore how counties and juvenile 
justice agencies around the state responded to the CRIPA investigation.  Chapter 6 will 
then examine the reformation of the original I & I unit, the impact that it has had on the 
agency, and perceptions of staff of the unit to determine if the CRIPA reforms have been 
maintained because of punitive and preventive controls placed on the agency.   
 
Motivations of Reforming the ADJC 
 Reforming the ADJC is Necessary to Improve Treatment.  The overwhelming 
majority of ADJC employees interviewed for this study acknowledged that the practices 
at the ADJC prior to CRIPA were harmful to juveniles and that the DOJ was not targeting 
them unnecessarily.  The agency had reportedly been cutting corners, was hiring staff 
who were abusive to juveniles, had a high turnover rate, was unable to provide effective 
programming and education, was unable to prevent suicide, and was not conducting 
background checks. The facilities were described by many as being “prison like,” as 
opposed to providing the treatment that was expected of a juvenile facility.  However, 
many administrators seemed unaware of problems that were occurring within the agency 
until the New Times released a series of articles documenting abuse.  While these were 
described as highly sensationalistic, they indicated that problems were occurring within 
the agency that they were failing to address.   
 Despite the recognition that abuse, deprivation of civil rights, and policy 
violations were pervasive in the agency, practically no ADJC employees expressed that 
this was their impetus for reforming the agency.  Multiple employees felt that their hands 
were tied because of policies, so they made no effort to make any changes to practices 
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until they were forced to do so because of CRIPA.  Separation (i.e. solitary confinement) 
was one area in particular where the ADJC was found to have abusive policies.  When 
asked about this, one employee was troubled that “people bring that up as a way to say 
officers were doing their jobs in correctly.  Separation was used the way the policy was 
read.  They got dogged on that because revamping separation was not a priority for those 
creating policies…It was wrong to pass judgment on the staff when they were following 
policy.”  Similarly, another employee stated that he had felt their use of separation prior 
to CRIPA was used appropriately, but “that was because I never thought there was 
another way.  I didn’t know punishment to change behaviors was a bad idea.”  This 
failure to recognize abusive policies was a likely contributor to the failure of many line 
staff to seek alternative means of treating juveniles. 
However, there was one exception to the agency failing to reform for rational 
reasons.  Multiple ADJC employees suggested that reforms were occurring in education a 
few years prior to the CRIPA investigation.  During the time of Johnson, the school 
received accreditation, which brought the school into adherence with national standards.  
Then around 2001 and 2002, the agency began to have a greater focus on giving juveniles 
the appropriate courses to help them pass their GEDs and training them for “low level 
jobs” that they would be able to advance in.  To further advance the school, new 
administrators were hired, including a principal and vice principal.  Also, it was 
recognized that the department had been poorly monitoring the progress of juveniles in 
school, had poor screenings, and were inadequately conducting Individualized Education 
Program (IEP) meetings.  A database to monitor this progress was being set up prior to 
the CRIPA investigation.  It was reported that “CRIPA made some of these changes, but 
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it was the superintendents around the same time who were the primary reason for the 
changes.”  With these exceptions in education, it was apparent that few changes were 
made just because they were best practices for juveniles.  An alternative explanation, that 
the reforms occurred because staff feared they would lose valuable resources if they 
continued in the same direction, is explored below.   
 Reforming the ADJC is Necessary to Maintain Resources.  Although few 
respondents suggested that the agency began reforming for rational reasons, some did 
make direct links between the changes made at ADJC because of CRIPA and concerns 
over appearing legitimate.  Institutional theory outlines how organizations that are 
perceived as illegitimate in their institutional environments are forced to adopt accepted 
norms into their organizational structures.  If an organization fails to adopt the myths that 
are valued by the institutional environment, they could potentially lose valuable 
resources.  The loss of legitimacy in the institutional environment was evident at the 
ADJC during the time of CRIPA.  Administrators of the ADJC stated that the Governor 
of Arizona had taken a particular interest in the reforms of the agency.  For example, one 
ADJC administrator felt that the agency changed because Governor Napolitano was 
particularly concerned about the agency.  During CRIPA, “they got a lot of attention from 
Napolitano and there were a lot of eyes on the agency.  They were all motivated to do 
well and Napolitano was vested in the lawsuit.  Many new staff were hired because they 
wanted to get out of the CRIPA.”  The fact that the Governor was responsible for 
determining the bulk of the ADJC budget suggests that there was a large financial 
motivation for ensuring the reforms occurred. 
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 Concerns of the ADJC over maintaining legitimacy in the institutional 
environment were also expressed by employees who recognized that they were dependent 
on a steady flow of juveniles being sent to the agency.  As is discussed in more depth 
below, as a direct result of the conditions at ADJC and the investigation, some counties 
began sending fewer juveniles to the state.  In 2004 and 2005, the ADJC had the lowest 
number of commitments in its history.  As a result, the new administration of ADJC grew 
concerned that counties did not perceive the ADJC facilities as safe and intervened to 
prevent any more resources being lost (i.e. kids being sent to ADJC).  One participant 
described how when 
The agency finally did break (i.e. CRIPA report was released), the director had to 
work hard to reestablish trust.  Judges felt bamboozled.  The director was more 
committed with courts and counties and would make the rounds.  He said they 
were going to be open and would allow outsiders to come into the facilities.  Pima 
was one of the counties that came out and still does.  A lot of the judges wanted 
tours.  No one had asked before CRIPA and they were under no obligation to let 
in outsiders. 
 
This practice was confirmed by various county representatives.  One that was particularly 
pleased with the director’s response following CRIPA stated that 
He did a great job talking with the counties about what they had been able to do, 
so Maricopa County judges really believed ADJC was a great place.  This became 
problematic because counties began sending inappropriate kids, as judges 
believed they could get better treatment at ADJC.  Eventually the director had to 
start talking to judges and telling them not to send over inappropriate kids, 
especially those who were misdemeanants.   
 
It is evident that the Director recognized that unless he was able to reestablish confidence 
in the county courts that the ADJC was a safe and rehabilitative place for juveniles, they 
would find other ways to take care of the juveniles.   
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 In addition to the links that were made between maintaining legitimacy and the 
CRIPA reforms, there were other indicators that the ADJC was generally concerned with 
perceptions of legitimacy.  This was particularly evident in the decision to keep Catalina 
Mountain School (CMS) open.  Multiple respondents felt that CMS in Tucson continued 
operations after it was no longer cost efficient because it made the agency appear 
legitimate.  Located over 100 miles southeast of Phoenix, CMS was the last remaining 
facility for housing juveniles outside of the main facility in Phoenix.  A primary function 
that CMS served was to house juveniles from Southern Arizona closer to their families 
and communities, rather than moving them to Maricopa County, and for the safety of 
juveniles from rival gangs.  Although this was the “rational” perspective that was 
presented to the public, it is apparent that the real reasons for maintaining the facility 
were much less sincere.  One participant stated that Director Branham: 
Had taken money from the community corrections side and given it to the central 
office and Catalina Mountain.  There were 72 kids at Catalina and they were 
running on a $7.8 million budget.  Branham was saying he was keeping Catalina 
open to keep rival gang members separated, to maintain a presence in Southeast 
Arizona, and to have kids closer to home for visitation.  However, few kids had 
visitors and many kids at the facility were not from Southeast Arizona.  The facts 
belie what the director was really doing.  I believe he really kept the facility open 
and to keep the ADJC large.  He also wanted to have an influence in Southeast 
Arizona so that Terry Goddard would elect Branham to a secure position if he 
became governor.  His job needs to be about doing the right thing.  
 
 Similar sentiments were expressed by other participants who were concerned that 
CMS was merely kept open for political reasons and appearances, not because it was 
better for the juveniles.  For example, one respondent stated that when the ADJC debated 
between closing CMS and another facility, Eagle Point School, in 2009, he felt that 
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Catalina should have been the Safe School to close.  The primary reason for this was 
because of the dated facilities at CMS and the inability to hire staff.  He further stated that 
For the number of kids there it didn’t make sense.  Pima County sends few kids 
there and these are usually only their highest risk.  Half of the kids, at most, there 
were from Pima.  The director had said that they were keeping the facility open 
for the politicians in the south… The director said they needed a presence so 
families could visit, but this was a hollow argument because they sent the girls up 
to Black Canyon School and other families all over the state had to drive to see 
their kids. 
 
  Although CMS was kept open to make the agency appear legitimate, it ultimately 
proved too costly to maintain.  As a direct result of the fiscal crisis in 2011, the decision 
was finally made to close CMS and relocate some of the juveniles and staff to the Safe 
Schools in Phoenix.  During a public meeting outlining the closure, ADJC staff argued 
that the most cost efficient and best decision for juveniles was to close CMS.  Part of this 
related to the supposed misinformation that had been given to the public regarding the 
cost per day of incarcerating juveniles at ADJC.  While it was publicly stated that it only 
cost about $250 per day for each juvenile to be housed at ADJC, compared to the national 
average of $150 per day, the administration in 2011 claimed that it cost over $300 per 
day per juvenile.  This was the direct result of “unnecessary layers of supervision.”  It 
was further argued that maintaining CMS was not “sound fiscal or correctional practice” 
because it was the most costly facility at ADJC and resulted in the decentralization of 
services for juveniles.  Coupled with the declining population of incarcerated juveniles in 
the state, maintaining the facility had grown to be an unnecessary expense.   
 The primary motivation of closing CMS was to reduce the costs of housing 
juveniles.  However, the ADJC also reported that the closure would be positive for 
juveniles because it would result in the concentration of resources in one facility.  Among 
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the improvements would be to: “expand core programs options, expand substance 
dependence programs, expand and make available to all youth a broader range of career 
technical educational opportunities, add a skills for work unit and fire science program, 
and make mental health and sex offender programs available to all eligible youths.”  If 
this were in fact the primary motivation for closing the facility, then this decision would 
have been made for rational reasons.   
   
Responses of Counties to an Illegitimate Agency 
Although only a few ADJC employees suggested that reforms occurred because 
of pressures to maintain legitimacy, those external to the agency believed that this one of 
the reasons why the agency reformed.  Although the responses of counties to CRIPA 
reforms are not the focus of the current dissertation, it is important to briefly examine 
their perceptions of ADJC because they have a direct influence on the management of 
ADJC.  More specifically, it became blatantly obvious through interviews with 
representatives from the seven counties that sent the largest number of juveniles to ADJC 
that there were severe concerns over how juveniles were being treated at the ADJC.  The 
following section examines how these concerns changed as a direct result of the CRIPA 
intervention. 
Prior to the CRIPA, practically no court representatives painted the ADJC as a 
legitimate institution where juveniles could be sent to reform and receive treatment.  
Instead, the overall perspective of ADJC pre-CRIPA was that the agency was failing for 
multiple reasons.  These included the staff who were hired at the ADJC, the lack of a 
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clear focus on rehabilitation or punishment, and the mistreatment of juveniles.  One of the 
biggest concerns of external agencies was who was being employed at the ADJC.  
Discussed in Chapter 5, juvenile court employees were concerned about the staffing of 
the agency following the Johnson v. Upchurch consent decree.  More specifically, many 
employees believed that ADC staff carried with them punitive attitudes that did not mesh 
well with the generally rehabilitative stance of juvenile corrections.  They also felt that 
the shifting focus of the agency from control to rehabilitation made it difficult for those 
internal and external to the agency to determine what the overall goal of the organization 
was.   
By 2000, it was apparent that many of the changes made under the Johnson 
consent decree had not been sustained.  This reportedly was concerning to those in 
juvenile detention who took part in placing juveniles in ADJC custody.  One article 
reported that 30 community advocates had written to the then Governor of Arizona 
because of the poor conditions at ADJC (Silverman, 2001d).  In this article, one of the 
initial federal monitors of the ADJC reportedly said that “I think they need an outside 
agency to come in once again and review procedure…that would be my advice to the 
governor.”  Although these advocates pushed the governor to initiate an external review 
of the ADJC, this did not occur.   
 In multiple interviews, representatives from county courts suggested that during 
the suicides and start of the CRIPA investigation, judges from numerous counties sent 
less kids to ADJC because they were fearful for the juveniles’ safety.  Statements such as, 
“many judges stopped sending kids there because they were being sent to die,” “there 
was almost like an informal agreement between the courts that they were not going to 
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send kids to ADJC,” and “prior to the CRIPA there was a higher rate of commitment, but 
this has been decreasing in recent years because of reports of harm and fighting” suggest 
that as a direct result of counties becoming more aware of abuses, their perspective that 
ADJC was a legitimate resource had completely diminished. 
 Overall, it appears that many of the counties that had previously sent the most 
juveniles to ADJC had fewer commitments following the reports of abuses and suicide 
risks in 2002 and 2003 (Figure 4a and 4b).  Figure 4a shows that Maricopa, Mohave, 
Pima, and Coconino counties were already sending fewer juveniles to the ADJC prior to 
the CRIPA.  Following the reports, Mohave and Maricopa committed even fewer 
juveniles than they had in nearly 10 years.  Respondents in the current project had 
reported that Pima County was the most concerned county and actively sent investigators 
to the facilities because of these fears.  These responses were confirmed with the data 
because in 2002 Pima County committed about 11 juveniles per 10,000 juveniles in the 
county, but when the CRIPA investigation occurred, they were only committing about 5 
juveniles per 10,000.  Coconino County did not follow any of these trends, and actually 
had higher commitment rates following the CRIPA.  Figure 4b shows that Pinal, Yavapai, 
and Yuma Counties also committed considerably fewer juveniles beginning in 2002.  The 
total rate of commitments for these seven counties further demonstrates that there were in 
fact fewer juveniles being sent to the ADJC following CRIPA.   
 Although multiple counties sent fewer juveniles to ADJC following the suicides 
and CRIPA investigation, many of these counties had been experiencing declines in the 
number of commitments prior to these events.  In other words, they would have likely 
sent fewer juveniles to the ADJC during this time, even if they had not experienced the  
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Figure 4a. Number of Commitments to ADJC per 10,000 Juveniles in County 
 
Source: ADJC Annual Report (2008; 2007; 2006; 2005; 2004; 2003; 2002; 2001; 2000; 
1999; 1998; 1997) 
 
 
Figure 4b. Number of Commitments to ADJC per 10,000 Juveniles in County 
 
Source: ADJC Annual Report (2008; 2007; 2006; 2005; 2004; 2003; 2002; 2001; 2000; 
1999; 1998; 1997) 
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CRIPA consent decree.  This pattern shows consistency with the crime declines 
experienced nationwide in the 1990s and 2000s (see Zimring, 2007).  However, an 
examination of the number of commitments to ADJC from the seven counties discussed 
above (i.e. Maricopa, Pima, Pinal, Yuma, Yavapai, Coconino, and Mohave) versus the 
number of juvenile court cases lends support to the notion that courts were concerned 
about the conditions at the ADJC (Figure 5).  Although ADJC had been experiencing a 
decline in commitments and county courts were dealing with fewer cases of juvenile 
delinquency since 1997, the decrease in the number of commitments to ADJC was more 
severe.  This suggests that both the conscious decision by judges across Arizona to send 
fewer juveniles because of reported abuse and suicide risks and the overall decline in 
juvenile offending contributed to a lower population.  These counties were responding 
rationally, as they perceived the ADJC to be an illegitimate agency that was unsafe for 
juveniles and was failing to accomplish its goals.  As discussed above, in direct response 
to these decisions, the ADJC had to make reforms and reestablish trust with counties in 
order for them to continue committing juveniles. 
 Similar to counties, juvenile justice advocates and groups that make funding 
decisions for ADJC expressed concerns over CRIPA.  Much of these concerns centered 
on the rhetoric that Director Gaspar portrayed to the public.  One participant 
characterized the director as a “snake oil salesman” who portrayed that the department 
was running well.  Another advocate stated that “[the director] had been putting money 
into education, cultural diversity, etc, so we thought that all of these things were working.  
ADJC would positively report on the treatment, partly because we decided on the money 
they would receive.  [The director] had been reporting that… ADJC was reducing  
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Figure 5. Number of Commitments to ADJC versus Number of Juvenile Court Cases  
 
Note: Only the seven counties that sent the highest number of juveniles were included in 
this graph.  Both ADJC commitments and juvenile court cases were per 10,000 juveniles.  
Also, the number of county court cases was normalized by dividing the number of cases 
each year by 30. 
 
Source: ADJC Annual Report (2008; 2007; 2006; 2005; 2004; 2003; 2002; 2001; 2000; 
1999; 1998; 1997); Juveniles Processed in the Arizona Court System (2008; 2007; 2006; 
2005; 2004; 2003; 2002; 2001; 2000; 1999; 1998; 1997) 
 
recidivism to about 15%.”  Despite the ability for the director to hide the reality of ADJC 
in many areas, the issue of suicides was very much public knowledge due to the New 
Times articles detailing each of the suicides.  In order to excuse the fact that three 
juveniles had committed suicide while confined in the “Safe Schools,” the director 
reportedly gave off the perception that the suicides weren’t “that big of a deal” because 
suicides do occur in that type of population.  At one point, Gaspar was even reported as 
saying that he “wouldn’t run an institution that I wouldn’t let my own child live in.”  
While that may have been true for him, it became evident that both those within and 
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 In hindsight it became clear, as one participant stated, that “we had been clowned.  
[They] had been sitting there telling us that the agency was running great when it 
wasn’t.”  To demonstrate the success of the agency, the director would cite reports from 
external agencies and awards the agency was receiving in the early 2000s.  During one 
site visit, one award was on display for the “Innovations in American Government 
Award” for ADJC’s success in “Performance Standards in Juvenile Corrections” from 
2004—the same year that the CRIPA investigation began.     
 As a direct result of the changes made through CRIPA, the perceptions of those in 
the environment improved.  As noted by one respondent, “department policies, practices, 
and culture appear to have improved above and beyond the first lawsuit.” This suggests 
that the changes that should have been institutionalized during the first lawsuit had been 
able to stick following the second lawsuit.  Another stated that “the ADJC was willing to 
let us take tours…and would encourage us to come out.”  For the most part, those from 
counties viewed the changes made during and after CRIPA to be positive for the agency 
and juveniles.  Most perceived the ADJC as being safer, providing more services to 
juveniles, and having an improved departmental culture.  This is not to say that relations 
between counties and the ADJC are always amicable, but in the areas addressed by 
CRIPA, it does appear that there is more satisfaction with the agency than there had been 
prior to CRIPA.   
 Despite the improved perceptions of the ADJC in several counties, many remain 
concerned.  These concerns directly relate back to the fact that ADJC was formed under a 
lawsuit, was forced to improve the quality of care of juveniles, improved this care for 
many years, and then following the end of the consent decree in 1997, endured a second 
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lawsuit in just a few short years.  This led to much cynicism as to whether the agency was 
capable of long-term reforms.  In other words, many had the perspective that they had 
seen these changes before.  One participant raised concerns that the changes were only 
going to last a short period because they were not required after CRIPA ended.  He stated 
that Director Branham had good intentions, but “a lot of changes were made that would 
look good on paper and satisfy the requirements of CRIPA.”  Pima County had remained 
concerned that the changes were not made after CRIPA, so they entered into an informal 
agreement with the ADJC that would allow court representatives to observe the ADJC 
facilities at any time.  As a result, they still send court representatives to the facilities to 
ensure that staff are not abusing them. 
 Others met the reforms with cynicism because they did not agree with the 
direction the director was taking the agency.  As reported in Chapter 5, Director Branham 
was from a law enforcement background and had limited experience with juveniles or 
corrections.  This meant that some of the methods he used to institutionalize change were 
from a law enforcement, not juvenile corrections, perspective.  Many complained that the 
“director brought in his ‘law enforcement friends’ and they kept track of incidents.”  
Furthermore, many of those external to the agency did not view the investigative focus 
the agency was taking as legitimate.  This was evidenced by numerous court 
representatives being critical of the director bringing in drug sniffing dogs, which was 
viewed as being a practice that does not lead to juvenile rehabilitation.   
 In sum, it is evident that some of the reforms of the agency can partially be 
attributed to a desire of the agency to appear legitimate.  Although some internal to the 
ADJC acknowledged that the CRIPA investigation was fully justified because of the 
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harms that were occurring to the juveniles, it is difficult to go so far as to claim the 
organization initially changed because of rational reasons.  If this were the case, it would 
have been evident that changes were being made long before the CRIPA investigation 
began.  It appears as if the Johnson lawsuit was able to remedy the problems during the 
time they were being monitored, but this changed quickly after the consent decree ended.  
When the suicides and reports of poor conditions began around 2002, the agency 
demonstrated that it had failed to reform for rational reasons.  It was only when the 
CRIPA investigation occurred and there was a decline in resources to the agency, did 
they step up and make attempts to reform.  One of these reform efforts was the 
implementation of punitive and preventive controls.  The following section will examine 
how these controls have had an impact on the agency to determine if they too have 
impacted the agency reforms.   
 
Implementing Punitive and Preventive Controls at the ADJC 
Following the CRIPA consent decree, ADJC administrators developed a strategic 
plan to guide the organizational changes over a three year period (Arizona Department of 
Juvenile Corrections, 2007b).   Two specific areas of change were outlined as being 
critical to the reform: achieving a continuum of services and having an organizational 
culture change.  One aspect of cultural reforms that was required by the CRIPA monitors 
was the implementation a Quality Assurance Team (QA) and the revamping of the 
Investigations and Inspections Unit (I&I) in the agency.  The following section will 
examine how these units were created, how they have been received by administrators 
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and line level staff, and will conclude with the current situation in these units following 
budget cuts in 2010. 
Creation of QA and I&I Units at the ADJC.  Prior to CRIPA, the ADJC had no 
Quality Assurance unit and the previous investigative unit was found to be lacking.  
Many ADJC employees pointed to this issue as a primary contributor to the agency 
enduring a second federal lawsuit.  Following the Johnson v. Upchurch lawsuit, the 
agency was not committed to providing any form of “checks and balances” to ensure 
policies were adhered to and that discipline was carried out.  Further contributing to the 
lack of investigations in the agency, many employees reported that information was not 
free flowing in the agency.  More specifically, “before the CRIPA and Branham, the 
information in the agency was controlled primarily at the facility level, which meant that 
the administration wasn’t always aware of problems.  The flow of information used to be 
from the superintendent determining if the report should go higher up.”  Staff misconduct 
was also frequently handled by the same staff who had been involved in the incident 
itself.  When issues did reach the investigations unit, the investigators had no experience 
in corrections, which further harmed the investigations. 
 As a direct result of CRIPA, the agency became more committed to providing QA 
and professionalizing the practice of Investigations and Inspections to monitor both 
juveniles and staff.  To head the revamped I&I Division, Director Branham hired a law 
enforcement consultant (Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections, 2004).  The unit 
was responsible for “investigat[ing] all allegations of staff and youth misconduct and 
audit[ing] all agency operations to ensure compliance with departmental policy and 
procedure” (27).  In contrast to the reporting practices following the Johnson consent 
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decree, specific types of issues are automatically reported to I&I (e.g. threatening or 
intimidating remarks) who report directly to the Director.  This prevents the director from 
being out of the loop, as occurred previously in the agency.  The Investigations branch of 
the unit is responsible for criminal investigations, professional standards, and the canine 
unit, while the Inspections branch is responsible for ensuring compliance with 
“departmental and national standards, procedures, and policies” (27). 
The Memorandum of Agreement between the DOJ and ADJC stipulated that I&I 
and QA must work closely together in all of their tasks.  Both units were responsible for 
monitoring compliance of policies, audits, investigations of abuse, and implementation of 
programming.  Furthermore, it was required that the units create a quality assurance 
program.  The program would allow the units to conduct extensive audits, including: 
“inspection[s] of institutional, medical, and educational records, unit logs, incident 
reports, use of force reports, major disciplinary reports, documentation of room checks by 
line staff, etc.; interviews with staff, administrators, and youth at each facility; where 
appropriate, interviews with the parents or other care givers of youth confined in the 
facilities; inspection of the physical plant; determination of compliance with the 
facilities’ policies” (Memorandum of Agreement, 2005, p. 13).  
 One of the biggest concerns during CRIPA was the speed with which changes 
were being made.  Relative to other CRIPA consent decrees, the ADJC’s three-year 
monitoring period was very short.  ADJC, county, and community representatives were 
all concerned that it is difficult to institutionalize change in such a short period of time.  
In order to ensure that the ADJC would be able to sustain changes after CRIPA 
monitoring ended, the department instituted a quality assurance process.  Although it was 
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reported that quality assurance initially did not have a “great start,” it was eventually 
formalized “as they were focusing on their own sustainability.”  In order to formalize the 
QA process, each aspect of the MOA was broken down into individual issues that could 
more easily be monitored.  The breakdown of the MOA was then called the Unique File 
Numbering Ratings (UFN), and identified nearly 140 specific issues that needed to be 
monitored in the agency.  In order to ensure that the requirements of the CRIPA have 
been sustained, the ADJC now has twice yearly audits by QA and compliance is checked 
daily.     
 In June of 2007, the ADJC began using a new method of monitoring the 
institutions through a police management tool.  By adopting Computer Aided Statistics 
(COMPSTAT), the department has been better able to monitor the QA issues outlined by 
the UFN (Office of the Auditor General, 2009a).  Using this tool, the I&I unit is able to 
identify “hotspots” of violence within the facilities.  Every two weeks departmental 
administrators meet to discuss issues that were identified in the COMPSTAT that are 
related to juvenile violence and staff misconduct.  One ADJC report describes these 
meetings as follows: “During the Central Office COMPSTAT meeting each facility 
Superintendent presents his or her top problem areas as well as successes…Applause and 
congratulations are regularly given to unit staff who have reduced violence.  Current and 
proposed intervention strategies to reduce assaults are discussed and input is provided by 
all disciplines” (Dempsey and Vivian, 2009, p.2).  
Reception of Reforms in QA and I&I.  Although the ADJC revamped its I&I 
and QA units to comply with the consent decree, not all ADJC employees were 
supportive of how these units were created.  As reported above, Director Branham had 
  
184 
 
 
previously been a law enforcement officer, so part of his strategy to reform the agency 
was to bring in investigators with law enforcement experience, some of whom he had 
been friends with previously.  Many criticized this move because they felt that a law 
enforcement perspective would not necessarily translate into effective management of a 
juvenile correctional facility.  For example, one county court representative stated that 
one of Director Branham’s “first official acts was that he sent out an email saying that 
they had purchased drug sniffing dogs and then there was a contest for naming them.  
This isn’t really in line with juvenile corrections.”  The following section will outline 
how both administrators and line staff at the ADJC responded to the reforms that placed 
stronger preventive controls on the agency.  First, the response to cameras being installed 
in the units will be examined.  Then the section will address how improvements in I&I 
and the adoption of COMPSTAT have helped the agency sustain the CRIPA changes.  
Finally the section will address multiple critiques of the reforms in preventive controls 
including how the agency has become focused on minor issues, has lead to attacks 
against line staff, has prevented them from doing their jobs, and the challenges that will 
be faced in the unit as a result of budget cuts.   
 Overall, ADJC staff working in the facilities and Central Office both reported that 
the cameras have been a positive addition to the facilities that have made them safer and 
ensured staff were not abusing the system.  These include allowing teachers and line staff 
to corroborate stories of fights, “flashers,” and vandalism.  The general perspective about 
the monitoring of staff was that it was really only those employees who needed to have 
increased supervision who raised concerns that the cameras were an invasion of privacy.  
For example, one employee stated that “for the staff who aren’t doing anything wrong 
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they don’t need to be concerned…for people who let things go and don’t keep a good 
watch, they have fear, but I don’t think it is unfair.”  Others find that the cameras have 
been better at monitoring staff than they have been at monitoring the juveniles.  Prior to 
the cameras being installed, there was no way to determine if staff were really conducting 
their jobs properly.  Following their installation, numerous staff were found to have been 
falsely conducting room check because they were logging the checks in the computer, but 
not physically conducting the checks. 
 In contrast to the support that was expressed by facility and Central Office 
employees for the installation of cameras, the perspectives of I&I, QA, and COMPSTAT 
were clearly opposing.  More specifically, Central Office employees expressed an overall 
positive sentiment towards the preventive controls, while facility employees tended to 
express dissatisfaction with the level and types of controls that were brought to the 
agency.  In regard to the former, Central Office employees praised I&I, QA, and 
COMPSTAT for being primary contributors to the agency not slipping back to the 
harmful practices that had led them to the two lawsuits.  It was only when Director 
Branham was hired and “took the proverbial bull by the horns,” by implementing 
preventive controls that the agency was able to reform.  The methods of control adopted 
by Director Branham (e.g. hiring police officers, strong investigative focus) were 
reportedly rarely used in other juvenile correctional agencies, but were necessary for the 
ADJC during the time of CRIPA. 
As a result of I&I, QA, and COMPSTAT, the agency is now able to tackle 
important problems before they occur.  Most notably, the department developed an 
automated quality assurance system that shows when facility staff are out of compliance 
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with policies by highlighting the incident in red in the computer system.  This is viewed 
by administrative staff as a beneficial tool for the agency because it allows the entire 
institution to see when they are out of compliance with policies.  By being able to 
identify when staff are correctly or incorrectly performing specific duties (e.g. line 
movements, pat downs, welfare checks), they can work to correct improper practices.  
One administrator reported that “compliance is checked day by day.  The COMPSTAT is 
good for looking at trends.  We now try to catch problems as they go along.  For 
example, a few months ago, a couple of kids hadn’t been assessed right away.  This was 
caught immediately and the psychologist was disciplined.”  Similar to the findings made 
about the installation of cameras, administrators felt that facility staff who adhered to the 
rules and policies of the agency would have no reason to fear checks by QA and I&I. 
 Using the COMPSTAT system, the investigators and superintendents began to 
meet with one another to develop plans to address issues within the facilities.  This 
eventually evolved to include administrators from other units (e.g. education, mental 
health), who now meet every other week to discuss issues from the COMPSTAT.  This 
collaboration has contributed to the elimination of the silos that existed between units 
prior to CRIPA.  For example, one administrator noted that “when something would 
happen their first reactions would be, ‘thank God it’s you and not me,’ then it became, 
‘how can we work together as a team.’”  These meetings have resulted in more of a 
coordinated effort to treat juveniles, as opposed to the responses prior to CRIPA, when 
each unit dealt with the same juveniles but did not share information with one another. 
 Despite the acceptance of preventive controls by administrators, those working in 
the facilities were much less tolerant of the changes in control.  First, many facility staff 
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were cynical about the praise given to I&I and COMPSTAT following the CRIPA.  One 
line staff reported that they “don’t like I&I and they question why they get such good 
salaries.  They don’t really understand the ins and outs of correctional officer duties 
because they have never been in those positions.”  Similar criticisms were levied towards 
the COMPSTAT program because many staff didn’t feel that it was a revolutionary tool 
that had changed the agency.  Many felt that there was a program very similar to 
COMPSTAT prior to its implementation, but that it was just less sophisticated.  However, 
the investigators took credit for developing the program, but the agency reportedly 
already “had all that” before COMPSAT.  One of the most critical respondents stated that 
“they spent millions for this and I feel like I could tell them where the problems were.  
You have a unit filled with violent kids and you have a program telling you there are high 
rates of violence there.  You guys are not brilliant.  I could tell you without all of these 
programs who the problem kids are.”   
A second criticism that was made by numerous line staff was that the 
COMPSTAT and I&I have forced the department to be focused on very minor issues.  
One employee stated that “QA has their days when they can be extreme… they can drive 
me nuts sometimes because they look at such little things.”  For example, staff reported 
that “if YCOs clock in one minute before they are supposed to or clock out late they will 
be written up” and “you can get in trouble for the carpets not being vacuumed.”  This has 
been criticized by some staff who feel that the supervisors should be the ones taking the 
blame and not the line YCOs.  This way, the supervisors are held accountable and the line 
staff can then be reprimanded by their supervisors.  This sentiment was also expressed for 
more serious violations, with staff stating that “you can’t keep firing YCOs.  They need 
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to look at what processes didn’t work and not just look at the line staff.”  Some now feel 
that the concern that line staff now feel to make sure that they are in full compliance in all 
areas has resulted in them neglecting more important aspects of their jobs (e.g. therapy, 
groups, crisis intervention).   
The third and most prevalent issue that arose among line staff and a few Central 
Office staff was the direction that the COMPSTAT had taken.  Initially, the COMPSTAT 
had “meant not to target specific employees but it was going that way because by the 
process of elimination they could figure it out.”  Typical statements that were made 
included: “they point out all of the things we have done wrong and not the things done 
right,” “line level staff are held accountable through COMPSTAT, but the leadership 
isn’t held accountable,” “people could be abused in COMPSTAT and some got publicly 
humiliated,” and “they run that bus over someone and back up and do it again.”  For an 
individual who is pinpointed in the COMPSTAT, their name remains highlighted for 24 
hours and any problems stay in their files for six months, making it difficult to achieve 
promotions.  Similarly, line staff feel that even when they are performing their jobs 
correctly, misbehaviors among juveniles can occur that make them look poorly in the 
COMPSTAT.  Multiple officers stated that whenever fights occur, one of the first 
questions that is asked of them is “where were you?”  Because they feel that many 
situations are out of their control, they have clearly become dissatisfied with the blame 
that has been placed upon them. 
As a direct result of the attention given to policy violators in the COMPSTAT, 
some staff are fearful to report incidents.  One employee felt that morale in the agency 
was “awful.”  When asked if this was the result of the proposed closure of the agency, the 
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employee stated that “we are over the closure now.  Part of it is because of COMPSTAT 
and them being so stat driven.  Things are going on that are shady.  Now they hold staff 
responsible for a lot of issues and not the kids…A lot of the time staff won’t report things 
because they don’t want to deal with the repercussions…they just never know what the 
next day is going to bring.”  Many line staff now feel that the reliance on I&I and 
COMPSTAT to monitor the agency has now led to the facilities being run from 
downtown.  They now face high levels of scrutiny that had not occurred previously. 
Maintaining Preventive Controls Following Budget Cuts.  Following the 
budget cuts in 2010, the threat to close the agency, and dozens of laid off employees, the 
impact that these changes will have on I&I has been questioned.  On the one hand, many 
attribute the success of the ADJC to the controls that were placed on the agency by I&I 
and consider it a necessary presence in the agency.  On the other hand, as the number of 
incarcerated juveniles has decreased and the department has come to terms with budget 
reductions, questions have been raised over how large the unit needs to be.  The 
following section will examine each of these perspectives in more depth to shed light on 
how the agency will proceed in light of recent changes.   
 As evidenced above, many of the administrators at the ADJC attributed a large 
portion of the agency reforms to the increased monitoring by I&I.  Because of this, some 
Central Office employees expressed concerns about how the agency would sustain the 
changes if the unit were to be drastically cut.  For example, one administrator felt that the 
changes made during the time of CRIPA were effective and necessary for the agency, but 
felt it was unlikely that all future directors would find it necessary to employ so many 
costly investigators.  Following the CRIPA, this employee believed that “there was a lack 
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of ownership on the part of people doing things because someone else was checking on 
them.  They need to create ownership.”  This sentiment was echoed when the Arizona 
Auditor General audited the ADJC in 2009.  Following their audit, they concluded that 
the monitoring of I&I had helped to improve the facilities, but recognized that a variety 
of factors could impact the long term presence of the I&I unit.  “These threats include 
changes in funding, department management, staffing levels, and the size of the juvenile 
population.  Therefore, the Department should continue to monitor the level of violence 
within its secure facilities, assess whether its actions and practices are having a positive 
impact on reducing violence, and adjust when necessary if it finds that these actions and 
practices no longer help to sustain reduced levels of violence” (Office of the Auditor 
General, 2009a, p. ii).  Despite the benefits that internal monitoring by I&I have brought 
the agency, many at the ADJC question the need to have such a large unit. 
 Staff at both Central Office and the facilities believed that an appropriate direction 
for the agency was to retain the I&I unit, but that cuts within the unit were necessary.  
Similar to the respondents who were concerned about cutting I&I, these employees also 
felt that the controls placed upon the ADJC by I&I were needed to reform the agency.  
However, they raised questions how about many investigators were actually needed.  For 
example, statements like “the agency is really fat,” “how many cops do we need,” and 
“how come you need 15 people doing investigations?” were typical.  Those in the 
institutions were supportive of Director Flanagan’s direction, as he had been cutting staff 
from Central Office (e.g. investigative positions) and was bringing more officers to the 
institutions.  Under Director Branham, there were nearly 40 employees in the I&I unit 
because he believed that punishing officers and preventing future misconduct was 
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essential to reforming the culture of the agency.  In contrast, Director Flanagan has 
advocated for a smaller I&I unit.  The unit now has less than 30 employees, as they have 
been losing staff through layoffs and attrition.    
Many held the perspective that the agency had just hired too many I&I employees 
during the time of CRIPA.  As a result, they indicated that the layoffs when the budget 
was reduced were partially the fault of the ADJC.  One Central Office employee was 
particularly critical of Director Branham’s strategy and felt that: 
this type of law enforcement focus is negative.  I give Branham credit that this 
was initially needed, but this was not a long term strategy.  Branham had 
defended the agency from change, but he failed because when he lost money he 
was unable to adapt and those in the government became unhappy.  There was a 
lot of money given to Branham in the wake of CRIPA.  He should have used that 
money to make the necessary changes within the agency, but then he needed to 
figure out ways to cut the budget, but he did not want to do this.     
 
Some employees now feel that the direction of the agency needs to be one where they 
continue cultural reforms and are less dependent on oversight to maintain the CRIPA 
changes.  They now seem to be somewhat optimistic that the changes that have been 
made (e.g. increased training, setting boundaries, holding staff accountable, cultural 
reforms) are extensive enough to reduce the size of the inspections unit without 
slipping back to conditions that would warrant a third lawsuit.  The following section 
will examine one of these changes in more depth, the implementation of punitive 
controls, as they have a direct impact on the sustainability of the CRIPA reforms. 
Implementation of Punitive Controls at the ADJC.  As a result of the 
preventive controls that were implemented following CRIPA, it has been easier for the 
department to identify and punish staff misbehaviors.  Prior to the CRIPA investigation, 
it was reported that there has been little follow up for discipline.  Director Branham 
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disagreed with this practice and would make sure that investigations were followed 
through or would punish employees when he felt they were misbehaving.   
The reporting of abuse and misconduct was made easier following the CRIPA.  In 
fact, the “ADJC has policies, procedures, and 24-hour management team members in 
place to render immediate assistance to employees and juveniles who report harassment, 
discrimination, retaliation, misconduct, and other incidents that poses a threat to a safe 
and secure working and living environment” (Arizona Department of Juvenile 
Corrections, 2011b, p. 2).  There are multiple policies and procedures by which reporting 
can be reported under.  Most notably is “Project Zero Tolerance,” which was started by 
Director Branham.  Through the use of an email address and phone number, employees, 
family members, or others who are aware of abuses are encouraged to report them to the 
director.  Other departmental policies have been adopted to ensure equal opportunities for 
employees, protection from sexual harassment, allow for employee grievances, 
investigations of all complaints, protection of juveniles from sexual abuse, incident 
reporting, juvenile rights, and juvenile grievances.   
In some cases, before initiating formal discipline towards employees, the 
department may handle an issue informally through either a letter or verbal 
communication.  The department’s Non-Discrimination Policy Statement outlines how 
employee grievances can be resolved informally.  More specifically, employees who are 
aware of discrimination, violations of personnel rules, or other issues that harm 
employees are given the “opportunity to attempt informal resolution of conflicts and 
concerns through communication and teamwork” (Arizona Department of Juvenile 
Corrections, 2011b, p. 5).  In cases where an issue cannot be resolved informally, the 
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department will formally respond to the issue.  Formal investigations include interviews 
with those involved in the incident.  Substantiated findings of misconduct by an 
employee can result in sanctions from training to termination.  In cases where an 
employee is suspended for 40 hours or longer, the employee will be notified within 3 to 5 
days if they will be fired.   
Following the hiring of Director Branham, the number of cases investigated by 
the Investigations and Inspections Unit tripled (Figure 6).  In the four years prior to the 
CRIPA consent decree, there was an average of 122 cases investigated per year.  In 2004 
there were over 350 cases that were investigated, which included investigations into past 
misconduct.  Director Branham reportedly felt it was crucial to conduct investigations 
and remove abusive staff in order to reform the culture of the agency.  After the 
implementation of the I & I unit, one ADJC employee noted that there has been an 
increase in disciplinary issues in the agency.  However, this is likely the result of the 
agency now having the tools to confirm problems and reports of abuse.   
Another form of punitive controls that have been placed on the agency following 
the CRIPA investigation was the firing of abusive staff.  As mentioned in Chapter 5, 
Director Branham fired officers who were found to have abused juveniles in the past and 
had them prosecuted.  This included abuses against juveniles that had been made in the 
initial New Times articles.  This practice continued for the duration of Director 
Branham’s term with the agency, suggesting that abuse was no longer going to be 
tolerated in the agency.  In other words, after the CRIPA monitoring ended, firings for 
abusive behaviors were still going to be the norm in the agency.  To conduct the  
  
194 
 
 
Figure 6.  Number of Cases Investigated by I&I Before and During CRIPA   
 
Source: Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections, 2003 
investigations, Director Branham hired many of his friends who had formerly been law 
enforcement officers to review old files and substantiate claims of abuse.  In addition to 
abuses, employees who were inadequately doing their jobs (e.g. letting juveniles color in 
class) were also fired from the agency.  These practices set a tone in the agency that 
employees who were abusing juveniles or not doing their jobs would face serious 
repercussions.  Staff who committed the most egregious forms of abuse were formally 
prosecuted.  The knowledge that staff will face punishments has made employees more 
likely to report problems, as they believe their complaints will be responded to.   
The extent to which Director Branham took the firings seriously is demonstrated 
in the firing of an ADJC officer in 2006 for “making inappropriate and unprofessional 
comments, making racially discriminatory comments, insubordination, and dishonesty” 
in front of other officers (Fuller v. ADJC, 2008, p. 2).  On appeal it was found that the 
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officer had not actually made radically discriminatory comments; however, his firing was 
upheld because he had in fact made inappropriate comments.  The officer had argued that 
his firing was arbitrary because other employees would not have received such a 
punishment.  One factor that made this case different than other employees’ cases was 
that this officer had two previous offenses on his record where he had failed to monitor 
juveniles.  For the two prior offenses he was reprimanded and informed that a third 
offense could result in a dismissal.  For these reasons, his appeal to the Arizona Superior 
Court affirmed the original decision of the trial court that his firing was an appropriate 
response. 
 
Conclusion 
 The current chapter has demonstrated that there are likely two reasons why the 
ADJC has sustained many of the requirements of the CRIPA consent decree, even when 
confronted with drastic budget cuts.  First, counties expressed grave concerns that 
juveniles were being placed in abusive conditions while at the ADJC.  In response, 
counties committed fewer juveniles to the agency and instead treated them in their 
communities.  If this practice had continued over a long period of time, the ADJC would 
have been faced with severe budget reductions by the governor who was particularly 
interested in the agency reforming.  Second, as Director Branham recognized that the 
agency was losing legitimacy in the eyes of various agencies across the state, he 
implemented both punitive and preventive controls that would finally prevent the 
deprivation of juveniles’ civil rights.  While administrators have found these to be 
effective in ensuring the safety and security of juveniles, line staff feel that these controls 
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have attacked them and prevented them from providing rehabilitation.  Chapter 7 will 
provide direct linkages between these reasons for reform and the changing culture of the 
agency.  The chapter will then discuss policy implications, limitations, and future 
research on the sustainability of reforms following CRIPA interventions. 
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Chapter 7 
Discussion 
Introduction 
 Deprivations of civil rights of persons in prisons, jails, and juvenile correctional 
facilities have persisted for centuries (Pisciotta, 1994).  Such deprivations include but are 
not limited to: overcrowded facilities, unsanitary conditions, inmate rioting, physical and 
sexual abuse by officers, and failure to provide rehabilitation.  One recent mechanism for 
responding to these abuses has been to take legal action against the responsible 
institutions through the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA).  Through 
CRIPA, the Department of Justice has sued or entered into over 130 consent decrees, 
some of which were directed at multiple facilities (e.g. Arizona Department of Juvenile 
Corrections had one consent decree that covered three facilities).  Over 70 facilities for 
confining juveniles have been under a consent decree or lawsuit with the DOJ since 1980.  
In order to comply with a consent decree or lawsuit, the facility must come into 
adherence with all areas found to violate the civil rights of inmates.  Once compliance has 
been achieved, the federal government ceases to have any authority to improve 
institutional conditions.   
 At issue here is that an institution could revert back to abusive conditions after 
federal monitoring has ended.  The limited research available in this area suggests that in 
order to sustain consent decrees, an agency must have a commitment on the part of 
employees who desire to reform (Barton, 1994; Chanin, 2012).  Furthermore, it is 
important to determine why agencies have reformed, as these motivations will have a 
direct impact on maintaining long-term reforms.  One possibility is that an agency will 
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reform for rational reasons, like providing job skills training because the agency is 
committed to rehabilitating offenders.  In contrast, according to the institutional 
perspective, an agency may reform because of concerns that the agency will no longer 
appear legitimate to those in the institutional environment, and as a result will lose 
critical resources (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  A second possibility is that institutions can 
accomplish reforms because of punitive and preventive controls that are placed on 
employees to ensure compliance with policies (Sherman, 1978).   
To determine how agencies are able to sustain reforms following CRIPAs, the 
current dissertation explored the responses of the Arizona Department of Juvenile 
Corrections (ADJC) after the agency was monitored under the CRIPA from 2004 to 
2007.  The current chapter presents major findings and discusses them in context with 
prior literature.  It then examines policy implications, limitations, and directions for 
future research. 
 
Maintaining Reforms Following a Consent Decree 
 When organizations become so deviant that they warrant formal social controls to 
achieve reform, it is crucial that they sustain long-term changes (Reiss, 1966).  A small 
body of research has examined the outcomes of police departments following consent 
decrees and even fewer studies have documented reforms in correctional institutions after 
consent decrees have been lifted.  The majority of studies find that consent decrees have 
been successful at reducing officer misconduct and reforming conditions of correctional 
institutions, including juvenile facilities (Dale and Sanniti, 1993; Davis, Henderson, 
Mandelstam, Ortiz, and Miller, 2005; McMickle, 2003; Stone, Foglesong, and Cole, 
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2009).  More specifically, they are typically successful at remedying the issues outlined 
in the consent decrees, but have been less able to impact cultures.  Furthermore, in 
departments where consent decrees have failed, relationships between the department and 
community are poor (i.e. community policing is unable to be institutionalized), leadership 
is deficient, and there is high turnover.   
 Following the consent decree at the ADJC, there are several areas where the 
department has been able to maintain long-term reforms and others where they have had 
less success.  Most notably, the training and monitoring of staff has improved, juveniles 
are no longer held in solitary confinement for weeks at a time, physical conditions of the 
institutions have made it easier to prevent suicides, juveniles now have an outlet to grieve 
abusive staff and conditions, juveniles are provided with better medical treatment, and 
juveniles are better monitored in school progress.  The agency had struggled in improving 
many of these services, even after the Johnson v. Upchurch consent decree.  However, 
following CRIPA the ADJC has been more successful at improving many of the key 
areas of care.   
Areas where the department has still struggled include providing a sufficient 
number of teachers, completely preventing suicide, preventing sexual abuse, and 
adhering to programming materials for mental health treatment.  The most notable issue 
following the cessation of the consent decree was the completed suicide in 2010.  Many 
of the factors that contributed to this specific incident have since been remedied (e.g. 
restrictions placed on moving juveniles from one unit to another, plastic bags are not 
allowed in rooms).  More importantly, the officer on duty that night was fired because of 
his disregard of policies on the night of the suicide.  These changes are likely to prevent 
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future suicides, but one change in the organization following CRIPA will have a much 
more substantial impact on suicide prevention.  In a national survey of confined youth, 
Hayes (2009) found that one of the biggest contributors to completed suicides was being 
held in solitary room confinement during the daytime.  After CRIPA, solitary 
confinement is rarely used and when it is, juveniles are under heavy monitoring (e.g. 
frequent room checks).  Despite these challenges, the overall picture of the ADJC is that 
they have made significant improvements to the treatment and confinement of juveniles 
in their custody.  There have been some glaring exceptions (e.g. completed suicide in 
2010, sexual victimization) that have marred this progress, but the agency has adopted 
policies and been committed to maintaining conditions that do not deprive juveniles of 
their civil rights.   
 Although the ADJC was required to reform as a result of a federal consent decree, 
the fact that they have been unable to sustain every aspect of the consent decree six years 
after monitoring ended is not surprising.  The challenges faced by the agency to provide 
services like rehabilitation, education, and mental health, especially during a time of 
severe budget cuts, are not unique to the ADJC (Guarino and Loughran, 2006; Parent et 
al., 1994).  Deficiencies in juvenile facilities are “widespread,” especially when providing 
services in some of the most notable areas of the ADJC reform (e.g. mental health, 
preventing suicide, physical health).  Providing treatment in institutions is further 
complicated by the preoccupation that exists in juvenile correctional facilities with 
maintaining security (Bortner and Williams, 1997).  Research suggests that an 
environment where juveniles are confined can itself lead to increased mental health 
problems, making it even more challenging to provide treatment (Kashani, Manning, 
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McKnew, Cytryn, Simonds, and Wooderson, 1980).  Juvenile justice advocates have also 
been highly critical over the confinement of juveniles, as it has been associated with 
worse outcomes (e.g. limited employment options, worsened mental health, difficulties 
enrolling in school) post release (Holman and Ziedenberg, 2006).  In sum, the ADJC has 
been able to tackle many of the structural and policy oriented reforms, but has faced 
challenges when addressing issues that are more inherent to correctional institutions.  
Large institutions for confinement have recently been coming under fire as the 
benefits of small regional institutions and community placements have been recognized 
(Butts, 2011; Lee, Bright, Svoboda, Fakunmoju, and Barth, 2011).  For example, 
juveniles placed in diversions programs in the community have reduced recidivism rates 
when compared to juveniles held in detention (Shelden, 1999).  In fact, Jerome Miller’s 
(1991) decision to close the large juvenile state institutions in Massachusetts and 
transition to small local facilities was in direct response to the inability to successfully 
reform conditions of confinement in the large institutions.  States like Utah and Missouri 
have also experienced tremendous success following consent decrees in delivering a 
regionalized model (Huebner, 2012; Krisberg, 2005).   
 Most notable has been the success of Missouri after it developed a regionalized 
model that allowed juveniles to remain closer to their homes.  The “Missouri Model” has 
been praised for the incredibly low recidivism rates (8%), has not reportedly had major 
conditional problems over the past 35 years, and has not had a completed suicide 
(Nelson, Jolivette, Leone, and Mathur, 2010).  The treatment provided to juveniles in 
Missouri occurs in small group settings and the progress of treatment is monitored 
closely.  Juveniles are also given job training, education, and counseling, all in a “non-
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punitive environment” where the focus is rehabilitation (Vestal, 2008).  The focus on 
treatment continues into the community as caseworkers work with families, schools, and 
staff to coordinate a successful reintegration back into the community (Huebner, 2012). 
Participants in the current dissertation raved over the operations of the Missouri 
juvenile justice system and questioned why similar services were unable to be provided 
in Arizona.  The failure to obtain a commitment on the part of the ADJC, the governor, 
counties, and the public to initiate a reform has pushed Arizona even further away from 
ever providing a decentralized model.  The closure of the two facilities outside of 
Phoenix over the past three years indicates that the state is now dedicated to consolidating 
services in a centralized facility.   
 In sum, it is evident that the CRIPA consent decree has had long-term effects on 
influencing the conditions of the ADJC.  Juveniles now have more quality education, 
receive more timely and thorough medical care, have more protections from suicide 
attempts, are able to effectively grieve problems, and have better living conditions.  
However, these improvements do not mean the agency has maintained all of the areas of 
CRIPA (e.g. preventing suicide, maintaining low ratios of staff to juveniles).  The 
inherent problems associated with juvenile correctional facilities, especially a large 
centralized facility, and budget cuts prevent this from being the case.    
 
Reforming Culture through Consent Decrees 
 One of the most difficult challenges facing organizations that are experiencing 
reforms is responding to cultures (Schein, 1993).  Nevertheless, research indicates that in 
order to implement policy changes, culture is one of the most critical areas to address 
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(Chanin, 2012; Proctor et al., 2009).   In the case of the Arizona Department of Juvenile 
Corrections, the culture of the agency has in fact been one of the most difficult areas to 
reform.  Following the Johnson v. Upchurch lawsuit, officers were still supportive of 
practices that were harmful to juveniles (e.g. physical abuse, separation) and had little 
communication with one another.  To make matters worse, the director of the agency was 
unaware of what was occurring in the facilities, making it possible for abuses to go 
unpunished.  These struggles of the agency are not unique to Arizona, as cultures have 
historically been difficult to reform.    
 Studies of police reforms suggest that if officers are unsupportive of agency 
reforms, any subsequent changes in the culture will be unsuccessful (Chanin, 2012; Ikert, 
2007).  This was evident at the ADJC following Johnson, as the failure to reform was in 
large part because employees never became fully committed to the changes.  The 
uncertainty of the direction of the agency led to confusion as to what the officers should 
have even been committed to (i.e. rehabilitation or control).  Furthermore, the orientation 
of officers who had been hired from the adult system resulted in a culture where officers 
had mixed goals and were pitted against one another. 
In order to obtain long-term cultural reforms, multiple strategies must be adopted 
by an agency, including: 1.) having a strategic vision, 2.) having a commitment from 
management, 3.) management must also adopt the cultural change, 4.) changing the 
organization to allow for the change (e.g. different management style), 5.) socializing 
new employees into the culture and firing employees who violate policies, and 6.) 
developing “ethical and legal sensitivity” (e.g. internal review, supporting ways for 
employees to raise complaints) (Cummings and Worley, 2009).  It is because of an 
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adherence to these strategies that the ADJC was much more successful at reforming the 
culture following the second consent decree.  More specifically, a director was hired with 
clear ideas on reforming the agency.  These included the firing of abusive staff, hiring of 
professionals with experience in juvenile justice and investigations, improving the 
communication between institutional level staff and administrators, improved 
communication between administrative staff, hiring and training line level staff who had 
no ties to the ADJC’s abusive past, and maintaining a long term commitment towards 
reform.  As a result, the culture of the ADJC has improved above and beyond any 
changes that were made following the first consent decree. 
 The finding that Director Branham had been so influential at successfully 
reforming the agency was surprising to many because of his policing background and 
lack of experience in corrections.  However, one theme that emerged from the interviews 
was that Branham was successful because he was able to be a true leader for the agency.  
When considering his success from this perspective, it becomes much clearer as to why 
and how he was able to take the “bull by the horns.”  An extensive body of research has 
demonstrated the importance of effective leadership in reforming organizational cultures 
(Daniel and McIntosh, 1972; Fiedler and Chemers, 1967; Leithwood, Jantzi, and 
Steinbach, 1999).  For example, Schein (2006) suggests that “leadership is touted over 
and over again as a critical variable in defining the success or failure of organizations, 
[so] it becomes all the more important to look at the other side of the leadership coin—
how leaders create culture and how culture defines and creates leaders” (p. xi). 
 Studies of leadership in police departments provide further evidence of why 
leadership is a critical element of effective management (Beito, 1999; Couper and Lobitz, 
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1991; Mastrofski, 2002; Schafer, 2009a).  More specifically, the leadership style adopted 
by supervisors can have a direct influence on subsequent employee behaviors (Dickson, 
Smith, Grojean, and Ehrhart, 2001; Prenzler, 2010).  For example, Huberts, Kaptein, and 
Lasthuizen’s (2007) study of varying police leadership styles suggests that the 
supervisory style adopted can have a direct impact on specific types of unethical officer 
behaviors.  In police departments where supervisors adopted a role modeling leadership 
style, officers were less likely to engage in inappropriate interpersonal relationships.  In 
contrast, in departments where supervisors adopted a strict leadership style, officers were 
less likely to commit offenses like fraud, corruption, and abuses of resources.  Similar 
research suggests that police leaders characterized as having poor communication, 
lacking interpersonal skills, lacking integrity, being unable to respond to problems, and 
egotistical are considered to be ineffective by their subordinates (Schafer, 2009b).  
Despite Branham’s lack of experience in corrections, the skills he gained from a career in 
law enforcement and heading the Arizona Criminal Justice Commission likely served as a 
much needed source of leadership for the ADJC. 
 Despite the observed changes in culture following the CRIPA consent decree, the 
extent of these cultural reforms is questionable.  Critics of institutional reforms argue that 
improving prison cultures through litigation is extremely difficult for three reasons: 1.) 
Consent decrees are not always enforced, 2.) Those enforcing the consent decree take a 
“hands off” approach because they will feel that prison administrators are more 
knowledgeable, and 3.) Litigation can only target conditions of the facilities and not 
cultural reforms (Brooks, 1996).  With regard to the first two points, these did not occur 
in the enforcement of the CRIPA consent decree with the ADJC.  The CRIPA monitors 
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were highly active in enforcing the changes outlined in the Memorandum of Agreement 
and made numerous site visits to ensure that compliance had occurred.  The monitors that 
were hired also had extensive backgrounds in critical areas that needed to be reformed 
(e.g. suicide, education), suggesting that they would be unlikely to adopt a hands off 
approach.   
Brooks’ final contention is that “litigation has improved the culture of prisons by 
improving conditions and improving services, [but] litigation cannot address the cultural 
problems” (p. 175) that led to institutional problems.  In the case of the ADJC reform, 
this is not necessarily the case.  As Brooks suggests, the litigation was able to improve 
conditions and improve services, which did improve the staff culture.  This was 
evidenced by staff reporting more favorable working conditions following the CRIPA 
and less abuse committed by their co-workers.  However, the litigation was able to 
improve some of the cultural conditions, above and beyond improving institutional 
conditions.  More specifically, the firing of abusive staff set a new tone in the agency that 
allowed for a greater commitment to rehabilitation of juveniles and an overall 
improvement in the satisfaction of employees towards their jobs.  While it is true that 
litigation cannot improve management style and communication, having dedicated 
administrators to root out individuals that contribute to an abusive culture following 
litigation can have an impact.   
 
Organizational Reforms to Maintain Legitimacy 
 Organizations are dependent on external agencies for resources and legitimacy.  
Institutional theory indicates that it is because of this dependency that organizations will 
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adopt practices or policies to make them appear legitimate in their institutional 
environments (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  The result is that organizations are not 
adhering to these norms for rational reasons (e.g. make the agency more effective).  
Instead, organizations will adopt these practices ceremonially because they will in turn be 
rewarded with resources from the institutional environment (e.g. financial support).  The 
result is that organizations that are dependent on their environments will begin to 
resemble one another (i.e. isomorphism) (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).   
In the criminal justice literature, institutional theory has predominantly been 
applied to police department management (Crank, 2003; Crank and Langworthy, 1992; 
Katz, 2001), but rarely to correctional facilities.  However, because of the dependency 
that correctional facilities have on their environments for resources, this is a critical area 
to explore (McGarrell, 1993).  For example, Ogle (1999) suggests that there is conflict 
faced by private prisons to maintain legitimacy in the institutional environment and keep 
costs of incapacitation low, which can be difficult to accomplish at the same time.  In the 
case of the ADJC, there were clear pressures on the agency to appear legitimate to the 
environment.  The abuses and failure to prevent suicides caused public outcry from 
correctional leaders and juvenile justice advocates throughout the state.  Once the 
governor of Arizona became aware of these abuses, she publicly expressed concerns and 
took an active role in ensuring the agency reformed.   
Crank and Langworthy (1992) state that when organizations fail to adhere to the 
institutional myths, “crises are resolved ceremonially through a ritual that combines the 
public degradation of the department and the removal and replacement of the disgraced 
police chief by a new chief with a ‘legitimating’ mandate” (p. 338).  This process was 
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clearly evidenced in the reforms at the ADJC following CRIPA after the department was 
publicly shamed in countless news articles.  As a result counties that sent juveniles to the 
ADJC reduced the number of commitments because they no longer perceived the agency 
as legitimate and able to treat delinquents.  The director of the ADJC was quickly ousted 
following the CRIPA report detailing abuses and was replaced with a director who 
openly outlined his plan to bring legitimacy to the agency.  Not only did the director 
detail how he was going to come into compliance with the CRIPA, he went a step further 
by vowing a cultural overhaul through the firing of abusive employees, retraining of 
officers, punishment of policy violators, and increased supervision of staff.   
Organizations that are reforming to achieve legitimacy may do so by becoming 
more similar to other organizations that are perceived as legitimate (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983).  The three forms of isomorphism outlined by DiMaggio and Powell are: 
1.) Coercive isomorphism- the type of change that results from political factors, pressures 
to maintain legitimacy, and government mandates, 2.) Normative isomorphism- the type 
of change that results from organizations adopting practices for professionalism (e.g. 
requiring degrees), and 3.) Mimetic isomorphism- organizations that are unsure of best 
practices to adopt will mimic other successful organizations.  The source of isomorphism 
that primarily guided the reforms at the ADJC was coercive isomorphism.  More 
specifically, the ADJC felt tremendous pressures to reform all aspects of the agency 
because the federal government could potentially sue to force those reforms.  Even 
though they never were formally sued by the DOJ, the coercive powers of the consent 
decree to reform clearly contributed to the changes.  Mimetic isomorphism also had the 
potential to impact overarching reforms to juvenile corrections in Arizona.  More 
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specifically, following the CRIPA, multiple ADJC administrators and representatives for 
the Governor visited facilities in Utah and Missouri to observe model juvenile justice 
institutions.  The ADJC director expressed optimism towards the small regionalized 
models adopted in these states, but felt that during the CRIPA was an inappropriate time 
to completely revamp the structure of the institution.  The sentiment expressed by ADJC 
administrators was that, although it was best practice for juveniles, the primary focus had 
to be getting out of the CRIPA.  As noted above, the closure of multiple ADJC facilities 
indicates that the agency is far from adopting a decentralized model. 
Part of the reason why the ADJC has been able to “survive,” even after the budget 
of the agency was cut and the Governor planned to close the agency, is because the 
practices now adhered to by the ADJC are viewed as legitimate.  Counties do not have 
the resources to provide long-term housing, mental health treatment, education, 
rehabilitation, and supervision, but they perceive the ADJC as having the ability to 
accomplish these valued norms of juvenile corrections.  Similarly, Crank and 
Langworthy (1992) suggest that it is for these reasons that police departments have been 
able to survive—police departments have incorporated “ceremonial displays of 
legitimacy…into their organizational structure[s]” (p. 360).  Departments that have lost 
legitimacy and do not subsequently reform are then at an increased risk of organizational 
death (Maguire and King, 2007; Weed, 1991).   
When considering the long-term sustainability of the CRIPA reforms, it is likely 
that the ADJC will remain committed to the practices that were adopted.  Theoretically, 
the ADJC did not have to maintain the reforms that were made during CRIPA because 
the DOJ was no longer monitoring the agency.  Although there was no longer a consent 
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decree that the ADJC had to adhere to, administrators realized they needed to continue to 
appear legitimate by the institutional environment.  Following Johnson v. Upchurch those 
in the institutional environment had been concerned that the ADJC had abusive practices 
and began committing fewer juveniles to the ADJC.  If the ADJC failed to adhere to the 
institutional myths adopted during the second consent decree, it is possible that even 
fewer juveniles would have been committed to the agency, potentially resulting in the 
organizational death of the ADJC
8
.   
 
Outcomes of Implementing Punitive and Preventive Controls 
DiIulio (1987) argues that “poor prison conditions are produced by observable, 
and it appears, remedial defects in the way that prisons are organized and managed” (p. 
235).  Administrators running prisons with informal methods of controlling inmates and 
staff are frequently unable to maintain orderly institutions (Useem and Kimball, 1987).  
In contrast, DiIulio finds that prison administrators who adhere to a control model of 
management can more effectively manage safe institutions.  This model is characterized 
by staff being required to closely adhere to policies and administrators who are 
committed to order maintenance and supervision of staff.  As a result of strict policies, 
supervision, and punishments, administrators are then able to effectively control staff 
misconduct (Stojkovic, 2003).    
                                                          
 
8
 This was a very real possibility because in 2011, the ADJC was in danger of being closed when the 
Governor of Arizona announced that the entire budget for the agency had been cut.  This did not occur 
because of pressures from county courts and juvenile justice advocates across the state who still viewed 
the agency as legitimate. 
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One potential outcome of formal controls being placed on organizations by 
external agencies is that they will develop stronger internal controls (Sherman, 1978).  
Sherman suggests three ways that employees in corrupt organizations can be deterred 
from misconduct: developing standards so that employees can be held accountable for 
violations, increased supervision of employees, and removing opportunities for 
corruption.  Following the CRIPA investigation, ADJC administrators grew highly 
committed to developing a managerial approach that closely resembled DiIulio’s control 
model to finally be able to control staff.  The recognition that the culture of the ADJC had 
failed to reform following the first consent decree led the department to enforce new 
methods of cultural change.  The revamping of an Investigations and Inspections unit, 
creation of a Quality Assurance program, and initiation of COMPSTAT all set the tone 
that the department was more committed to deterring misconduct.   
It was evident that the director during CRIPA perceived that previous reforms in 
the agency had not been sustained, due in large part to the poor culture of the agency.  As 
a result, misconduct was no longer going to be accepted in the agency.  By punishing 
staff who violated policies, monitoring employees through cameras, and more closely 
supervising officers, the department was able to effectively deter much of the misconduct 
that had occurred in the agency prior to CRIPA.  The control model persisted after the 
CRIPA monitors left, as administrators remained committed to maintaining control of 
line staff.  Although staff oftentimes felt as if they were going overboard, the clear 
outcome was that institutional staff were finally adhering to policies and training and 
juveniles were finally receiving appropriate programming.   
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 One concern is that a control model may not be the most effective model for an 
agency that is geared towards providing rehabilitative treatment towards juveniles.  In 
contrast to the findings of DiIulio, subsequent research has demonstrated the institutional 
harms associated with control models.  For example, research suggests that “job 
autonomy and participation in decision making are associated with enhanced 
occupational outcomes including higher job satisfaction, stronger commitment to the 
institution, greater effectiveness in working with inmates, and less job-related stress” 
(Wright, Saylor, Gilman, and Camp, 1997, p. 525).  Jail employees who are granted more 
discretion and control in their responsibilities have also exhibited lower turnover rates 
(Stohr, Lovrich, Menke, and Zupan, 1994).  In addition to making staff less satisfied with 
their jobs, control models of management have also been associated with increased 
disorder in prisons (Reisig, 1998), line staff imposing increased levels of control over 
inmates (Hepburn and Crepin, 1984), and difficulties in providing rehabilitation (Craig, 
2004). 
  The findings of the current dissertation confirm these arguments against DiIulio’s 
position.  Line staff repeatedly expressed how the controls that were placed on them 
following CRIPA have left them frustrated and made their jobs more difficult.  They 
report feeling targeted and singled out when any of their misbehaviors were reported to 
the agency.  Although the overall culture of the agency had reformed and the officers 
were working under better conditions, the punitive and preventive controls that were 
placed upon them were a sore spot in the cultural reforms.  While many acknowledged 
that the monitoring made them better, they also felt that it prevented them from providing 
some of the most critical elements of their jobs (e.g. counseling).   
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The resulting frustrations have contributed to the persistently high turnover rates 
that have plagued the agency since its inception.  In 2007, the turnover rate of line level 
officers was 56% and in 2009, the turnover rate of correctional officers was 50% 
(Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections, 2012a).  As a result of the high turnover in 
2009, the department began to develop a “succession planning program to mitigate the 
loss of institutional knowledge” (p. 4).  By 2012, the turnover rate of line officer was 
26%, suggesting that the agency has done a better job at officer retention (Arizona 
Department of Juvenile Corrections, 2012b).  They also continue to remind staff in 
training about the problems that occurred during CRIPA (e.g. suicides, sexual violence) 
to ensure that these do not become widespread problems again. 
 The formal controls that were implemented by ADJC administrators following 
CRIPA have had both positive and negative effects on the agency which can impact the 
sustainability of the reforms.  On the one hand, investigations, inspections, and quality 
assurance have caused staff to be more cognizant of actions that deprive juveniles of their 
civil rights (e.g. denying youths the opportunity to grieve conditions, holding juveniles in 
solitary confinement over a long period of time, physical abuse).  The fears of 
punishment have also deterred staff misconduct, as officers are aware they can easily be 
monitored through security cameras.  Sherman (1978) argues that being able to 
effectively implement both punitive and preventive controls are critical for establishing 
sustainable reforms.  However, officers may become burnt out because they do not feel 
they are trusted to do their own jobs.  The ADJC has consistently had extremely high 
turnover that can partially be attributed to the management tactics.  It is important that the 
ADJC is able to find a balance between the control practices that have benefitted them 
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over the past six years, while also doing so in such a manner that staff no longer feel 
attacked and singled out when misconduct does occur.   
 
Policy Implications 
CRIPA consent decrees have received criticism over their ability to provide 
thorough monitoring of institutions.  Most notably, Cornwell (1988) criticized CRIPA 
because “the consent decrees it has negotiated may appear, at first blush, to remedy 
alleged violations, but the failure to provide for effective enforcement both within and 
outside of the institution substantially undermines their utility” (852).  More specifically, 
CRIPA has limited authority over treatment that occurs outside of institutions (e.g. 
parole).  Furthermore, once an institution has come into compliance with a consent 
decree, the consent decree then ends and the DOJ has no authority to monitor or enforce 
reforms.  In other words, there is no requirement that the agency must face any form of 
monitoring following the cessation of the consent decree.  Although not negotiated under 
CRIPA, the failure of the Johnson v. Upchurch consent decree highlights this point well.  
In the case of the ADJC, the agency overall has adequately maintained the requirements 
of the CRIPA consent decree.  However, there are clear areas where the agency has 
slipped (e.g. suicide prevention, education).  During the negotiation of the consent 
decree, the DOJ could make one of the requirements of the consent decree be that an 
external agency must monitor the agency for a set period of time.  The inability to really 
enforce this requirement likely prevents the DOJ from making this a requirement.  
In the police literature, there is some evidence that external oversight can improve 
police legitimacy and reduce misconduct (Walker, 2001).  Similar research suggests that 
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outside oversight can ensure sustainable reforms in juvenile correctional facilities 
(Barton, 1994).  However, the way the CRIPA is currently written prevents any external 
monitoring following the end of the consent decree because once compliance is reached, 
the DOJ has no legal authority to force changes.  In the future, the CRIPA legislation 
should be reformed to include external oversight for a select period of time as a 
requirement.  These could be infrequent visits by local volunteers with direct knowledge 
of correctional practices (e.g. judges).  If an institution were found to be quickly reverting 
back to practices that deprived inmates of their civil rights, the DOJ would then be 
granted the authority to reactivate the consent decree.  In other words, it would not take 
reports to the DOJ by newspapers, family members, or prisoners that they are being 
abused at the facilities to initiate a new investigation.  This practice would also increase 
the amount of time that the institution would feel the pressure from the federal 
government to maintain the changes.  Chanin (2012) suggests that continued oversight in 
police departments “has the potential to reduce slippage or the loss of focus that naturally 
coincides with the absence of a legal mandate and/or the page of time” (p. 347).  It is 
likely that this would similarly impact a juvenile corrections institution, but this remains 
to be seen.   
 
Limitations 
 The current project was a useful first step at examining how correctional facilities 
are able to maintain long-term reforms following consent decrees through the Civil 
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act.  However, there were several limitations that 
could be addressed in future research.  First, the current study focused on one institution 
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that was experiencing a reform under CRIPA.  Over 130 correctional agencies have been 
under federal monitoring through CRIPA, so subsequent research is needed to determine 
how unique the changes and challenges at the ADJC are.  It is possible that the responses 
based upon the type of institution (e.g. juvenile corrections, prison, jail) may impact the 
methods of reform.  Limited research has found that consent decrees have had success at 
reforming juvenile detention facilities (Bazemore, Dicker, and Nyhan, 1994; Dale and 
Sanniti, 1993), but none has examined the process of state juvenile institutions reforming 
over a long period.  State institutions versus county institutions tend to be physically 
larger, have more employees, house more violent offenders, and provide treatment over a 
longer period, suggesting that their processes for reform would be much different from 
county institutions.  Similarly, the orientation of the institution (e.g. rehabilitative, crime 
control), may require differing responses to sustain reforms.  Related to this issue, similar 
research examining criminal justice reforms has compared reforms that occurred in 
multiple cities to more thoroughly examine the process and outcomes of interventions 
(Chanin, 2012; Sherman, 1978), suggesting the importance of comparing the current 
findings with other institutions.   
 Second, the measurement of cultural reforms was indirect and imprecise, as it was 
measured through the interviews with ADJC employees.  In contrast to quantitative 
research where variables are precisely measured using data, qualitative research consists 
of interviews and document reviews that do not allow for the precise measurement of 
concepts (Merriam, 1988).  However, the advantage to qualitative research is that it 
allows for an in depth investigation of a nuanced issue.  Because “precise measuring 
instruments and strictly defined variables [in qualitative research] somehow limit the 
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inquiry with the demarcations of the instruments and the definitions” (Ebrahim, 2013, p. 
199), research participants were allowed to guide their perceptions of culture (e.g. crime 
control oriented, rehabilitative, punitive).  Future quantitative research with clearly 
defined measures of culture are important to examine the process of cultural reforms in 
more depth. 
 Finally, this project is also limited because two important groups with insight into 
the reforms were not able to be interviewed: confined juveniles and the monitors who 
oversaw the reforms.  First, research suggests that correctional officers and inmates hold 
differing views towards the criminal justice system (Alpert and Hicks, 1977; Crouch and 
Alpert, 1980).  More specifically, these studies suggest that officers have more positive 
views about the criminal justice system, while inmates tend to be more critical of those 
employed in the criminal justice system.  Extending this perspective to officer versus 
inmate views of prison conditions and treatment, it is wholly possible that officers 
presented relatively optimistic views of conditions.  Capturing the perspectives of 
juvenile delinquents would provide important insight into the reception of the reforms.  
Second, because CRIPA monitors are constrained under a non-disclosure agreement 
following their service, their insights were unable to be captured for the current project.  
It would have been useful to compare their perspectives of the conditions immediately 
following both consent decrees.  This would have provided insight as to how the agency 
was responding differently to the second consent decree and the long-term impact of the 
reform efforts.  
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Future Research 
One factor that has contributed to the maintenance of reforms at the ADJC is the 
high level of internal controls that were imposed upon employees.  The high degree of 
internal monitoring adopted by the ADJC was criticized by respondents as being 
inappropriate for juvenile corrections (i.e. not appropriate for an agency focused on 
rehabilitation).  Others suggested that future directors may not be as committed to 
internal controls and could adopt new tactics.  In other words, the ADJC may be unique 
in the high degree of internal controls that were implemented following the consent 
decree.  Other agencies may adopt different tactics following consent decrees or lawsuits 
to make changes sustainable.  Future research should examine other tactics implemented 
by departments facing CRIPA interventions to determine effective methods for 
maintaining reforms. 
The primary focus of this dissertation has been on how agencies are able to 
sustain changes after consent decrees are lifted.  A related issue that is critical to 
understanding and improving DOJ responses to civil rights violations is to explore why 
some institutions face difficulties in having consent decrees lifted.  For example, the case 
of United States v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, aimed at improving the conditions of 
juvenile justice facilities, has not been resolved since 1994 (U.S. Department of Justice, 
2011).  Other institutions have been under CRIPAs since the mid-1980s.  Brooks (1996) 
argues that one of the reasons why facilities might not reform is because “unlike fining a 
corporation, when one branch of the government fines another branch of the government, 
there is not the same personal stake in the pecuniary loss” (p. 175).  Future research 
should explore if there are unique characteristics of institutions that make them more 
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difficult to reform (e.g. institution is large, political orientation of the community in 
which the institution is embedded within) and suggest policy implications to improve 
these.  These findings could guide future consent decrees to ensure that compliance with 
civil rights are met as quickly as possible.  
Future research should also examine how relationships between external agencies 
and the community influence the long-term changes in the agency.  Of the limited 
research examining the sustainability of reforms following consent decrees in juvenile 
facilities, one critical aspect of these reforms has been the involvement of judges, 
counties, and other community actors (Dale and Sanniti, 1993).  Police departments have 
also had more success following consent decrees when they have the support of external 
agencies and the community (e.g. community policing) (Chanin, 2012).   
The current dissertation briefly examined the impact that the loss of legitimacy by 
the institutional environment had on the number of juveniles sent to the ADJC following 
the consent decree.  However, the interactions between counties and juvenile justice 
agencies are more extensive than just the number of commitments.  More specifically, 
there is an exchange relationship occurring where counties temporarily send juveniles to 
state agencies.  The decision to commit juveniles is impacted by perceptions of 
conditions, but also by the appropriateness of placement, financial considerations, and 
rehabilitation are typically considered.  Similarly, there is always the expectation that the 
juveniles will eventually return to their counties, so having thorough and effective 
communication between counties and the state is critical for reentry.  For example, if 
counties were frequently committing juvenile misdemeanants who utilize state resources, 
but who are better able to be treated in their communities, this could impact the ability of 
  
220 
 
 
the state to provide effective services to all juveniles.  This type of scenario would require 
that a relationship exist between state and county agencies to examine alternatives to 
confinement.  Furthermore, it is critical that the general public perceives the agency as 
legitimate, as they have a direct influence on the legislature, which can in turn impact 
funding decisions for the agency. 
 
Conclusion 
 This study showed that correctional facilities that are forced to reform under the 
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act face challenges in the long-term 
sustainability of change.  Strategies that aide in the institutionalization of changes include 
reforming organizational culture and implementing internal controls over employees.  
The ability of the ADJC to sustain so many important changes six years after the consent 
decree was lifted indicates that these strategies positively affected the agency.  Agencies 
are also encouraged to reform because of pressures to appear legitimate in the 
institutional environment to avoid the loss of resources.  However, the adoption of highly 
punitive and preventive controls may have adverse effects on employees that could harm 
progress of the culture, the reform, and contribute to high officer turnover.  For an 
organization that has faced historically faced so many challenges, it is critical to maintain 
the support of the officers who have direct supervision over the confined juveniles.  
Overall, it is evident that the CRIPA is able to improve the conditions of correctional 
facilities, but achieving a long-term full adherence to required reforms has proved 
difficult.    
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Source 
Focus of 
Study Agency 
Impetus 
for 
Consent 
Decree Major Findings 
McMickle 
(2003) 
Police- 
Racial 
Profiling 
Pittsburgh 
Police 
Department, 
Steubenville 
Police 
Department, 
State Police 
of New 
Jersey, and 
Los Angeles 
Police 
Department DOJ 
McMickle reviews the 
responses of four police 
departments that entered 
into consent decrees with 
the DOJ for racial profiling.  
While McMickle found that 
some improvements were 
made because of the consent 
decrees, she finds the DOJ 
has multiple limitations.  
These include: the DOJ only 
acts after local and state 
attempts to reform have 
failed, the Civil Rights 
Division is limited in 
resources (e.g. litigators), 
and findings of 
investigations are rarely 
publicized.   
Davis, 
Henderson, 
Mandelstam, 
Ortiz, and 
Miller 
(2005) 
Police- 
Misconduct 
Pittsburgh 
Bureau of 
Police 
Class-
Action 
Lawsuit 
Davis and colleagues 
examined the changes made 
after the Pittsburgh Bureau 
of Police entered into a 
consent decree with the 
American Civil Liberties 
Union and the National 
Association for the 
Advancement of Colored 
People.  The consent decree 
was in response to reported 
misconduct, including 
excessive force, ineffective 
supervision of officers, 
improper searches/seizures, 
and other abusive practices.  
Overall it was concluded 
that the consent decree 
effectively reformed the 
agency.  Specifically, the 
reforms improved police 
accountability and 
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productivity and reduced 
misconduct.  However, 
many officers were 
dissatisfied that the agency 
had entered into a consent 
decree.  In response, there 
was less interaction with the 
public, which harmed 
community policing 
strategies. 
Kupferberg 
(2008) 
Police- 
Racial 
Profiling 
Los Angeles 
Police 
Department, 
New Jersey 
State 
Troopers, and 
New York 
Police 
Department DOJ 
Kupferberg's review of 
three police departments 
that entered into consent 
decrees with the DOJ found 
that there were no 
significant reductions in 
racial profiling four years 
after each department 
entered into a consent 
decree.  However, they 
argued that consent decrees 
were valuable for collecting 
data on profiling and 
informing the public of 
these practices. 
Stone, 
Foglesong, 
and Cole 
(2009) 
Police- 
Misconduct 
Los Angeles 
Police 
Department DOJ 
Stone and colleagues 
examined the consent 
decree between the LAPD 
and the DOJ in 2000, which 
arose in part because of the 
Rodney King beating.  They 
concluded that the 
department had made and 
sustained significant 
improvements, which was 
exhibited by increased 
satisfaction by the public, 
less frequent use of serious 
force, increased quality in 
police stops (e.g. an 
increased number of cases 
with felony charges filed by 
the D.A. ), and increased 
use of technology to combat 
crime. 
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Chanin 
(2012) 
Police- 
Pattern or 
Practice of 
Illegal 
Conduct 
Pittsburgh 
Police 
Bureau, 
Washington 
D.C. 
Metropolitan 
Police 
Department, 
Cincinnati 
Police 
Department, 
and Prince 
George's 
County 
Police 
Department DOJ 
Chanin reviews the 
implementation of consent 
decrees and their 
sustainability in four 
jurisdictions.  The 
endurance of changes across 
the four jurisdictions varied 
widely.  In Cincinnati, 
where complaints against 
the police decreased along 
with the officer use of force, 
internal accountability and a 
greater involvement of the 
community and officers 
were key to reforming 
departmental culture.  In 
contrast, law enforcement in 
Prince George's County was 
unsuccessful as is evidenced 
by excessive use of force 
and officer corruption.  
Jurisdictions where consent 
decrees were unsuccessful 
were characterized as 
having little external 
support, high turnover, little 
community involvement, 
poor leadership, no post-
reform evaluation, and poor 
external accountability. 
Dale and 
Sanniti 
(1993) 
Corrections- 
Changing 
Juvenile 
Detention 
Broward 
County 
Regional 
Juvenile 
Detention 
Center 
Class-
Action 
Lawsuit 
Dale and Sanniti found that 
the consent decree to 
improve conditions at the 
Broward County Regional 
Juvenile Detention Center 
improved as a direct result 
of the intervention.  
Improvements includes: 
elimination of 
overcrowding, improved 
food quality, increased 
quality of mental health 
services, and improved 
housing conditions.  In 
contrast to formal litigation, 
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they argue that the 
negotiated consent decree 
allowed for changes in the 
community as well.  By 
forming relationships with 
county administrators, the 
Center was able to provide a 
continuum of services upon 
release and create 
alternative detention 
programs. 
Bazemore, 
Dicker, and 
Nyhan 
(1994) 
Corrections- 
Officer 
Attitudes 
Broward 
County 
Regional 
Juvenile 
Detention 
Center 
Class-
Action 
Lawsuit 
Bazemore and colleagues 
found that litigation did 
influence officer attitudes 
towards treatment and 
rehabilitation, but failed to 
improve the "organizational 
climate" among detention 
staff.  They conclude that 
additional factors like wages 
and relationships with 
colleagues are more 
influential on organizational 
commitment and trust in 
supervisors. 
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<Insert Date> 
<Insert Contact Information > 
 
Dear <Insert Name >: 
I am a professor in the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Arizona State 
University.  I am conducting a research study to examine the investigation of the Arizona 
Department of Juvenile Corrections (ADJC) under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized 
Persons Act (CRIPA).  The investigation allows us to examine both the short and long 
term changes in the institution that resulted after the investigation. We propose a study 
plan with six purposes: 1.) Understand the processes leading to federal intervention; 2.) 
Understand the resulting changes in the immediate months after the CRIPA investigation; 
3.) Understand the status of ADJC’s progress prior to the current financial crisis; 4.) 
Understand the status of services and quality of care after a reduction of funding for the 
agency, 5) Understand how selected juvenile court jurisdictions perceive and respond to 
the changes and 6.) Understand changes to those supervised under community 
corrections. 
 
It is our goal to interview a wide group of people, including administrators of the ADJC 
regarding this project. I look forward to holding interviews with those who have insight 
into the investigation.  I am inviting your participation, which will involve an interview 
of approximately one hour at your location of employment or other desired location.  You 
will be asked to provide your opinion on the ADJC investigation, how you are involved 
in the investigation, and the long term effects of federal involvement.  Human Subjects 
protections require that I tell you that you have the right not to answer any question, you 
have the right to stop the interview at any time, your participation in this study is 
voluntary, and if you choose not to participate or to withdraw from the study at any time 
you may do so.  The possible/main benefits of your participation in the research are 
providing input as to impact that the CRIPA investigation had on the organization of 
ADJC and treatment of youths.  An evaluation of ADJC is important because it provides 
necessary insight into the process and outcomes of federal interventions of correctional 
facilities.  There are no foreseeable risks or discomforts for your participation. 
 
All information obtained in this study is strictly confidential. The results of this research 
study may be used in reports, presentations, and publications, but the researchers will not 
identify you.  Because confidentiality is of the utmost importance when conducting 
research, names and specific titles/positions of participants will not be reported.  Instead 
of directly identifying persons by name, more general terms will be used in the report to 
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describe the interviews (e.g. a representative from the Arizona Department of Public 
Safety).   
 
If you would like to participate in the study, or would like additional information, please 
contact Melanie Taylor at mtaylor9@asu.edu so that we may schedule a time to meet 
with one another.  Privacy is very important to us, so future reports will not bear any 
names, contact information, or other identifying information. 
 
If you have any questions about your rights as a subject/participant in this research, or if 
you feel you have been placed at risk, you can contact the Chair of the Human Subjects 
Institutional Review Board, through the ASU Office of Research Integrity and 
Assurance, at (480) 965-6788. Please let me know if you wish to be part of the study. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
Scott H. Decker 
Professor and Director 
School of Criminology and Criminal Justice 
Arizona State University 
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APPENDIX 3 
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL: ADJC 
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Interview Protocol ADJC 
Background Information 
1. Please identify your specific job and responsibilities?  
2. How long have you been in this job?  
3. What is your history of involvement with ADJC?  
a. Juveniles?  
b. Other relevant experience? 
Opinions on ADJC: 
1. Why do you believe the investigation occurred? 
2. Describe your perceptions of the ADJC prior to the investigation. 
a. In ADJC secure facilities? 
b. In community corrections? 
3. What changes have you seen occur to the agency over time? 
a. In ADJC secure facilities? 
b. In community corrections? 
Opinions on the CRIPA Investigation: 
1. What has been your role in the investigation?  
2. When did you learn about the investigation? How did you learn about it?  
3. How did the ADJC respond to the investigation?  
a. In ADJC secure facilities? 
b. In community corrections? 
4. Did you have the opportunity to express your opinions during the 
investigation?   
5. What are some notable changes that were a direct result of the federal 
intervention? 
Opinions on Changes Post-CRIPA 
1. How have these changes been sustained? 
a. In ADJC secure facilities? 
b. In community corrections? 
2. What are the pros/cons of the investigation? Can you be specific? Do you 
think it was a good idea?  
3. What areas still need to be improved upon? 
4. How has the potential for closure and budget shortfalls affected the progress 
made by the ADJC after the investigation? 
5. How has life at the ADJC changed for youths/staff since the investigation? 
6. How are others at your agency/department responding to the intervention? 
7. How have juveniles reacted to the investigation? 
8. Since the intervention, have there been changes in the services juveniles have 
been receiving?  Any additional programs? 
a. What services are lacking currently? 
b. How have special populations (e.g. sex offenders, those with mental 
illnesses) been treated since the investigation? 
9. What will the long term consequences/benefits of the investigation be for 
juveniles and staff?  
Additional Questions 
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1. How has the potential closure of the ADJC impacted the agency? 
2. Are there any other issues you would like to raise? 
3. Any other suggestions on who to discuss CRIPA investigation with? 
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APPENDIX 4 
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL: COUNTIES AND COMMUNITY 
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 Interview Protocol- County Corrections/Community Advocates 
 
Background Information 
1. Please identify your specific job and responsibilities?  
2. How long have you been in this job?  
3. What is your history of involvement with ADJC?  
a. Juveniles?  
b. Other relevant experience? 
Opinions on ADJC: 
1. What is the relationship between <INSERT AGENCY NAME HERE> and the 
ADJC?  - Is communication frequent between the two agencies? 
2. How does communication usually occur between your agency and ADJC? 
3. Were you or others in the department aware of conditions in ADJC prior to the 
CRIPA investigation?   
a. Did they raise concerns over any issues? 
Opinions on the CRIPA Investigation: 
1. What are some notable changes that were a direct result of the federal 
intervention?  
2. What changes have you noticed since the consent decree was lifted in 2007? 
a. How have these changes been sustained? 
b. What areas still need to be improved upon? 
3. Did you/your agency have the opportunity to express your opinions during the 
investigation?   
4. At meetings and committees you have been involved in, what sense do you get as 
to how CRIPA has affected juvenile justice in Arizona?   
a. What have you heard the conditions at the agency are currently like? 
5. Are there any concerns that juvenile courts have had over sending certain 
juveniles to ADJC in light of the investigation (e.g. those with mental health 
issues)? 
Opinions on Changes Post-CRIPA 
1. Has the <INSERT AGENCY NAME HERE> made any changes in sending 
juveniles to the ADJC because of conditions at the ADJC? 
2. Since the intervention, have there been changes in the services juveniles have 
been receiving?  Any additional programs? 
3. What services are lacking currently? 
4. How have special populations (e.g. sex offenders, those with mental illnesses) 
been treated since the investigation? 
Additional Questions 
1. How has the potential closure of the ADJC been received by <INSERT AGENCY 
NAME HERE> county probation? 
2. Are there any other issues you would like to raise? 
3. Any other suggestions on who to discuss CRIPA investigation with? 
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APPENDIX 5 
TIMELINE OF THE ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE CORRECTIONS 
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Historical Timeline for the Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections 
 
1901 
 Territorial Industrial School created in Benson, AZ to confine juveniles 
 
1927 
 Fort Grant School was formed 
 
1968 
 Arizona Department of Corrections takes over jurisdiction of juveniles 
 
1967 
 Arizona Youth Center opened in Tucson (Renamed Catalina Mountain in 1980) 
 
1972 
 Adobe Mountain opens for girls 
 
1974 
 Adobe Mountain begins to house boys and girls 
 
1975 
 A correctional officer is killed at Adobe Mountain by juveniles 
 
1986 
 A juvenile files a civil rights lawsuit that leads to the Johnson v. Upchurch 
consent decree (April, 6) 
 
1987 
 Johnson v. Upchurch becomes a class action lawsuit (July, 27) 
 
1988 
 Catalina Mountain opens  
 
1989 
 Governor Mofford creates a commission to examine the agency (September, 22) 
 
1990 
 The ADJC is formed after separating from the ADC (July, 1) 
 The first director, Carol Hurtt, is appointed from the ADC 
 Fifteen juveniles escaped from the ADJC; One is killed after crashing a stolen car 
(July) 
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1991 
 Name of agency changed from the ADJC to the Department of Youth Treatment 
and Rehabilitation 
 The director reports that the agency is facing challenges with the budget and is 
trying to focus money on the most troubled juveniles (April, 5) 
 Director Hurtt resigns and Eugene Moore is hired as interim Director 
 John Arredondo from the Texas Youth Commission is appointed director 
(October 30) 
 
1993 
 The state enters into a consent decree to resolve Johnson v. Upchurch; is required 
to make 109 reforms throughout the agency (May, 5) 
 A play using real guns was performed at Black Canyon School (November, 13) 
 
1994 
 A guard is suspended after writing a complaint to the director and Governor about 
the play stating that the play was inappropriate (January, 3)  
 Governor of Arizona fires Director Arredondo and he is replaced by Eugene 
Moore (January, 6) 
 Federal monitors for Johnson v. Upchurch consent decree report that the state is 
coming into compliance, but believe the agency may not be able to provide 
adequate treatment to juveniles (December 11) 
 
1995 
 Department changes its name back to the ADJC (January, 19) 
 
1996 
 Federal Judge Bilby orders that the ADJC cannot accept any more juveniles 
because they are over capacity (April, 10) 
 
1997 
 Bilby again orders the ADJC to comply with population caps (January 17) 
 The ADJC announces that they will not comply with the population caps set by 
the federal judge (January 19) 
 Bilby sets a hearing to examine the ADJC being in contempt of the Johnson 
consent decree (February 7) 
 ADJC begins to release juveniles to comply with population caps (February 15) 
 ADJC continues to release juveniles to comply with population caps (February 
19) 
 ADJC receives nearly half a million dollars in fines because of overcrowding 
(March 21) 
 Judge Bilby agrees to postpone the fine (April 1) 
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 Judge Bilby allows the consent decree to expire and does not require the agency 
to pay fines (May 5) 
 A grand jury reports the ADJC released 13 dangerous juveniles early (October 3) 
 Director Eugene Moore retires and Deputy Director David Gaspar is appointed 
director (December) 
 
1998 
 The ADJC proposes to have juveniles housed at the Arizona State Prison 
Complex in Tucson (March 25) 
 Bilby criticizes ADJC’s attempt to house juveniles in state prison facility (April 
1998) 
 ADJC begins to house 15 boys at the prison facility (June, 9) 
 
1999 
 ADJC reports their recidivism rates has been decreasing (May, 13) 
 A youth rights ombudsman at the ADJC writes a memo to the ADJC director that 
conditions for juveniles were unsanitary and unsafe (May, 19) 
 
2000 
 Black Canyon is used solely to house the female ADJC population; Units are 
opened that are specifically designed for parole violators (March) 
 
2001 
 A juvenile at the ADJC was reportedly punched by an officer (January)  
 The New Times releases the article “The Kids are Not Alright”; Arizona 
community leaders ask Governor Hull to create a task force to review conditions 
at the ADJC (July, 5) 
 The parent of the juvenile who was punched by an officer write a letter of 
complaint to Governor Hull (October) 
 The New Times releases the article “Learning Disorder” documenting the failing 
education system at the ADJC (December, 13) 
 The New Times releases the article “The Kids are Still not Alright” where one of 
the Johnson monitors says that another investigation of the agency is needed and 
that the agency is hiding its problems (December, 20) 
 
2002 
 Freedom and Hope cottages at the ADJC are on lockdown for over one week; A 
youth rights advocate reports that the juveniles are being deprived of their civil 
rights in numerous ways (e.g. not providing juveniles with exercise, 
overcrowding, high temperatures) (March) 
 Director Gaspar is a candidate for the 2002 American Correctional Association 
Director election (April, 1) 
 A male juvenile commits suicide at the ADJC; The juvenile had been in his cell 
for a week and made reports about inappropriate touching by staff (April, 11) 
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 The Department of Justice informs Arizona that it will be investigating the ADJC 
(June, 2) 
 Director Gaspar informs staff that they will be investigated (June, 18) 
 The New Times releases the article “Federal Inquiry: Justice Department 
Examines Conditions At State Youth Facilities” (June, 22) 
 The Tempe chapter of Amnesty International met to discuss violations at the 
ADJC (June, 26) 
 A second male juvenile commits suicide (July) 
 Governor Hull reports that the ADJC may receive a 10% budget cut (August, 30) 
 DOJ consultants conducted on-site investigations of ADJC facilities (October, 1-
4) 
 Janet Napolitano is elected as the Governor of Arizona (November, 5) 
 Director Gaspar reports that the proposed budget cut to the ADJC of 5% will 
result in the early release of juveniles and failure to provide them with community 
care (November, 15) 
 
2003 
 DOJ consultants conducted on-site investigations of ADJC facilities (January, 13) 
 A third male juvenile commits suicide at the ADJC (March, 23) 
 The New Times releases the article “Suicide Watch” about the dangers of suicide 
at the agency and the DOJ investigation (April, 3) 
 The Girl Scouts and Catholic Social Service DIGNITY Programs partnered with 
ADJC to provide programs for girls on prostitution and drug diversion (July, 9) 
 Director Gaspar retires and is replaced by Interim Director Michael Branham 
(September, 30) 
 DOJ consultants conducted on-site investigations of ADJC facilities (October, 22-
25) 
 DOJ consultants conducted on-site investigations of ADJC facilities (December 
3-6 and 17-20) 
 
2004 
 The DOJ releases its findings letter to Governor Napolitano outlining the 
deprivations of civil rights at the ADJC (January, 23) 
 The New Times releases the article “Juvenile Offenses” about the findings of the 
CRIPA report (January, 29) 
 An ADJC officer is arrested for having sexual relations with a juvenile inmate 
(February, 26) 
 Napolitano wrote a letter to Alexander Acosta, the Assistant Attorney General.  In 
it she states that she is committed to reforming the ADJC.  She states how they 
are currently making changes and she has formed a task force to provide 
oversight.  (March, 10) 
 Michael Branham is named as director (March, 11) 
 Governor Napolitano and CRIPA monitors tour ADJC to review changes (March, 
22) 
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 A former ADJC officer pleads guilty to having sexual relations with a juvenile 
inmate (July) 
 The Governor of Arizona tours Catalina Mountain School (August, 16) 
 Governor Napolitano suggests she wants to avoid a lawsuit with the federal 
government (August, 17) 
 Arizona negotiates with the DOJ over consent decree (September) 
 Memorandum of Agreement to reform the ADJC is signed (September, 15) 
 A second officers if found guilty of sexual assault (October) 
 
2005 
 The first semi-annual CRIPA report finds that the ADJC is in substantial 
compliance with 23 provisions, partial compliance with 91 provision, non-
compliance with 9 provisions, and did not rate 13 provisions (March, 15) 
 Dateline runs a story on the ADJC, with a partial focus on the CRIPA (August, 4) 
 The second semi-annual CRIPA report finds that the ADJC is in substantial 
compliance with 55 provisions, partial compliance with 70 provision, and non-
compliance with 1 provision (September, 15) 
 
2006 
 The third semi-annual CRIPA report finds that the ADJC is in substantial 
compliance with 107 provisions, partial compliance with 19 provision, and non-
compliance with 0 provisions (March, 15) 
 The ADJC is sued by a juvenile who was solicited by an officer (April, 12) 
 The fourth semi-annual CRIPA report finds that the ADJC is in substantial 
compliance with 118 provisions, partial compliance with 10 provision, and non-
compliance with 0 provisions (September, 15) 
 The New Times releases the article “Teenage Wasteland” about the potential for a 
permanent oversight committee 
 
2007 
 Juvenile Detention Task Force established to review AZ Auditor General’s 
Performance Audit Report (February, 13) 
 The fifth semi-annual CRIPA report finds that the ADJC is in substantial 
compliance with 120 provisions, partial compliance with 3 provision, and non-
compliance with 0 provisions (March, 15) 
 The American Friends Service Committee in Arizona released “Buried Alive: 
Solitary Confinement in Arizona’s Prisons and Jails.”  This report strongly 
criticized the ADJC for their use of solitary confinement. (May) 
 The ADJC responded to the “Buried Alive” report, claiming that many of the 
allegations made in the report were either false, or no longer true, as their policies 
had changed. 
 The DOJ files to dismiss the consent decree with the ADJC (September, 14) 
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 The sixth semi-annual CRIPA report finds that the ADJC is in substantial 
compliance with 60 provisions, partial compliance with 0 provision, and non-
compliance with 0 provisions (September, 15) 
 DOJ announces that the ADJC is now in full compliance with CRIPA 
(September, 21) 
 
2008 
 Representatives from the National Associations for Child and Teenage Protection 
in France visited ADJC to learn how they can be successful at providing a tough 
on crime approach along with rehabilitation. (February, 7) 
 An ADJC employee is assaulted by juveniles trying to escape the safe schools 
(September, 4) 
 Therapy dogs are being used in the mental health unit at Black Canyon 
(September, 17) 
 
2009 
 A male juvenile at Adobe is found unconscious while trying to hang himself 
(February, 14) 
 A female juvenile at Black Canyon was found trying to commit suicide by 
strangling herself with a shirt, but was prevented from doing so by staff 
intervention (April, 3) 
 A male juvenile tried to commit suicide by tying a towel to his feet and neck, but 
was prevented from doing so by staff intervention (April, 4) 
 A female juvenile is found cutting herself with staples (April, 14) 
 A male juvenile is found cutting himself with a staple and hitting his head against 
bars (May, 17) 
 Mental health unit for juveniles at the Arizona State Hospital is closed because it 
was reportedly being used less frequently (September, 11) 
 Auditor General releases performance report about the ADJC (September, 17) 
 A female juvenile left in the bathroom alone is found with severe cuts 
(September, 21) 
 The Arizona Republic releases the article “Arizona’s Juvenile Jails Free of 
Suicides Since ‘03” (September, 29) 
 Eagle Point School and units at Adobe Mountain and Catalina Mountain are 
closed (December, 30) 
 
2010 
 Arizona Governor Jan Brewer announces proposal to close the ADJC (January) 
 Arizona counties report that closing the ADJC would make it difficult for them to 
provide services to juveniles (March) 
 An ADJC officer commits suicide (May) 
 A male juvenile at the ADJC commits suicide after being transferred from a 
mental health unit to a unit for violent juveniles (May, 25) 
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 At an Arizona Juvenile Justice Commission meeting it is announced that the 
ADJC will likely not be closing, but could still be privatized (September, 16) 
 Joint House-Senate hearing resulted in the recommendation to keep ADJC open 
(December, 6) 
2011 
 A boy at Catalina Mountain School was ordered released after he was reportedly 
assaulted while in custody (March, 5) 
 Brewer announced that Branham was stepping down and that the Deputy Director 
of the Arizona Department of Corrections, Charles Flanagan, would be appointed 
as Director (June 10) 
 Director Flanagan announces that Catalina Mountain School will be closing in an 
effort to cut down on costs (July, 12) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
